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CHAPTER I 
t 
THE CONTROVERSY OVER DETENTE 
On March 1, 1976, President Gerald Ford announced that 
t 
he would no longer use the word "detente" to describe the 
state of United States foreign policy, and specifically, 
the conduct of American policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. 
Rather, he stated in an interview with Murray Marder of the 
washington Post, he would substitute the term "peace through 
strength." 1 What had occurred to cause an American Presi-
dent, who had closely collaborated with the chief architect 
t 
of detente, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, to terminate 
not only the usage of the word, but perhaps question the 
policy as well? After all, President Ford had wholehearted-
ly endorsed Kissinger's efforts, penned his signature to the 
Vladivostok Accords in 1974, and signed the Helsinki Agree-
ments in 1975 at the conclusion of the Conference on Securi-
ty and Cooperation in Europe. 
A great debate had been building in the foreign policy 
establishment since the time of the VietNam War. This ques-
tioning of the conduct of American foreign policy challenged 
the continuation of the conventional post-war strategy of 
politically and militarily combating the spread of Communism, 
1. The Washington Post, March 3, 1976, p.1. 
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and because of its massive strength second only to the Unit-
ed States, containing the power of the Soviet Union. With 
the advent of Richard Nixon to Presidential power, and his 
reliance on Dr. Henry Kissinger as his chief foreign policy 
adviser, new policy initiatives were begun to correct what 
was perceived by them to be a faulty and outdated analysis 
of the global competition between the two superpowers. On 
the one hand was the ideological threat of Marxism that ema-
nated principally from the Soviet Union, but was by no means 
limited only to Moscow. On the other hand were the basic 
political questions of how to most effectively utilize the 
strength of the United States in areas where the two nuclear 
giants were rivals for power. 
The main concern of this debate was the question of 
the national survival of the United States. A policy that 
failed to exhibit an American willingness to use its power 
to its best advantage could provide the Soviets with the op-
portunity to drastically increase their own power. As such, 
any new policy would have to delicately analyze Soviet goals 
and intentions, and what the projection of Soviet strength 
would mean to the existing power balance. The debate that 
would ensue encompassed not only speculation about Soviet 
purposes, but also the manner by which the United States ap-
proached the methods of modifying its prior strategic poli-
cy. 
t 
What were the origins of this controversy on detente 
3 
that would provoke such a statement from President Ford? 
something must surely have occurred for so explicit a state-
ment that seemed to repudiate a policy that had character-
ized American foreign affairs since Richard Nixon assumed 
t 
office. To President Ford, the policy of detente could not 
only be responsible for the loss of millions of votes in an 
election year, but could possibly imply that the national 
security had been endangered by a misinterpretation of the 
Soviet Union's willingness to reach an accommodation with 
its American rival. Secretary of State Kissinger had re-
quested a national debate, and in this regard the comments 
from political observers were willingly offered. Before 
one can delve into the sources of the controversy, a brief 
t 
generalized account of why detente was attractive to the 
United States and the Soviet Union is in order. 
Foreign policy observers have expressed a number of 
opinions delineating the factors that influenced an alterna-
• t 
tion of policy that was labeled "detente." This thesis will 
concern itself with a number of these factors. One factor 
that seemed to predominate over other concerns was the com-
mitment by American and Soviet officials to avoid nuclear 
war. Since the end of World war II, the United States and 
the Soviet Union have been locked in an ideological and po-
litical-military struggle on a global scale. The Soviets 
have stated the intention to perpetuate their Marxist dog-
rna, and to amass all the means in their power to spread its 
4 
appeal world-wide. The United States had made an equally 
determined commitment to check the furtherance of this dog-
rna, whose purpose its practitioners quite emphatically 
state, is to eliminate America's political and economic 
system. The capability to destroy civilized existence with 
nuclear weapons is another factor that has made the politi-
cal and military struggle particularly dangerous. 
With the advent of the atomic bomb and the means at the 
disposal of both sides to deliver the instrument of destruc-
tion, Moscow and washington had to weigh every political 
' move in the light of this awesome alternative. Detente was 
the conclusion drawn from thirty years of unceasing enmity 
by both sides, that a Third World War should be avoided. 
Secretary Kissinger has written: 
Each of us (the United States and the Soviet Union) has 
thus come into possession of power singlehandedly capable 
of exterminating the human race. Paradoxically, this 
very fact, and the global interests of both sides, create 
a certain commonality of outlook, a sort of interdepend-
ence for survival between the two of us. Although we 
compete, the conflict will not admit of resolution by 
victory in the classical sense. We are compelled to co-
exist. We have an inescapable obligation to build joint-
ly a structure for peace. Recognition of this reality 
is the beginning of wisdom for a sane and effective for-
eign policy today.2 
Both the United States and the Soviet Union expressed 
themselves in favor of avoiding this terrible catastrophe. 
2. Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy. New York: 
W. w. Norton and Company (1974), p.l41. 
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some type of arrangement had to be made by which the nuclear 
arms race would be brought under control. The fear that nu-
clear weapons had created was not just in its massive de-
structiveness, but that political conflicts could possibly 
emerge in which one of the superpowers would utilize its 
nuclear capability. Out of this environment, the Nixon 
and Ford administrations, and their counterpart Secretary 
' Brezhnev, sought a detente between their respective nations 
to reduce the threat of nuclear war and its consequent arms 
buildup. 
' Detente struck at the very heart of this most complex 
dilemma: How could the United States and the Soviet Union 
co-exist without resorting to war, and yet realize that they 
will continue to remain rivals for global power? Each side 
' would be favorably inclined toward detente, but with certain 
conditions. The two superpowers adhered to certain views 
and policies that seemed unlikely to change. For example, 
the Soviet Union was willing to partake in negotiations on 
strategic arms, and accept inducements such as economic and 
technological assistance, but not at the expense of ending 
its ideological mission, nor its concerns about a nuclear 
China, and the withdrawal of its political and military mus-
cle in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Likewise, the 
United States was inclined toward a reduction in tension -
' detente - but not at the prospect of abandoning its politi-
' cal and military allies. Detente would be accepted, but on 
6 
certain conditions understood by each side. 
' To summarize, the United States would accept a detente 
with the Soviet Union because of the gigantic costs that the 
political and military rivalry between these two superpowers 
had created, and because of the diminishing American willing-
ness and ability to contain Communism, except in specific 
areas where direct challenges to American security had to be 
repulsed. The post-war American commitment to resist Commu-
nism through the policy of containment was believed to have 
been an effective strategy. With American assistance, West-
ern Europe had recovered from the devastation of the Second 
World War, and was protected by the American nuclear umbrel-
la, along with the conventional forces of NATO. The Commu~ 
nists had been defeated in a civil war in Greece, Turkey was 
a secure partner in the Atlantic Alliance, West Berlin re-
sisted Soviet pressure to starve the city into submission, 
and American forces acting under a mandate from the United 
Nations had successfully resisted a Soviet-sponsored North 
Korean invasion against South Korea. In numerous other re-
gions of the globe, the United States policy of containment 
was rating high marks. But then came VietNam, and with it 
a great policy dislocation. Through almost a decade of 
fighting in the jungles of Viet Nam, America paid a terrible 
price in attempting to extricate itself from the Asian in-
volvement, without appearing to have foresaken our political 
and military commitment to that country and our allies. 
7 
Viet Nam was the most challenging event of American 
foreign policy since World War II, not solely because of the 
protracted military commitment, but because of the extended 
political ramifications our involvement there will have for 
years to come. The French historian and political observer, 
Andre Fontaine, penned a fitting commentary on America's in-
volvement. 
The United States lost in Viet Nam their finest title to 
fame, that of the champion of the right of peoples and 
individuals to self-determination. But it is not only 
abroad that its image has deteriorated. How many of the 
hundreds of thousands of well-fed and overequipped young 
men who have been fighting in the rice paddies for a 
year against men, women and sometimes children whose 
emaciation and reproachful gaze perpetually faced them 
with the question l;vhy they were there, have returned 
cynical, disgusted, drug-addicts, or at the very least 
disillusioned with the American dream on which they were 
raised? Nothing has been so instrumental in the profound 
crisis tha~ has af§licted the United States for some 
years as V1et Nam. 
For a decade, the debate over our involvement in Viet 
Nam would call into question a number of tenets basic to 
American philosophy. · Politically, the involvement meant 
America's concentrating primarily on VietNam to the detri-
ment of our ability to act with political and military deci-
siveness in the Middle East and Europe. An America stifled 
and bogged down in Viet Nam would provide the Soviets the op-
portunity to exploit this situation. 
3. LeMonde (Paris) , Hay 13, 1972. 
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There were other inducements, which will be mentioned 
later in this paper, such as the possibility of a decreased 
military budget, an improved economy, and an opportune mo-
ment to concentrate more on national affairs. All these 
exerted a combined effect over a period of a decade to in-
' duce a detente. 
' What of the soviet Union? What factors made detente 
acceptable to it? A brief mention of these inducements 
were: the Soviet Union's great desire for Western tech-
nology; the need to purchase food to feed a population which 
is unable to adequately feed itself; the political and mili-
tarily significant question of how to respond to a nuclear 
China, unwilling to acknowledge Soviet hegemony in Asia, or 
Soviet ideology in the Communist movement; and finally, the 
need for security and the acceptance of the status quo in 
Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union was to make it explicitly 
clear that they would be favorably disposed to negotiating 
with the United States on a broad range of subjects vital to 
each nation. To this end, the Soviets also made it known 
' that their acceptance of detente did not include the abandon-
ment of their Marxist faith. Simply stated: the Soviets 
' would assent to a detente with their capitalist rival because 
of the nature of the political and military questions in-
volved; but for the United States to assume that the Soviets 
would no longer follow their Marxist-Leninist principles was 
an analysis that could possibly lead to a false sense of 
9 
security with dangerous implications. 
' This brief introduction to detente leads one to the 
roots of the controversy itself. Any political question in 
a pluralistic society is bound to provoke lively debate, and 
' the topic of detente is a vivid example. Professor Stephen 
P. Gibert 1n Soviet Images of America lists three types of 
' ' detentists: "the 'orthodox detente' supporters, who have 
controlled American foreign policy since 1969, the 'revision-
' . 4 ist detente' school and the 'rea11sts.'" These are three 
labels which this paper will use to a great extent in de-
scribing the positions of various individuals and groups in-
' volved in the detente controversy. Because of the Soviet-
American competition in the international arena since the 
termination of World war II, opinions in the United States 
concerning Soviet actions, and the American response to them, 
' have made the question of detente the foremost concern in the 
field of American foreign policy. 
When a controversial political decision is made the 
responsibility for that action is in many cases attributed 
' to an individual. It is axiomatic that whenever detente is 
mentioned in any fashion, the name of Dr. Henry Kissinger is 
inevitably linked to that political persuasion. Even though 
President Richard Nixon possessed his own world views, he 
W8uld not have allowed the "influence of the gray eminence, 
4. Stephen P. Gibert, Soviet Images of America (New York: 
Crane, Russak, and Company, 1977), p.16. 
10 
the obscure, German-born ex-professor, ••. unless both the 
president and his adviser viewed the world through the same 
5 
spectacles." 
It would be commented on by many observers that Henry 
Kissinger was the architect and initiator, and Richard Nixon 
the willing actor whose views were not too dissimilar. Each 
complemented the other. Indeed, it lS unlikely that Kissin-
ger would ever have tasted of power had it not been for 
Richard Nixon, who noticed that Kissinger's views on interna-
tional politics and the utilization of power on a vast scale 
were similar to his own. It is at this point that a chapter 
devoted to Dr. Kissinger is in order. One cannot examine 
the policy without studying the architect, and thus an ex-
ploration of Kissinger's thesis. 
5. Raymond Aron, The Imperial Republic. (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentlce Hall, Inc., 1974), p.130. 
CHAPTER II 
KISSINGER: A VIEW OF POWER IN A NUCLEAR WORLD 
To analyze Henry Kissinger's theory of political pow-
er, one can begin by taking a step back in time to the dif-
ficulties that faced the European world 1n the wake of Bona-
parte's defeat. This is essential in attempting to gain a 
clearer understanding of Kissinger's opinions, particularly 
in view of Kissinger's fascination with one of the greatest 
statesmen of Nineteenth Century Europe, the Austrian Foreign 
• Minister, Prince Clement Metternich. What was there about 
Metternich and the post-Bonaparte world of European politics 
that attracted Kissinger's attention? 
The Congress of Vienna was a landmark event in politi-
cal history. That assemblage of diplomats attempted not on-
ly to redefine the borders of states, replacing Napoleon's 
actions of political power predicated upon military conquest, 
but also to negotiate issues that were directed toward creat-
ing a stable European order. One of the conditions for a 
guaranteed peace was the legitimacy of all European govern-
ments, and a shared balance of interests. With Great Britain, 
France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia the primary contributors, 
the Congress was convened to redistribute the balance of pow-
er in Europe on some permanent basis to avoid further con-
11 
12 
flicts. 
Metternich's prime political mission was to negotiate 
the re-establishment of the Continental Order in what he was 
to describe as the community of European interests. It was 
from the political and military influences by the strongest 
European powers that Metternich sought a limitation of state 
power, and with that prospect, a true "Concert of Europe." 
The problem that confronted Metternich was how to temper the 
constant strivings for increased power and territory that in-
evitably led to European war, with a more lasting order, and 
with it the "sacred principle of legitimacy." Metternich 
strove for what was politically advantageous for Austria, 
specifically, and for the future of European politics in a 
broad sense. A balance of power within the community of 
European interests would be possible to Metternich only if 
each state respected the sovereignty of the others, thereby 
limiting its foreign desires. In a passage that can describe 
his political philosophy as it regards the interests of the 
European state system, Metternich wrote: 
Politics is the science of the vital interests of states 
in its widest meaning. Since, however, an isolated state 
no longer exists and is found only in the annals of the 
heathen world •.. we must always view the Society of States 
as the essential condition of the modern world. The 
great axioms of political science proceed from the know-
ledge of the true political interests of all states; it 
is upon these general interests that rest that guarantee 
of respect for acquired rights •.. constitutes in our time 
the essence of politics, of which diplomacy is merely 
the daily application. Between the two there is in my 
13 
1 
opinion the same difference as between science and art. 
As a graduate student at Harvard, Kissinger's doctoral dis-
sertation was concerned with the political actions of Met-
ternich, and the British Foreign Secretary, Viscount Castle-
reagh, at the Congress of Vienna. His doctoral dissertation 
was published in 1957 under the title A World Restored: Met-
ternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822. 
As a scholar preoccupied with the dimensions of inter-
national politics in our nuclear age, his inquiry into the 
maneuvers and ramifications of the Congress of Vienna offered 
him a focus of study conducive to deciphering any similari-
ties that might appear with those in the present age. The 
parallels, of course, were quite obvious. Europe after Hit-
ler's defeat resembled to a marked extent the Europe after 
Napoleon's demise. Without cataloguing the parallels, one 
similarity that concerned Kissinger was how the statesmen of 
the Nineteenth Century approached the reconstruction of a 
stable European system. The political question that even-
tually faced the statesmen of the victorious nations was how 
to devise a stable European order out of the fragile alli-
ances they had entered into for military considerations. 
In describing Metternich and his balance of power ad-
vocacy, one may inquire in what way did this influence Henry 
Kissinger? There are parallels that can be observed compar-
1. Harold Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna (New York: Har-
court, Brace, Jovanovich, 1974), p.39. 
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ing the political world of post-Bonaparte Europe with the 
global - or more specifically European - situation of the 
post-World War II era. Whatever the similarities may be be-
tween those days and the present, one overriding factor ex-
ists today that was absent in the time of Metternich: a 
nation, the Soviet Union, with a world view which it propa-
gates aggressively so as to change the present political or-
der. 
Metternich was well aware of the political and military 
ambitions of a Russia under the rule of the unstable Alexan-
der, and how a Russia yearning for more power in Central and 
Eastern Europe could threaten European order. For decades 
Russia has been stifled at various times in its quest for 
greater political influence by the weight of the powers of 
approximate military strength - Prussia, Poland, Austria. 
Each at intervals was militarily prepared enough and suffi-
ciently motivated on a cultural, national and religious basis 
to adequately resist and neutralize - and in same cases de-
feat - a Russia with covetous ambitions that was seeking ter-
ritorial security. The balance of power to which Metternich 
so adhered was achieved only because of the nature of the 
powers involved. Prussia, Austria, Russia, France and Great 
Britain were of comparable military strength. Each nation 
was capable of defending itself, and realized that the deser-
tion of one side to another side could disturb a precious 
balance. As a result of World Wars I and II, the balance of 
15 
power, which had secured European order for one hundred 
years as inaugurated at the Congress of Vienna, was obliter-
ated, thereby creating a political situation altogether dif-
ferent from anything that came before, and proving the 
prophecy of de Tocqueville: Russia and America would emerge 
as the world's two great powers. 
Kissinger's fascination with Metternich and his curi-
osity regarding the deliberations and strategems contrived 
at the Congress would provide a beginning point at which to 
explore in further detail the mechanisms through which 
states construct foreign policy. Beyond this critique of 
scholarship there existed Kissinger's inquisitive appetite 
for discerning how men function in the political world of 
their peers, particularly those statesmen and diplomats on 
the international plane. This is indeed the actual workings 
of politics, the reality which transcends all other factors. 
History ultimately evaluates and reevaluates the success or 
failure of any diplomatic enterprise through the passing of 
time. Metternich's conduct and those of his peers at Vienna 
are no exception. 
Kissinger's thesis, in one respect resembling that of 
Metternich, places a great emphasis on equilibrium and sta-
bility if international order is to be achieved. As Metter-
nich evaluated the political and military questions that con-
fronted a number of powers after the abdication of Napoleon, 
Kissinger viewed the present order since World War II as a 
16 
world chaotically structured, with fewer powerful actors 
able to shape their own destiny because of a Soviet-American 
bipolar balance of power. No longer do the nations of Eu-
rope exercise their prime political and military power as 
was their privilege prior to World war II. What Dr. Kis-
singer has noticed - and he is by no means the only observer 
of this political phase - is that the balance of power may 
not be the sole determinant of a stable system. Indeed, it 
may very well be an unstable condition. To this end, when 
one nation ends its partnership with other nations for what-
ever reason, the balance of power is disturbed, creating an 
unstable condition that can lead to possible military and 
political crisis. The concept of the balance of power relies 
on a number of powers, each somewhat approximate in strength, 
each having the capacity to counter-balance the outcome of 
the scheme of things. Thus, Kissinger believes, it is dif-
ficult to achieve equilibrium and stability in a world that 
is militarily bipolar, functioning within a world community 
that is politically multipolar. 
In his American Foreign Policy, Kissinger wrote of the 
international distribution of power in the militarily bipo-
lar, yet politically multipolar age, as having put an end to 
the political dominance of the two superpowers. Although the 
superpowers continue to possess the greatest of military 
strength, this condition remarkably enough "has actually en-
couraged political multipolarity. Weaker allies have good 
17 
reason to believe that their defense is in the overwhelming 
2 interest of their senior partner." Because the two super-
powers require political and military allies, these weaker 
states recognize that their political importance has grown 
disproportionate to their military strength. The superpow-
ers desire their support, and therefore tolerate an amount 
of independence that traditionally would not have been ac-
ceptable. Kissinger views political multipolarity as con-
tributing to a state of instability that interferes with the 
necessity of international order. Such a situation poses 
difficulties in the search to find some way toward reaching 
equilibrium, particularly "among states widely divergent in 
. d . . 3 values, goals, expectat1ons an prev1ous exper1ence." 
The Twentieth Century has seen a drastic deviation 
from the political world prior to our time. Europe was 
ruled by a number of states, each attempting to gain in-
creased power and influence. Whatever the sources of con-
flict that pitted Russia against Prussia, or Austria, or 
Britain versus France or the Ottomans, these aberrations of 
policy affected only to a minute degree - if at all - the 
situation in China, or Japan, indeed, hardly even touching 
America. Foreign policy was basically the application of 
political and military strengths of nations in areas within 
2. Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy (Expanded Edi-
tion; New York: w. w. Norton and Company, 1974), pp.56-57. 
3. ~., Pp.56-57. 
18 
close proximity to one another. Kissinger believes that it 
has been the revolutionary nature of the Twentieth Century 
that politics is now performed on a global stage; that mili-
tary might can be disposed anywhere by a number of powers; 
and that the emerging nations from the colonial past have 
created new pm..rer centers of their own. 
The emergence of the nuclear age and the outgrowth of 
atomic weaponry; the rising importance of products such as 
raw materials and petroleum; and the addition of new nations 
that sprang from the loss of European colonial possessions, 
are factors that have forced technologically powerful na-
tions to exercise policies that not too long ago would have 
produced military intervention without hesitation. Conse-
quently, Dr. Kissinger has written that every nation is now 
an active participant in global affairs. Because of the 
revolutionary advance in communications and technology, even 
previously insignificant nations can affect the global bal-
ance of power. In this regard, Dr. Kissinger sums up the 
"revolutionary character of our age" as having increased the 
number of international actors, their "technical ability to 
affect each other," and the greatly enlarged "scope of their 
purposes. Whenever the participants in the international 
system change, a period of profound dislocation is inevita-
ble. " 4 
Because of the nature of a changed political world 
4. Ibid. , p. 53. 
19 
since world War II, the traditional powers, while still ca-
pable of exercising great economic might, have found them-
selves in a position of profound military and national impo-
tence. The end of their colonial empires now a fait accom-
pli; the reluctance to utilize their still conventionally 
adequate - even potent - military and economic power as 
weapons of political authority; and the disruption of the 
balance of power by a Russia equipped with nuclear weapons, 
has produced a great cleavage in the traditional power bal-
ance since World war II. 
The United States and the Soviet Union still possess 
the instrQ~ents of monopolistic strategic weaponry, but in a 
world where the exercise of that power must take into account 
other power centers. Henry Kissinger may well have asked: 
What is required to bring order to an unstable world, and in 
this regard what contribution should America make? An im-
portant particular of Kissinger's thesis states that the 
"greatest need of the contemporary international system is an 
5 
agreed concept of order." When such an "agreed concept of 
order" is lacking, power is used without any degree of shared 
purposes. Such a condition can fall prey to the forces of 
ideology and nationalism, which weaken the chances for sta-
bility. The shared concerns of Nineteenth Century Europe 
which allowed for adjustments in the political sphere, Kis-
singer states, "are gone forever. A new concept of interna-
5. Ibid., Pp.57-58 
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tional order is essential; without it stability will prove 
. 6 
elUSlVe." 
The American contribution to this task cannot be im-
posed by America because of political multipolarity. Inter-
national order can only be based on the realities of the 
present political makeup of a multipolar world, where Ameri-
ca must fashion new policies to convince others that sta-
bility is in their best interests. 
In Kissinger's world view of the inter-relationship of 
global powers, what path does he suggest American foreign 
policy must follow? Dr. Kissinger observes that American 
policy must lead to the development of purposeful and order-
ly uses of Aillerican power that can alleviate the traditional 
types of crisis that in the nuclear age have become increas-
ingly critical. Dr. Kissinger states that a 
mature conception of our interest in the world would ob-
viously have to take into account the widespread interest 
in stability and peaceful change. It would deal with two 
fundamental questions: What is it in our interest to 
prevent? What should we seek to accomplish?7 
To Henry Kissinger, the answer to the first question 
is quite readily apparent: the avoidance of nuclear war and 
aggression. The second question is difficult to answer be-
cause of the continuing debate over political and strategic 
goals. The United States should no longer attempt to shoul-
der the supreme responsibility for the defense of the free 
6. Ibid., Pp.57-58. 
7. Ibid. , p. 9 2. 
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world and our allies alone. America's strength and leader-
ship can be utilized effectively only with the assistance of 
our fellow allies acting in concert, and of other states in-
terested in preserving regional order. Kissinger thought 
that other states, particularly in Western Europe and Asia, 
should begin to shoulder an increased burden for their own 
protection, while the United States would be "concerned more 
with the overall framework of order than with the management 
. . 8 
of every reg1ona1 enterpr1se." 
Shared regional responsibilities; a changed conception 
of power; the bipolar military dimension in a politically 
multipolar world; these conditions in the fact of a nuclear 
world called for a strategy that would devise new tactics 
toward the goal of "building a stable and creative world 
9 
order." 
Kissinger's erudition on the notion of power on a vast 
scale in the atmosphere of Cold War conflict is of primary 
importance, for it provides a clue to a most vexing problem: 
the question of Soviet-American relations, and in that con-
' text, detente. How power is distributed, how much each has, 
and how it continues to be exercised, are questions that pre-
sented to Henry Kissinger the ~eans by which to analyze ques-
tions of war and peace. 
Another astute observer, Raymond Aron, also considered 
8 . Ibid. , p. 97. 
9. Ibid., p.97. 
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the difficulties of devising an effective strategy to meet 
the conditions of a multipolar world. The specific problem 
when approaching the realities of a radically changed global 
condition where many new power centers have emerged is "to 
. . . . 10 . 1 find a prec1se mean1ng for mult1polar1ty." Part1cu1ar y 
difficult to devise is a strategy that accepts the political 
realities of multipolarity when "two rivalries, one conti-
nental, the other global, overlap in a subsystem." 11 The 
sino-Soviet rivalry on a continental basis, and the Soviet-
American competition globally, are two rivalries that Aron 
referred to when noting the complexity of such an interna-
tional system that also had to account for smaller rivalries 
and other power centers. Even though the United States and 
the Soviet Union would remain militarily supreme, multipo-
larity would continue to create problems for stability and 
international order. These were matters that concerned 
Henry Kissinger. 
Raymond Aron would comment that Kissinger's global 
politics, his partnership with Richard Nixon, and his part-
ing of the ways with Metternich was "contributing to the 
creation of a post-war world wholly unlike that of Metter-
nich or Bismarck." 12 Nixon, through Kissinger, was accepting 
the realities of the interstate system which -,;v-as less a re-
sult of ideological conflict than it is a contest for power 
10. Aron, op. cit., p.138. 
11.· Ibid., p.138. 
12. Ibid., Pp.146-147. 
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normal among states. A military balance would exist between 
the two superpowers, and there would be a recognition that 
each has vital interests to protect in their inter-relation-
ship with regional powers. American policy should not view 
"every revolutionary movement of any sort as a menace," while 
"a revolutionary state" - read Soviets and Chinese - would 
' d . th . d b . 1 " 13 renounce •sprea 1ng e1r cree y v1o ence ••. While Met-
ternich and Bismarck attempted to combat the emerging power 
of revolutionary forces, Nixon and Kissinger's policy would 
air for a rapproachment with states that espoused a revolu-
tionary ideology, and convince them that stability was in 
their best interests. 
' Before one begins with an examination of detente as 
defined by Dr. Kissinger, a final analysis of Kissinger's po-
litical observations and opinions on modern global power is 
necessary. Here, if anywhere, the problem faced Kissinger: 
What is the role of power in a scientific, technologically 
advanced world, that has re~tructured the pre-World War I 
conception of the balance-of-power? The nuclear age has pro-
duced a reconsideration of political and military thinking of 
the technologically developed powers, cautioning particularly 
the United States and the Soviet Union from relying solely on 
the traditional modes of behavior. Among the nuclear powers, 
military action as a ready alternative in meeting political 
challenges can no longer be implemented without taking into 
13. Ibid., Pp.146-147. 
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account far greater potential dangers. Implied in this re-
thinking of past political practice is that no political op-
tion can discount the likelihood that nuclear weapons can be 
utilized. Dr. Kissinger has written of the effect nuclear 
weapons has had on traditional modes of political practice, 
and what this can mean for the balance of power. Prior to 
the advent of nuclear weaponry, the balance of power was de-
pendent upon territorial considerations. States were able 
to expand their influence only through conquest and the 
threat of direct military forces. The "showing of the flag" 
placed not only military strength at a premium, but more im-
portantly political power as well. But in the nuclear world 
of post-war politics, and with the accelerating technological 
advances in weapons systems of a strategic and conventional 
type, "this is no longer true. Some conquests add little to 
effective military strength; major increases in power are 
possible entirely through developments within the territory 
of a sovereign state." 14 A state that is capable of develop-
ing nuclear weapons can disrupt the balance of power without 
dispatching military forces outside its border. 
Kissinger furnishes another example of the revolution-
ary increments of modern global power by speculating upon the 
notion that if the Soviet Union had conquered Western Europe, 
but remained deficient in nuclear weaponry, it would have re-
mained, to a considerable extent, less militarily able to 
14. Kissinger, op. cit., p.60. 
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dictate and protect its security needs than would a Soviet 
union in its present status. The political options that are 
available to policy implementors because of nuclear weapons 
have radically restructured diplomatic procedures. Kis-
singer elaborates: 
In other words, the really fundamental changes in the 
balance of power have all occurred within the territori-
al limits of sovereign states. Clearly, there is an ur-
gent need to analyze just what is understood by power -
as well as by balance of power - in the nuclear age.15 
Commenting on the evolution of modern technology, and 
what ramifications this has had for decision-makers, Kissin-
ger has noted the political difficulty of devising strategic 
policy when weapons technology continues to increase at a 
rapid pace. No sooner is a policy agreed upon than a tech-
nological advancement in nuclear weaponry makes a reconsid-
eration of political and military policy mandatory. "The 
d d . . . . d . 16 gap between experts an ec1.s1.on-makers 1.s Wl enJ.ng." 
Finally, the force of the enormity of modern power on 
the traditional modes of settling political and military dis-
putes 
has destroyed its cumulative impact to a considerable ex-
tent. Throughout history the use of force set a preced-
ent; it demonstrated a capacity to use power for national 
ends. In the twentieth century, any use of force sets 
up inhibitions against resorting to it again.17 
Kissinger would argue that in view of the changed na-
ture of power in the nuclear age, traditional attempts to 
15. Ibid., p.61. 
16. Ibid. , p. 61. 
17. Ibid. , p. 62. 
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gather more power and influence through "geopolitical and 
military power" is no longer relevant. The attempt to gain 
marginal advantages over an opponent and thus tip the scales 
of the balance of power, as in the past, does not mean that 
the practice for greater political power can be used to ad-
vantage over one's competitor in the nuclear age. The So-
viet Union and the United States have recognized, Kissinger 
states, that as their military power grows, the attempt to 
transfer that power for political ends "does not necessarily 
18 
represent an increment of useable political strength." 
Each advance in weapons technology by one side creates a ne-
cessity for the other side to keep pace. Consequently, mar-
ginal advantages cannot be decisive except in the short 
term. Such a situation is extremely dangerous and destabi-
lizing since it puts a "premium •.• on striking first and on 
creating a defense to blunt the other side's retaliatory ca-
b . . 19 pa lllty." Kissinger would make a most controversial point 
t 
that his detente opponents would focus on when he stated that 
. dd' . b d . . 20 
"marglnal a ltlons of power cannot e eclSlve." 
To Henry Kissinger, "marginal advantages" by each power 
must be hindered if a truly creative world order can become 
a goal that will result in arms control and coexistence in a 
world of divergent beliefs and aims. 
18. Ibid., Pp.141-142. 
19. Ibid., Pp.141-142. 
20. Ibid., Pp.141-142. 
CHAPTER III 
' KISSINGER, WHAT IS DETENTE? 
' Detente as a political term has been used to describe 
a period 1n which some form of conflict or tension has been 
replaced by an atmosphere where political or military dif-
ficulties have diminished. Theodore Draper, writing in 
' Commentary, stated that detente 
is another one of those perfectly good words that mis-
applied, gets a bad name. It appears to be a relative-
ly recent importation from the French. The first cita-
tion in the Oxford English Dictionary is dated 1908. 
The word is usually defined as a 'relaxation of tension' 
which may mean much or little depending on what kind of 
tension is being relaxed by how much.1 
Keith Eubank, Professor of History, Queens College, 
' has remarked that the word detente was commonly used in 
European diplomatic circles prior to World wars I & II to 
designate a period of reduced tension. Curiously enough, 
Eubank states, it was used "interchangeably" with "appease-
2 
ment." Neither term prior to World war II meant giving in 
to a more aggressive power, or of connoting a policy of sur-
render. And John Herz, Professor of Political Science, City 
' 1. Theodore Draper, "Appeasement and Detente," Commentary, 
LXI (February, 1976), p.27. 
' 2. Keith Eubank, "Detente 1919-1939: A Study in Failure," 
Detente in Historical Perspective, ed. George Schwab and 
Henry Friedlander (New York: Cyrco Press, 1975), p.9. 
27 
28 
t 
college of New York, has stated that detente "seems to un-
dergo a transformation in meaning similar to that which 
appeasement underwent in the earlier period, namely, from a 
genuine effort to arrive at mutual understanding to a policy 
of unilateral concessions." 3 
t 
To most people detente is synonymous with Dr. Kissin-
ger. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze Kissinger's 
t 
explanation of detente. As appeasement has fallen into 
disrepute because of the actions of British Prime Minister 
t 
Neville Chamberlain, so detente has, particularly since 
1974, come under a similar attack by critics who believe 
that Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger conceded too much to 
the Soviets, the United States receiving little in return. 
t 
since Kissinger is considered the architect of detente poli-
t 
cy, it is appropriate to analyze his views on detente. 
It should not be assumed that Kissinger was the sole 
t 
moving force behind detente; others contributed in a sub-
stantial and important degree to this policy. 4 What can be 
established with a reasonable amount of certainty is that 
' 3. John Herz, "Detente and Appeasement from a Political 
Scientists Vantage Point." Ibid., p.26. 
4. To dismiss individuals such as Richard Nixon and Leonid 
Brezhnev wou19 be a gross error. Both often ~tated their 
support for detente. As the controversy on detente un-
, ' t folded, the1r concept1ons on what detente should be be-
came increasingly,ambiguous and conflicting. Also, Willy 
Brandt sought a detente with East Germany and the Soviet 
Union through his policy of Ostpolitik. 
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Kissinger was the architect who found in Richard Nixon an 
individual who shared a number of his personal and political 
idiosyncracies and views. There can be little doubt that 
William P. Rogers, Nixon's Secretary of State in his first 
administration, was by occupation and temperament ill-
equipped to challenge someone of Kissinger's discipline, 
and especially someone who had daily access to the Presi-
dent. As Chairman of the National Security Council, unen-
cumbered by ceremonial and bureaucratic necessities, Kis-
singer was provided with the opportunity to offer Richard 
Nixon suggestions for reforming an American foreign policy 
in need of rethinking, and to accept certain realities that 
could no longer be denied: that Communism was far from be-
ing a united political bloc; that the United States no long-
er enjoyed nuclear supremacy; and that the Soviet Union had 
reached nuclear parity with the United States, and would 
have to be dealt with as an equal power in world affairs. 
If any one factor would distinguish the conduct of 
the Nixon-Kissinger years from the previous administrations 
in the area of foreign policy, the radical turnabout of 
strategic 1veapons philosophy is surely the prime example. 
Since the advent of nuclear weaponry and all its modern ve-
hicles of delivery, each successive administration had em-
ployed the doctrine of strategic superiority. With the 
ever-increasing spiral of the nuclear arms race, including 
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decisions on both sides of building massive ABM systems, 
president Nixon stated the groundwork of his administration 
during his first press conference on January 27, 1969. 
While Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird spoke of "superi-
ority in nuclear weaponry," Nixon stated that "sufficiency 
is a better term actually than either superiority or pari-
ty."5 What this particular type of logic actually revealed 
was a recognition that the Soviet Union had indeed ap-
proached parity in nuclear weapons, and that only two op-
tions existed for both sides: continue the arms race in 
massive proportions, or attempt some form of rapproachment 
by which sufficiency - or in actuality parity - could be 
established as a framework to prevent the former prospect. 
The SALT negotiations would lay the groundwork for 
' the Nixon-Kissinger policy of detente. Finally, the United 
States and the Soviet Union had a common area of agreement. 
' 
"SALT is the central exhibit in Kissinger's museum of de-
6 tente," wrote former Ambassador George W. Ball.. The fac-
tors that compelled both sides to seek some sort of accom-
modation in the field of nuclear weaponry, Ball would state, 
was the nuclear weapons competition and its ever-increasing 
costs, the "escalation of what, in economic terms, was pure 
waste." 7 Both superpowers wished to establish some type of 
5. U.S., State Department Bulletin, Jan.-March, 1969, p.143. 
6. George w. Ball, Dlplomacy for a Crowded World (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Co., 1976), p.116. 
7. Ibid., p.116. 
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stability to reduce the dangers of nuclear competition, but 
this stability would be "possible only if something approach-
ing parity were achieved ••• For one thing, the recognition of 
parity would advance their [Soviets] ambition to be regarded 
as the equal of the United States, capable of dealing with 
. . b . 8 AmerJ.ca on a self-respectJ.ng asJ.s." 
With the advent of the Nixon administration, u.s. for-
eign policy was subjected to a careful reappraisal by Kis-
singer and his staff, primarily to determine what policies 
should be scrapped, and what future proposals would be ac-
ceptable. Either way, a modification of past policy was 
definitely predictable. Elliott L. Richardson, Under-Secre-
tary of State, in a speech to the American Political Science 
Association on September 5, 1969, entitled The Foreign Poli-
cy of the Nixon Administration: Its Aims and Strategy pre-
viewed the new tone. In his address, Richardson stated that 
Richard Nixon had noticed that the United States was respond-
ing to events and crisis, rather than forming new policies to 
avoid crisis; that Nixon noticed that "we fail to have the 
perspective and the long-range view that is essential for a 
policy that will be viable." 9 Richardson also mentioned that 
Nixon had "reinvigorated the National Security Council to as-
sure our policies will not lack these attributes." 10 
8. Ibid., p.116. 
9. u.s. State Department Bulletin, July-Sept., 1969, p.257. 
10. Ibid., p.257. 
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At this period in history the United States continued 
to be terribly hampered by Viet Nam, and by the previous 
administration's foreign policy 1n that area. The Nixon 
administration would establish the beginnings'by which the 
totality of foreign policy would not be jeopardized because 
of viet Nam. While Viet Nam would be dealt with, the aims 
of stifling the nuclear arms race through SALT, the search 
for a Middle East settlement, and the negotiations on Berlin 
and European security would proceed ahead despite the viet 
Nam impasse. 
The Johnson-Rusk administration, and the policy of 
Ostpolitik pursued by West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, 
who took office 1n October, 1969, provided an example of 
possible policy initiatives which Nixon-Kissinger could ob-
serve. Former Ambassador George Kennan wrote that the John-
son administration had noticed certain changes in Soviet 
policy that could possibly lead to a relaxation of tension, 
and that "certain gains were made, in the 1966-68 period 
which, if one had been able to build further on them, might 
well have developed into the sort of thing that later, in the 
early 1970's came to be known as d~tente." 11 Kennan notes 
that bm events interfered with the possible improvement of 
u.s.-soviet relations: the Soviet invasion of Czechoslova-
kia, and the American involvement in Viet Nam. "It was not 
11 . George F . Kennan, "The Uni. ted States and the Soviet 
Union, 1917-1976," Foreign Affairs, LIV (July, 1976), 
p.686. 
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until the first could be forgotten, and the second brought 
into process of liquidation in the early 1970's, that pros-
pects again opened up for further progress along the lines 
pioneered by Messrs. Johnson and Rusk some four to six years 
. 12 
ear11er." 
In August and September of 1974, the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations held one of its most extensive hear-
ings on American foreign policy in its history. Entitled, 
on United States Relations with Communist Countries, for-
eign policy experts and analysts testified on a broad range 
of subjects that dealt primarily with the relationship be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union. There is 
little doubt that the star witness was to be secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger, who would deliver his dissertation on 
' the fundamental reasoning that compelled detente. Chairman 
Fulbright welcomed Kissinger as "the one individual who may, 
' without exaggeration, be described as the architect of de-
tente." 13 
Dr. Kissinger's opening statement came right to the 
point in describing his suggestion for international order 
based on cooperation between the United States and the So-
' viet Union, and a broad definition of detente. 
12. Ibid., p.686. 
13. u.s., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Hearin s, On United States Relations with Communist 
Countr1es, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1974, p.238. To be 
referred to in latter footnotes as Detente Hearings). 
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There can be no peaceful international order without a 
constructive relationship between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. There will be no international sta-
bility unless both the Soviet Union and the United 
States conduct themselves with restraint and unless they 
use their enormous power for the benefit of mankind. 
Thus, we must be clear at the outset on what the term 
t • 
'detente' entalls. It is the search for a more construc-
tive relationship with the Soviet Union. It is a con-
tinuing process, not a final condition. And it has been 
pursued by successive American leaders though the means 
have varied as have world conditions.l4 
t 
Kissinger's fifty-page testimony on detente was not 
only an extensive exercise in the art of persuasion, but al-
so an equally clear explanation - at least in theory - of 
t 
what detente was meant to be, and what it was not. Although 
he had stated on other occasions the crux of his thesis, his 
testimony before the Committee was to be a thorough presen-
tation outlining his political views on the state of Soviet-
American relations, and the possibilities of expanding a re-
lationship that had as its objective the avoidance of general 
war. 
It was important for Kissinger to develop in his theory 
' of detente a policy that could show continuity and progress. 
Two years prior on May 29, 1972, in Moscow, the United States 
and the Soviet Union signed what was entitled as the Basic 
Principles of Relations Between the u.s.A. and the U.S.S.R. 
At a news conference held that day, Dr. Kissinger explained 
at length upon what the formal relations of the United 
14. Ibid., p.239. 
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states and the Soviet Union were based. While recognizing 
the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union 
that has been the foremost concern of almost every nation's 
foreign policy since World War II, Kissinger stated that 
this new phase of relations would take into account many 
issues. These issues, Kissinger stated, "would create on 
both sides so many vested interests in a continuation of a 
. h' 15 h d d'f more formal relat1ons 1p," t at a new an 1 ferent out-
look in the foreign policy of both powers would be possible. 
The existence of a Soviet ideology that would continue to 
compete with the West and the United states should not be an 
obstacle to peaceful coexistence, if the principles that 
were signed at Moscow were followed. The primary concern of 
the principles, Kissinger stated, was to avoid direct mili-
tary involvements, and not to take unilateral advantage of 
political situations, but rather recognize "that the attempt 
of traditional diplomacy to accumulate marginal advantages 
is bound.to lead to disastrous consequences in the nuclear 
age. This document is supposed to characterize relation-
16 
ships for the future." 
' Detente was more than just a reconsideration of past 
political strategies and goals. It became, to Kissinger, 
the attempt to form an understanding with the Soviet Union 
15. u.s., State Department Bulletin, June, 1972, p.884. 
16. Iei£., p.884. 
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that certain principles were i~~utable: nuclear war must 
be avoided, and the pursuit of "marginal advantages" made 
1ess desirable through the benefits of cooperation and mutu-
al gain. There can be little doubt that what sparked these 
concerns was Soviet parity in nuclear arms, which meant that 
a definite military balance in strategic weaponry existed 
between the two superpowers. This would surely have its af-
feet politically. On February 1, 1973, in an interview with 
Marvin Kalb of CBS News, Kissinger spoke of a "completely 
different world than the one that existed in the 19th Cen-
tury. You can't have these shifting alliances; you can't 
. 17 have these endless llttle wars." The balance of power, as 
fragile as it may be in this nuclear age, certainly does 
force upon states the recognition that their security cannot 
be entrusted "to the good will of another state, if it has a 
choice about it, especially of a state that announces a hos-
t 'l 'd 18 1 e 1 eology." Kissinger explained that what the adminis-
tration was attempting to accomplish was not so much to em-
bark upon a policy of 19th Century balance of power politics, 
but rather to deal with the obvious fact of a nuclear world: 
no side can survive an atomic war. To eliminate the hostili-
ties that are a result of this conflict, and with it the 
temptation to seek marginal advantages, would be the new 
policy rather than a continuation of confrontation politics 
17. U.S., State Department Bulletin, Oct.-Dec., 1972, p.395. 
18~ Ibid., p.395. 
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and limited wars that would only end in nuclear disaster. 
Kissinger had few illusions about the intricacies of 
diplomacy with a hostile adversary. Ideological competition 
was bound to continue, along with the pursuit of power on a 
global scale. No situation remains static. A realistic ap-
praisal of the Soviet Union's international status, its need 
for ideological legitimacy, and its resurgent conventional 
' and nuclear power, made the pursuit of detente necessary, 
Kissinger believed. One of the guiding principles of Kis-
, 
singer's detente policy was that the United States could not 
blindly trust the Soviet Union to ease international tensions 
for the sake of good will. Proper political interests would 
have to be devised to create the type of understanding that 
would make the easing of tension beneficial to both sides. 
An understanding of the differences that divide the 
two superpowers, Kissinger believed, was the first step to-
ward some type of reconciliation. But beyond the ideologi-
cal, political, and military divisions lay the spectre of 
possible nuclear war, which "defines the necessity of the 
task; deep differences in philosophy and interests between 
the United States and the Soviet Union point up its diffi-
culty."19 The rivalry between the two powers, Kissinger 
stated, is a result of how each nation views its own national 
interest, and the differences that spring from opposing ideo-
' 19. "Detente Hearings," op. cit., p.247. 
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logical systems. 
These two nuclear giants that are separated by diverg-
ing philosophies, governmental systems, and a plethora of 
other conditions and factors, must devise and agree to new 
policies to prevent nuclear war. Neither side, as Kissin-
ger would state many times, would alter the conduct of its 
foreign policy because of moral considerations. A lessen-
ing of competition, and the development of acceptable cri-
teria to enhance the probabilities for cooperation, are die-
tated by the realities of the political and military balance. 
A necessary condition is one in which both sides benefit. 
Politically, any negotiation between two formidable oppo-
nents with long-standing conflicts would only succeed when 
both sides believed that something could be gained. Kissin-
ger thought that in view of the factors that split the super-
powers, a new political approach would have to be attempted 
in which a number of issues would be negotiated over an un-
specified time period. A realistic view of the status of 
Soviet-American relations would have to accept the fact that 
both sides would continue to compete, but recognize that cer-
tain interests forced them to co-exist. Kissinger believed 
• 
that detente would reconcile the conflicts that produced this 
divisive condition by providing both sides with the opportu-
nity to "regulate and restrain their differences and ultimate-
39 
. . . 20 lY move from compet1t1on to cooperat1on." 
In this world of political divisions, power politics 
and two nuclear powers so contradictory to each other, came 
' Kissinger and detente. Other circ::umstances and prior ac-
tions made this plausible. What led up to a change in glob-
al politics, which Kissinger viewed as having begun by the 
end of the sixties and beginning of the seventies, was the 
political friction in the Communist world which no longer 
accepted Moscow's supposedly supreme authority in matters of 
ideology and power politics, and efforts by the United 
States, undoubtedly because of the Viet Nam experience, to 
improve relations with Moscow. Kissinger credited the So-
viets with restraint, particularly in refraining from exer-
cising a more aggressive role in the Communist camp; a policy 
that was taking an increasingly greater look at the consumer 
and material needs of its people; and by seeking to "calm its 
public opinion by joining in a relaxation of tensions." 21 
The United States sought to take advantage of this relaxation 
of tension by offering incentives to the Soviets to continue 
on this course. 
The political and military competition that had punc-
tuated so much of the post-war period was, to Kissinger, in 
a state of transformation by the mid-1960's. Superpower 
20. Ibid., p.248. 
21. Ibid., p.249. 
40 
status did not mean that power could be exercised against 
other states with impunity, even against developing nations, 
solely by the threat of military intervention. The United 
states experienced this painful lesson in Viet Nam. The 
soviets also experienced the limitation of their awesome 
power with Tito's Yugoslavia, in the conflict with China, and 
with the resentment and dissension that continues to plague 
them in Eastern Europe. 
A new international structure, Dr. Kissinger would 
write, was predicated on more than just a reduction of ten-
sion from the threat of military action and political compe-
tition. After the Second World War, a new international sys-
tern was emerging that presented America with an opportunity 
to confront challenges of a pluralistic world, and help shape 
a new international environment, "less dominated by military 
power, less susceptible to confrontation, more open to genu-
ine cooperation among the free and diverse elements of the 
22 globe." Such a desirable international system could only 
be likely if the major nuclear powers practiced a policy that 
inhibited them from utilizing the traditional elements of 
power and persuasion: political strategems that sought in-
increased power and influence for purely national ends, 
backed up by military muscle. Kissinger opined that the two 
major nuclear powers, because of political multipolarity, do 
22. Ibid., p.250. 
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not have the dominating power as in the past, nor do they 
have the means to dictate a new international order solely 
on account of their bipolar military strength. Nevertheless, 
the strongest nuclear powers can blunt opportunities toward 
moderation, and make the goals of restraining influences 
difficult to accomplish. 
In this new international structure of cooperation and 
restraint, the acquiescence of the United States and the So-
viet Union is paramount for a new beginning. The circum-
stances that forced a reappraisal of policy, Kissinger 
thought, were problems that were challenging all nations, 
regardless of political ideologies. The difficulties of 
energy, population control, pollution, and the perplexing 
questions of the world economy were problems that could not 
be eradicated - in fact, only compounded and delayed, if the 
United States and the Soviet Union continued to confront each 
other with dangerous and anachronistic policies, legacies of 
the Cold War. How to resolve this confrontation between the 
' two superpowers was the crux of Kissinger's detente. 
One possible avenue that could lead to a reconciliation 
of views was the recognition by both superpowers that common 
problems could be solved if a definite commitment was exhib-
ited by both sides. As negotiations began over a broad range 
of subjects, it was thought that progress in one area would 
lead to progress in more difficult fields. Negotiations and 
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agreements on vitally important political issues, Kissinger 
stated, would be an impetus to construct "a new standard of 
international conduct appropriate to the dangers of the 
23 
nuclear age." Benefits would be advantageous to both 
sides, particularly to the Soviet Union in the economic and 
technological spheres, when moderation and restraint became 
a normal instrument of conduct, instead of confrontation and 
the "search for marginal advantages." Kissinger would label 
the means toward achieving this new relationship as "link-
age." 
Linkage emerged as a concept of incentives and penal-
ties that attempted to influence restraint. With Kissinger's 
policy of negotiating with the Soviets on a broad political 
front, the elements of progress enjoyed by both sides would 
lead to a relationship that could possibly reduce difficul-
ties 1n other strategic areas. Progress in economic matters, 
in which the United States would assist the Soviet Union in 
. 
overcoming its technological and agricultural deficiencies, 
and even grant Most-Favored-Nation status, could lead to a 
Soviet willingness to seriously bargain in good faith the 
question of strategic weapons. With that accomplished, the 
United States could assist the Soviets in parallel matters 
that would act as an incentive for restrained Soviet behav-
23. Ibid., p.250. 
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ior in particularly explosive areas, such as the Middle East, 
Africa, and Southeast Asia. 
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, senior staff member of the National 
' security Council from 1969-1974, and a protege of Henry Kis-
' singer's, focused this definition of detente and the concept 
of linkage: 
It is (our policy) an attempt to evolve a balance of in-
centives for positive behavior and penalties for bellig-
erence; the objective being to instill in the minds of 
our potential adversaries an appreciation of the benefits 
of cooperation rather t~an conflict, and thus lessen the 
threat of war. Thus, detente in practice has been an 
active policy, conducted over the cr2~tion of mutual in-
terests in the maintenance of peace. 
' Critics of detente and linkage would comment that the 
Soviet Union could not be entrusted to abide by policies 
that the West would find desirable, such as objectives that 
would benefit the national interest by maintaining peace and 
stability. A state that proclaims a revolutionary ideology 
has obligations that transcend the need for security and sta-
bility. Indeed, the revolutionary ideology that the Soviet 
Union advocates on a global scale, the critics would state, 
labors in the opposite direction: It does not create stabili-
ty, but rather instability and political crisis. 
Kissinger could not ignore a Soviet policy which places 
its own interests first, even at the expense of the revolu-
' 24. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, "The Meaning of Detente," u.s. Naval 
War College Review, (Summer, 1975), p. 4. 
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tionary ideology it professes. The Soviets have used the 
power of Marxist ideology to a great extent 1n pursuing their 
foreign policy goals. The ideological factors have been tern-
pered in recent years, Nixon and Kissinger believed, due to 
the political and military questions that confronted the two 
superpowers. These questions were thought to have influenced 
a moderating effect on Soviet foreign policy, forcing the 
soviets to approach these critical matters in a practical and 
realistic manner. This does not spell an end to the politi-
cal and military rivalry, but rather channels the great power 
competition into areas that seem to hold the prospect for 
possible negotiation. To Nixon and Kissinger, the Soviet 
Union and Mainland China were no longer "revolutionary 
states" in the manner that Kissinger himself had at one time 
described them. 
Stephen R. Graubard, historian, long-time friend, and 
observer of Henry Kissinger, wrote that the new President and 
his foreign policy adviser shared the opinion that the .. times 
were propitious for new initiatives to be taken vis-a-vis 
both the Soviet Union and Communist China." 25 These .. new 
initiatives" were thought to be possible because of the nu-
clear balance between the two superpowers, the continued ero-
sion of unity in the Communist Bloc, and the thought that the 
25. Stephen R. Graubard, Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind. 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1974), p.273. 
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soviet Union and Communist China were no longer revolution-
ary states. A new international order was dependent upon 
the consensus of its members, particularly the most pm..rer-
ful. Because Moscow and Peking had significantly modified 
their revolutionary aspirations, this was thought to be an 
indication that an approach could be made to convince them 
that a new international order was possible. 
Hans Morgenthau would write after Mr. Nixon's Moscow 
summit in 1972 that both sides accepted the reality that they 
shared common interests, and that such an acceptance would 
necessitate joint pursuits. With this new outlook focused on 
resolving common problems, the ideological competition would 
recede. Morgenthau further stated that future conflicts in-
volving the U.S., U.S.S.R., and China will be more in tune 
with political and military questions of power in which the 
powers will be primarily concerned with their own national 
interests, and not the ideological competition between dif-
ferent social systems. This decrease in ideological tension 
is a positive step, Morgenthau believes, since traditional 
power struggles can be solved by normal diplomatic proce-
dures. 26 
The reduction of ideological conflict in the late 
1960's and early 1970's was interpreted by the Nixon adminis-
26. Hans Morgenthau, "After the Summit: Superpow·er Politics," 
New Leader, (June, 1972), p.ll. 
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tration as a change in policy on the part of certain Commu-
nist states, such as Poland, Romania, Hungary and the Soviet 
union, that the possibility of settling political disputes 
could be approached without resorting to past forms of ideo-
logical warfare. Much of this change of approach was due to 
the improvement in economic relations. To Kissinger, this 
hardly spelled a permanent truce in the competitive nature 
of the two superpowers. Kissinger realized, like all keen 
observers of political affairs, that nothing in politics is 
permanent, but that the fundamental, philosophical, and ideo-
logical structures of the two societies were too complex, in-
grained, and opposed to abolish conflict. Neither nation 
would supinely tolerate a political or military provocation 
that could materialize into a strategic advantage for one 
side; defeat for the other. Kissinger underlined four prin-
ciples which the United States would expound in its foreign 
policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union: 
' First, if detente is to endure, both sides must benefit; 
second, building a new relationship ~vith the Soviet Union 
does not entail any devaluation of traditional alliance 
relations; third, the emergence of more normal relations 
with the Soviet Union must not undermine our resolve to 
maintain our national defense; and fourth, we must know 
what can and cannoz be achieved in changing human condi-
tions in the East. 7 
The first principle stated what all negotiations ex-
plore: the possibility of gain. Neither side would cooper-
' 27. "Detente Hearings," op. cit., p.257. 
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ate in a serious atmosphere unless an element of gain would 
make the venture profitable. The second and third princi-
ples specified the traditional American posture of relying 
on the combined strength of the Western powers to provide 
' for a common defense strategy. Detente did not mean the ab-
rogation of conflict, but rather the possibility that a modi-
fication of policy by the two superpowers, and the benefits 
that could result from it, would be conducive toward re-
strained behavior. 
Kissinger believed that the Soviets would continue to 
exert their political and military power, and spread their 
Marxist ideology, but in a restrained and more cautious fash-
ion. To deal with Soviet power the United States would have 
to continue to rely on a Western strength that took into 
account the power centers of Western Europe and Japan. Such 
shared interests and values that bound the Western nations 
together were "an indispensable element in the equilibrium 
28 
needed to keep the world at peace." The political struc-
tures that the Western nations thought worth defending and 
preserving were vital if the West wished to survive. Western 
unity would not be cohesive and effective if it could only be 
invoked during times of crisis. To Kissinger, the Soviet 
Union would continue to be a formidable adversary, even with 
' the progress exhibited in the beginning stages of detente. 
28. ~., p.258. 
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The fourth principle, that of hlli~an rights, was recog-
nized by Nixon and Kissinger as indeed controversial, and 
potentially explosive. The issue of human rights was inex-
tricably woven into the very fabric of Western political 
life, and the values ascertained from its philosophy and 
historical evolution. In the American and British experi-
ence this affirmation was particularly more pronounced. The 
record of Soviet - and Communist - intransigence and refusal 
to grant their citizens political rights is well known. What 
can be mentioned with certainty is that Western governments 
have been perplexed in deciding what policy is appropriate in 
interacting with a government which negates some of the most 
fundamental values of political life, as the West views them, 
while pursuing with a determined effort the world-wide ac-
ceptance of its political and economic beliefs. 
To those who would argue that a precondition for any 
improved relations with the Soviet Union would be a tempering 
and/or reappraisal of their domestic policy, Kissinger re-
sponded by stating that the primary question was how the So-
viet Union approached international issues. This would be 
the measure by which to judge the relationship between the 
two superpowers. The political and military difficulties 
that needed to be resolved were the predominant concerns that 
overshadowed Soviet domestic policy. Though the United 
States would continue to use its power to persuade the So-
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viets to alter their policies at home, Kissinger stated, re-
sults could only be expected in the long-run, since to demand 
immediate changes would be "futile and at the same time haz-
ard all that has already been achieved." 29 
' And, finally, the future of detente will depend on a 
set of "ground rules" prescribing American and Soviet diplo-
' matic behavior on a continuum that perceives of detente as -
in Kissinger's words - "a continuing process, not a final 
condition." The primary sources of tension that have exacer-
bated the Soviet-American rivalry, and its political, mili-
tary, and ideological competition, stated Kissinger, 
must be guided by the principles of restraint ••• Crisis 
there will be, but the United States and the Soviet 
Union have a special obligation deriving from the un-
imaginable military power that they wield and represent. 
Exploitation of crisis situations for unilateral gain is 
not acceptable.30 
Negotiations on a continuing basis to dispel past sus-
picions and hinder possible future conflicts were to Kissin-
ger the methods for a redress of the tensions marking the 
Cold war. Kissinger's associate, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, has 
written that while the power of the Soviet Union continues 
to grow, it 
must be a major purpose of our diplomacy and of our 
security policies as a whole to insure that in these 
circumstances our own interests and values are safe-
guarded, that power is used with restraint, and influ-
ence wielded responsibly. Essentially, that is what 
detente is all about.31 
29. Ibid., p.258. 
30. Ibid., p.259. 
31. Sonnenfeldt, op. cit., p.4. 
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Throughout this third chapter, an effort has been made 
' to explain Kissinger's theory of detente. Opinions and atti-
tudes on policy are one matter; the course of action to di-
rectly implement policy is quite another. Chapter Four will 
explain the structure on which this new policy was built 
upon. The subject of this thesis is not solely what has been 
' defined as detente, or how it evolved, but also the debate 
this policy produced. To study these debates by the support-
' ers and opponents of detente, one must explain how the events 
of the Nixon-Ford administrations prompted these delibera-
tions. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE EVOLUTION OF POLICY 
When Richard Nixon assumed the Presidency in January, 
1969, "newness" became the watchword of the new administra-
tion. Nixon had promised during the Presidential campaign 
to revise American foreign policy, a policy that not only 
seemed to be suffering from a lack of direction, but also 
one experiencing an intense assault from domestic critics 
because of the involvement 1n Viet Nam. The inability of 
the Johnson administration to win decisively in Southeast 
Asia cast doubt on its effectiveness in other regions. It 
will be to Nixon's credit that he at least was able to modify 
and revise foreign policy without being totally absorbed with 
the war in Southeast Asia. No doubt, the war was still a 
burden, but nevertheless not an obstacle hindering new ini-
tiatives. Politics would be concentrated in other areas that 
might in some way alleviate the still controversial issue of 
Viet Nam. Thus, political points could be made by taking ad-
vantage of the fractures in the Communist world, such as the 
Sino-Soviet split. It was not by chance that Nixon journeyed 
to Romania in August, 1969, an indication that the adminis-
tration was showcasing a new policy that would lead to a 
rapproachment with various Communist states. 
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Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger were concerned over 
the inertia that American foreign policy was experiencing. 
Kissinger, in particular, had criticized American policy 
by noti~g in his writings that America was not channelling 
its great power in new policy directions and not facing up 
to the realities of a changed post-war world. To continue 
on the same course would only add other failures as observed 
in viet Nam, and in the increasing Soviet and Chinese poli-
tical and military penetration in the Middle East, Africa, 
and Third World nations. The dynamics of politics required 
a recognition of Soviet national interests on a world-wide 
scale, demanding a modified foreign policy and a strategic 
doctrine that allowed flexibility of purpose within the 
guidelines of American national security. This attempt to 
fashion a foreign policy to avoid the difficulties that del-
uged the Johnson administration was an initiative that Nixon 
and Kissinger believed imperative. The political and mili-
tary confrontation of forces on a global scale presented 
difficulties that were inherited from past administrations. 
The changed political and military conditions of the 1960's, 
particularly the rapid growth of Soviet nuclear power, de-
manded a revamped policy to deal with the questions of pro-
liferating nuclear arms, security in Europe, and a general 
reduction in tensions. 
To criticize policy and offer remedies, particularly 
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from a distance, is one matter. To actually formulate poli-
cy and manage it on a day to day basis is quite another. 
The Nixon policy would have an opportunity to evolve into 
practice what had been suggested in theory. 
The new administration acted expediously in its desire 
to proceed along the avenues of the Johnson administration's 
SALT initiatives. Having taken a brief respite to acquaint 
himself with past policy and procedures of a technical and 
bureaucratic kind, Nixon began publicly by June of 1969 to 
increasingly mention the SALT Talks, and the continuation of 
policy that would hopefully stabilize the arms race and open 
new possibilities for further improvement in East-West rela-
tions. Nixon announced at a June 19, 1969, press conference 
that the SALT Talks would begin in July or August at either 
Vienna or Geneva. He also stated his desire not to abandon 
MIRV testing, and to go ahead with the Safeguard AMB System, 
not only because of Soviet progress in that direction, but 
also because of Soviet testing in MIRV weaponry. 
This expressed desire to proceed with the SALT Talks 
would send a message to American policy observers, and most 
importantly to the Soviet Union, that the administration 
would actively negotiate issues of limiting nuclear arms. 
Progress in the area of stabilizing nuclear arms competition 
could lead to the advancement of procedures to alleviate oth-
er areas that bred political and military struggle on a glo-
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bal scale. SALT thus became the symbo~ of the Nixon-Kissin-
' ger policy of detente, and more importantly, its main focus. 
If one examines the United States State Department 
' Bulletin one finds no reference to "detente" until mentioned 
by Romanian President Ceausescu at a state dinner given for 
president Nixon in Bucharest on August 21, 1969. President 
' ' ceausescu spoke of the need for detente, a detente that 
should not be hindered by the present international situa-
' tion and diverging political systems, but rather a detente 
that would advance "a search for new ways of improving the 
1 
world political atmosphere." President Nixon sounded a 
theme that was to be repeated in the years to come: "We 
' 2 
seek the substance of detente, not its mere atmosphere." 
' An important part of the "substance of detente" was 
the commitment by the Nixon administration to proceed with 
the SALT Talks. This commitment was predicated upon there-
alization that the United States and the Soviet Union had 
reached a semblance of nuclear stalemate, in which the con-
tinued advancement of technological weaponry to achieve a 
temporary superiority and successful first strike capability 
was indeed costly, not to mention extremely dangerous. What 
had indeed become the reality was that both nuclear super-
powers had progressed to a point of relative parity, 1n 
which the word "sufficiency" in the American lexicon reduced 
1. u.s., State Department Bulletin, July-Sept., 1969, p.170. 
2. Ibid., p.172. 
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the possibility that the United States would seek an accel-
erated program to achieve what many thought would be a 
dubious superiority. This attitude was conditional upon 
the Soviet Union's acceptance of the nuclear status quo, an 
indication being their willingness to partake in serious 
negotiations to limit nuclear arms. On october 25, 1969, 
the White House announced that representatives of the United 
states and the Soviet Union would meet at Helsinki, Finland, 
on November 17 for preliminary discussions on SALT. In 
President Nixon's message to Gerard c. Smith, Chairman of 
the u.s. delegation, the explicit reference to sufficiency 
set the tone of the present and future direction of the ne-
gotiations. "I have stated that for our part we will be 
guided by the concept of maintaining 'sufficiency' in the 
. d d . 3 forces requ1re to protect ourselves an our allleS." 
This "sufficiency" in nuclear weaponry was based upon 
the assumption that there exists what former Secretary of 
Defense James Schlesinger called "the military balance of 
d . 'b . 4 power," an "an equ111 r1um of force." The SALT Talks and 
' detente were inextricably bound together by this nuclear 
balance. Schlesinger would elaborate on this matter at a 
1976 seminar on United States foreign policy sponsored by the 
3. Ibid., p.543. 
4. Yaities Schlesinger, "The Power to Deter," Center Magazine, 
IX (March-April, 1976), p.45. 
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center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. Schlesing-
er stated that United States allies are dependent on America 
to ensure that balance. Without the military balance of 
power and equilibrium the global political situation would 
t 
be altered. Schlesinger explained that if detente is to be 
achieved, then the military balance must be maintained. If 
not, to allow one side to gain advantage in strategic weap-
onry, particularly the Soviet Union, would result in"drastic 
. . . . d h d 5 changes 1n the pol1t1cal front1ers aroun t e worl ." 
When Henry Kissinger took command of the National Se-
curity Council, an exacting study was conducted on the stra-
tegic nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Un-
ion that attempted to define the capabilities and present 
nuclear doctrines of both sides, along with their future ca-
pabilities. Lawrence Whetten, a member of the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies in London, wrote that when 
the study was complete in the summer of 1969, the "essential 
. . 6 h outcome .•. was to settle for strateg1c par1ty." T e report 
described the Soviet strategic program as having indeed 
caught up with the United States in the field of strategic 
weaponry, having "reached such a size and such a momentum 
that there was no feasible way to maintain superiority at an 
b . 7 accepta le pr1ce." Perhaps because of the consternation 
5. Ibid. , p. 45. 
6. LaWrence Whetten, The Future of Soviet Military Power (New 
York: Crane, Russak and Company, 1976), Pp.19-20. 
7. ~., p.20. 
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this report would provoke, President Nixon referred to 
American strategy as one of "sufficiency." 
With the Soviet Union rapidly approaching the point 
where they could progress beyond parity to superiority, Nix-
on and Kissinger were faced with two difficult options: 
proceed with a massive and highly expensive program to push 
ahead of the Soviets; or negotiate limitations on strate-
gic arms, accepting the fact that a nuclear stalemate - or 
balance - was now the case. The latter course was selected. 
This decision would set the course for all the subsequent 
SALT Talks that were to come, the ramifications of which 
would hold great importance for the future conduct of Ameri-
t 
can policy, and subsequently detente with the most powerful 
adversary. To Kissinger, the SALT Talks were the beginning 
of a new political strategy "of an interlocking web of agree-
ments that would give the Soviet Union a stake in maintaining 
b . . 8 sta lllty." 
This desire on the part of the United States to active-
ly partake in the SALT Talks ultimately hinged upon the ac-
quiescence of the Soviets to negotiate in a like manner. A 
number of considerations influenced both powers. Dr. James 
E. Dougherty, former Professor of Political science at the 
National war College, and a research associate at the For-
eign Policy Research Institute, wrote that both parties were 
8. lEi£., Pp.22-23. 
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expected to negotiate arms limitations 1n accordance with the 
Non-proliferation Treaty. Beyond this agreement in principle 
1ay the price tag of greater expenditures of revenue, which 
often resulted in one sides' new weapons system cancelling 
out the other sides. Neither power could gain any appreci-
able advantage except in the short term. Dougherty states 
that both sides were cognizant of what would transpire if the 
SALT Talks faltered: more weapons would be designed and im-
plemented without permitting "either side to achieve military 
superiority in a meaningful sense." 9 
The Soviets and the United States were bothered by 
problems of a political nature central to the security of 
each nation. The question that emerged to American initia-
tors was whether the Soviets would accept parity. Professor 
r 
Dougherty wrote that opponents of detente were doubtful of 
Soviet indications to accept parity, since "no such concept 
[ f . J b . . . . 10 o par1ty can e found 1n sov1et strateg1c llterature." 
Dougherty goes on to state that the prime consideration in 
American participation in SALT was to discover if the Soviet 
political leadership was willing to accept parity and to 
force it upon their military establishment. 
On october 25, 1969, the White House announced that 
9. James E. Dougherty, How To Think About Arms Control and 
Disarmament, National Strategy Information Center (New 
York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1973), p.168. 
10. ~., p.176. 
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representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union 
would meet at Helsinki, Finland on November 17, 1969, for 
preliminary discussions on SALT. On that same day, Secre-
tary of State William P. Rogers stated at a press conference 
that the upcoming SALT Talks were an important feature of 
' detente. He also stated: "What we hope that we can do is 
negotiate an arms limitation agreement which will keep us in 
the same relative position that we are now - and which can be 
.. d 11 ver1f1e ." 
After the first session of the SALT Talks recessed in 
December, 1969, and was scheduled to commence again in April, 
1970 in Vienna, Gerard c. Smith, Chief of the u.s. Delega-
tion and Director of the u.s. Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, held a press conference on December 29, 1969, and 
stated that the Soviets did show a serious attitude at Hel-
sinki. To display an American willingness to construct ABM 
systems to counter Soviet MIRV testing, President Nixon an-
nounced on January 30, 1970 the go-ahead with stage one and 
two of ABM systems to defend Minutemen sites from major nu-
clear powers, and area defense for cities against m1nor nu-
clear powers. Also of importance was March 5, 1970, when 
the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered 
into force, which prohibited the nuclear weapons countries 
from transferring atomic weapons to states not already pos-
11. U.S., State Department Bulletin, Oct.-Dec., 1969, p.392. 
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sessing them. 
On August 14, 1970, phase two of SALT ended at Vienna, 
with the third phase scheduled to begin in Helsinki on Novem-
ber 2, 1970. This occasion prompted both Ambassador Smith 
and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister v.s. Semenov to comment 
that the Talks continued to exhibit a businesslike demeanor, 
and that both parties were looking forward to phase three on 
November 2, 1970. Apparently, a complication had occurred 
after the beginning of phase three. On March 9, 1971, Sec-
retary of State Rogers stated on a PBS broadcast that 
the Soviet Union realizes that we're not going t9 be 
cajoled into thinking that there's a spirit of detente 
if nothing has happened. On the other hand, I think they 
realize that we're prepared to work out agreements with 
them that are sensible and practical. And I think that's 
reflected in the SALT Talks we're having.12 
Consequently, the deadlock was broken, allowing Presi-
dent Nixon to announce on May 20, 1971, a significant break-
through: the United States and the Soviet Union would con-
centrate on working out an agreement for the limitation of 
ABM systems, and also to limit offensive nuclear weapons. On 
September 24, 1971, President Nixon approved two agreements 
that had been negotiated by the SALT delegations, one entit-
led, "Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak 
of Nuclear War Between U.S. and U.S.S.R.," and "Agreement 
Between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. on Measures to Improve the 
12. Ibid., (Jan.-March, 1971), p.444. 
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u.s. -U.S.S.R. Direct Communications Link." On this date, 
phase five of SALT concluded. 
The inclination to partake in serious negotiations on 
arms limitations, and the steady advancement of those talks 
by both sides, resulted in a transformation of terms, con-
cepts and language. Sufficiency was increasingly being re-
placed by parity. That fundamental change - gradual to be 
sure, but nevertheless quite noticeable - was a signal that 
previous expressions of strategic doctrine were to be funda-
mentally altered. Opposition would in some cases be vehe-
mently voiced to the newly initiated policy, particularly by 
those in the military. But at this point the acceptance of 
parity was rapidly replacing strategic superiority. President 
Nixon spoke of this new policy when he briefed the Western 
Media Executives in Portland, Oregon on September 25, 1971, 
by admitting that a strategic balance now existed 1n regard 
to nuclear missiles, and that "neither power at this time is 
going to be able to gain a clear enough superiority that ei-
ther would launch a preemptive attack upon the other." 13 
Nixon went on to say that this strategic balance was the rea-
son why the SALT Talks were showing signs of success. 
An interesting perspective on the SALT I agreements 
that portrays the difficulties of negotiating with Soviet 
13. Ibid., p.407. 
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strategic perceptions is provided by Paul A. Nitze, a parti-
cipant in the Talks from their inception in 1969 to 1974. 
Nitze describes the American attempt to convince the Soviets 
to accept the "desirability of limitations which would assure 
•crisis stability' and 'essential equivalence'" - and adds 
h . . d . d h 14 that "t e Sov~et s~ e stoutly res~ste t ese efforts." 
Nitze describes the most important political-military posi-
tions that guided the Soviet stance on security as being 
their refusal to accept the American concept of "essential 
equivalence." The American SALT delegation attempted to con-
vince the Soviets, states Nitze, that "both sides did not 
have to be exactly equal to that of the other and at a level, 
one could hope, lower than that programmed by the United 
15 States." The Soviets would have none of this. Rather, 
they lobbied for their own concept of "equal security," 
which took geographic factors into account besides the re-
quirements of political and military considerations. What 
this amounted to, says Nitze, was the Soviet desire for stra-
tegic superiority over the United States, American allies, 
and China. Nevertheless, both sides were successful in fi-
nalizing an Interim Agreement limiting ABM systems and halt-
ing new offensive missile systems. 
14. Paul H. Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability In An Era Of 
' Detente," Foreign Affairs, LIV (Jan., 1976), p.217. 
15. Ibid., p.217. 
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The SALT Talks that had been in progress since 1969 
were leading up to the historic agreements signed by Presi-
dent Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev in Moscow in May, 1972. 
on this occasion, the United States and the Soviet Union had 
agreed to limit the scope of their nuclear endeavors, and to 
refrain from what were the very likely prospects of an un-
limited nuclear arms race. Edward Luttwak, Associate Direc-
tor of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research at 
Johns Hopkins noted the disparity in the number of long-range 
nuclear weapons that were agreed to by the SALT delegations: 
u.s. USSR 
Land-based Ballistic Missiles 1054 1450 
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles 656 880 
Strategic Bombers 382 210 
Totals 2092 2540 16 
Luttwak commented that even though the numbers on the 
side of the Soviets are important, those in favor of this 
arrangement would argue "that this advantage is entirely mean-
ingless, since the quality of the American missiles means 
th t th 1 h . 17 a ey can aunc many more separate nuclear str1kes." 
The disparity in nuclear weaponry agreed to by both 
sides sparked a controversy by many American observers, the 
16. Edward W. Luttwak, "Defense Reconsidered," Commentary, 
LXIII (March, 1977), p.52. 
17. Ibid. , p. 52. 
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primary cause being the Soviet "advantage" that the American 
side conceded. This controversy centered around the opinion 
that America was unilaterally foresaking nuclear superiority 
to the Soviets without any concrete concessions, except pos-
sibly the limitation of ABM systems. This outcry provoked 
Kissinger's famous impassioned plea while in Moscow: "What 
in the name of God is strategic superiority? What do you do 
with it?" 
Negotiations were proceeding not only in the limitation 
of strategic weapons, but also in commercial agreements, in 
the proposed Conference on Security and Cooperation in Eu-
rope, and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. Proposals 
for negotiating issues on a broad range of subjects and in-
terests were moving forward. Two agreements on strategic and 
political issues that resulted from successful negotiations 
were the September 3, 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, 
signed by the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and 
England. The September 24, 1971 Agreements on Measures to 
Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the u.s. 
and U.S.S.R., and the Agreement Between the u.s. and U.s.s.R. 
on Measures to improve the u.s. -U.S.S.R. Direct Communica-
tions Link as negotiated by the SALT delegations, and ap-
proved by President Nixon, were signed by Secretary Rogers on 
September 30, 1971. 
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These specific agreements began to produce a certain 
mushrooming effect. One successful endeavor was leading to 
another, and opening the possibility of progress at a steady 
pace, primarily because of the momentum these discussions 
generated, and the desire by Nixon and his administration to 
display this series of agreements as fuel for the upcoming 
1972 Presidential campaign. Soviet willingness was shown by 
their desire to negotiate concrete issues, and by the first 
objective expressed by Secretary Brezhnev as he addressed the 
Twenty-Fourth Party Congress in March, 1971, "a final recog-
nition of the territorial changes which took place in Europe 
18 
as a result of World War II." Consequently, on October 12, 
' 1971, in a joint communique by President Nixon and Secretary 
Brezhnev, the two stated their intent to meet in Moscow in 
the latter part of May, 1972, because of the progress in ne-
gotiations involving both parties. The communique specifi-
cally mentioned that both leaders would review all major 
issues "with a view toward further improving their bilateral 
19 
relations and enhancing the prospects for world peace." 
It is important to note the effect these pronouncements 
had on a Viet Nam weary American populace, and especially 
those active in foreign policy matters. The administration 
continued to stress that America had to awaken from past po-
18. U.S., State Department Bulletin, April-June, 1971, p.748. 
19. Ibid., Oct.-Dec., 1971, p.473. 
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1icies that led to involvements such as Viet Nam, and recog-
nize a world changed from the perceptions of the 1950's and 
1960's. In a report to the congress on February 9, 1972, 
u.s. Foreign Policy for the 1970's -The Emerging Structure 
for Peace, President Nixon stated that the world had indeed 
changed because of the economic recovery of Western Europe 
and Japan; the increased self-reliance of the post-colonial 
states; the breakdown of unity in the Communist Bloc; the 
end of unquestioned American strategic superiority; and the 
desire by the American people that other nations should bear 
an increased burden for their national defense, with the con-
sequent restrained American role. 
The administration began announcing a number of agree-
ments that had been negotiated with the Soviet Union. Nixon 
' would continue his commitment to detente, to a "new" policy, 
in a "new" world, in a "new" era, that demanded American com-
pliance in its realities. There can be no doubt that this 
veritable barrage of rhetoric carried with it an expectation 
of domestic rewards - votes in the upcoming election year -
and Nixon was making himself into the candidate of peace in 
Viet Nam, and the world at large. This should not be examined 
ln a cynical manner. The agreements were tangible enough, 
and the administration certainly did embark on a course that 
could take credit for foreign policy achievements with a de-
termined adversary. Nixon considered 1971 "the watershed 
year. The foundation laid and the cumulative effect of the 
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actions taken earlier enabled us to achieve, during the past 
year, changes 1n our foreign policy of historic scope and 
. . f. 20 
s1gn1 1cance." 
Nixon then gave a step-by-step notation of what had 
been accomplished. 
In February - we agreed on a treaty banning weapons of 
mass destruction from the ocean floor. In May - we broke 
the deadlock in the talks on limiting strategic arms, and 
agreed on a framework which made it possible to rescue 
progress. In September -we and our British and French 
allies reached an agreement with the Soviet Union in Ber-
lin to end the use of the citizens of West Berlin as Cold 
War hostages. In September- we agreed on a draft treaty 
prohibiting the production or possession of biological 
and toxic weapons. In November - the visits of the Sec-
retary. of ~ommerce to M?scow lo~king2Ioward a general norma11zat1on of econom1c relat1ons. 
Similar to the pieces of a complicated puzzle that be-
g1n to take form, a provocative series of negotiations was 
leading to the Basic Principles of Relations, the political 
' dimensions of detente. Henry Kissinger, at a news conference 
in Moscow on May 29, 1972, the date of the signing of the 
landmark agreements, sounded the tone of the administration 
in which his personal hand had had such an indomitable influ-
ence: 
For two years we have been engaged in negotiations on a 
broad range of issues with the Soviet Union. We are on 
the verge not just of success in this or that negotia-
tion, but of what could be a new relationship of benefit 
to all of mankind - a ne1v relationship in which, on both 
sides, whenever there is a danger of crisis, there will 
20. Ibid., March 13, 1972, p.314. 
21. Ibid., p.315. 
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be enough people who have a commitment to constructive 
progra~~ so that they could exercise restraining influ-
ences. 
In an address before a joint sess1on of Congress on 
June 1, 1972, President Nixon spoke glowingly of his triumph 
in Moscow, and beckoned the Congress to concur with the de-
liberations and agreements that were negotiated over a three 
year period. 
The foundation has been laid for a new relationship be-
tween the two most powerful nations in the world ••• The 
final achievement of the Moscow Conference was the sign-
ing of a landmark declaration entitled Basic Principles 
of Mutual Relations Between the u.s. and U.S.S.R. As 
these twelve basic principles are put into practice, they 
can provide a ~olid fr~mework f~r thz3future development of better Amer1can-Sov1et re1at1ons. 
What were these twelve principles that were designed to 
bridge the gap between the United States and the Soviet Un-
ion, establishing the political framework for the policy of 
I I 
detente? Throughout the debate on detente, the Basic Prin-
ciples would be prominently mentioned as examples that either 
the Cold War had ended, and a new era 1n Soviet-American rela-
tions had begun, or that the United States had fallen victim 
to a ruse delicately devised by Moscow. The twelve Basic 
Principles as signed by President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev 
can be summarized as follows: 
1) There is no alternative to peaceful coexistence in the 
nuclear age. Even though such state adheres to certain 
world views, these views should not hinder "normal rela-
22, Ibid., May, 1972, p.752. 
23, Ibid., June 26, 1972, p.855. 
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tions based on principles of sovereignty, equality, non-
interference in internal affairs, and mutual advantage." 
2) Both sides would strive to eliminate situations that 
could lead to political and military crisis. Negotia-
tions will continue to redress difficulties that have 
contributed to conflict. Neither side will conduct its 
policy with the view toward seeking "unilateral advantage 
at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly •.• " 
Security for both sides will be based on an equality of 
strength. 
3) Both sides will attempt to create conditions for a peace-
ful world order, and refrain from interfering in the in-
ternal affairs of other nations. 
4) Both sides will take notice that all agreements must be 
faithfully implemented. 
5) Both sides agree to continue the process of negotiating 
and discussing issues. 
6) Both sides "regard as the ultimate objective" complete 
disarmament. 
7) Improvement in commercial and economic fields. 
8) Increased contacts in science and technology. 
9) Improved cultural ties. 
10) Both sides will continue contacts "on a firm and long-
term basis." 
11) Both sides will recognize the sovereign equality of all 
states. Soviet-American relations will not be conducted 
to the detriment of other nations. 
12) The Basic Principles will not terminate any agreements 
that both sides have toward other nations.24 
' In the text of the Joint Communique, both sides agreed 
to continue efforts toward a reduction in tension. Great im-
portance was attached to the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agree-
24. Ibid., June 26, 1972, p.898. 
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ment limiting strategic offensive arms, and to other agree-
ments which were meant to facilitate efforts for cooperation 
in economic relations, maritime matters, cultural exchange, 
health, science and technology. The signing of the Basic 
principles was the culmination of a lengthy series of nego-
tiations involving issues of political, military, and eco-
nomic concern to both superpowers. An agreement was reached 
by which both sides sought to formalize their new relation-
ship. Time tested this new relationship. Each power would 
judge how the other approached the vitally important politi-
cal-military questions that were still unresolved. On many 
' an occasion Henry Kissinger reminded his listeners that de-
tente was "a continuing process" and not a "final condition." 
After the Presidential election of 1972, the process of 
' detente came increasingly under fire because of the SALT I 
Agreements, the Yom Kippur War of 1973, Soviet support for 
Marxist groups in Angola and Portugal, the downfall of Rich-
ard Nixon, and the consequent embarrassment to Henry Kissin-
ger. Nevertheless, two related agreements in the military-
political spheres were signed during President Ford's tenure 
in 1974 and 1975. These two agreements, the Vladivostok Ac-
cord of November 1974, and the Helsinki Agreements which 
were the product of the CSCE in July 1975, would continue to 
elicit both support and criticism from a wide array of domes-
tic observers. A brief explanation of Vladivostok and Hel-
sinki is in order. 
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The SALT I Agreements were a first step in the limita-
tion of strategic offensive arms. Because of the nuclear 
security requirements of the two superpowers, and the steady 
advancement of weapons technology, Washington and Moscow 
thought the SALT I Agreements would result in a "continuing 
process" to further reduce the volu..>ne of nuclear arms. The 
most vexing problem in negotiating a SALT II Agreement was 
what - by definition - is a strategic system? According to 
the u.s. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Soviet ap-
proach before the Valdivostok Accord was to define a strate-
gic system as one that accounted for the total nuclear arsen-
als of both sides that were capable of striking targets in 
the respective states. The Agency report goes on to state 
that this definition was "carefully tailored to include the 
u.s. -but not Soviet - tactical nuclear weapons in SALT ne-
gotiations."25 Expanding further in their desires, the So-
viets attempted to include the nuclear arsenals of u.s. al-
lies in the SALT deliberations without accounting for "medium-
based ballistic missiles and bombers in the Soviet Union which 
'k h . 26 can strl e t e same allles." 
The American response to the Soviet position, the Agen-
cy reported, was not to exclude these Soviet ideas in further 
discussions if u.s. allies were invited to partake as active 
25. U.s., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control 
Report, Publication 89 (July, 1976), p.30. 
26, Ibid., p.30. 
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participants. The American position was to "strenuously op-
pose attempts to use theoretical definitions as a way of im-
posing one-sided limitations," 27 particularly on the military 
forces of u.s. allies, but not on the Soviet systems. The 
Agency report concluded by stressing the importance of the 
Vladivostok Accord because of the establishment of balanced 
strategic systems such as ICBM's, SLBM's, and bombers, and 
the Soviet concessions in dropping demands to "include what 
28 they call U.s. 'forward-based systems. •" 
After the May, 1972 ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement 
was signed in Moscow, Paul Nitze stated that both sides 
agreed to continue the arms negotiations toward "a more com-
plete and balanced long-term agreement on offensive strategic 
29 
arms." The American posture, Nitze stated, advocated a 
policy that dealt with the "principles of equality in capa-
bilities, greater stability in the nuclear relationship be-
tween the two sides, and a mutual desire to reduce the re-
. d . 30 sources commJ.tte to strategJ.c arms." The Soviets thought 
otherwise, however, but did make concessions at Vladivostok. 
The equality of force levels as agreed to at Vladivos-
tok, and signed by President Ford and Secretary Brezhnev, was 
of major political importance, particularly as regards Soviet 
concessiors. What it did accomplish was to set near-parity 
2 7 . Ibid. , p. 31 . 
28. Ibid., p.30. 
29. Nitze, op. cit., p.218. 
30. Ibid., p.218. 
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in offensive strategic systems. Edward Luttwak coinmented 
that American negotiators saw "the equality in force levels 
d d . . . . h' 31 agree at Vla J.Vostok as a major negot1.at1.ng ac J.evement." 
prior to Vladivostok the American negotiators thought the 
numerical differences in strategic weapons of SALT I were 
unimportant. Luttwak gives Soviet diplomacy high marks for 
its skill in getting "higher force-level ceilings in 1972 as 
a free concession," then numerical parity at Vladivostok. 32 
' Another product of the detente process was the negotia-
tions that led up to the Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe. The CSCE had been an important goal of So-
viet foreign policy. If any time had been advantageous for 
the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies to finally persuade 
the West to partake in these discussions that would encom-
pass political and military questions, it was in the atmos-
' phere created by the momentum and success of detente. The 
Soviets, and especially Secretary Brezhnev, were particularly 
enthused as the assemblage of Foreign Ministers, Presidents, 
and their respective diplomats from East-West nations gath-
ered in Helsinki to sign the agreement that had for so long 
been a prime Soviet objective. 
31. Edward N. Luttwak, Strategic Power: Military Capabilities 
and Political Utility, The Center for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies, Georgetown University, (Beverly Hills, 
Calif: Sage Publications, 1976), p.l5. 
32. Ibid., p.15. 
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Basket I of the CSCE provided for the recognition of 
the European boundaries as a result of World war II. Basket 
II dealt with technological and economic cooperation that 
the Soviets felt they could extract from the west in return 
for restrained Soviet conduct in Europe. Basket III pro-
vided for the "free flow of people, information and ideas" 
across the European frontiers. This last Basket was prima-
rily a Western European proposal. The provisions of Basket 
III in the Helsinki Final Act did - like all the agreements 
' before it - spark a further debate on detente. 
' The third and final dimension of detente was the hope 
for a broadened economic relationship with the Soviet Union 
that would not only bring profits for American industry, but 
hopefully add another element to Kissinger's web of inter-
locking agreements: linkage. If the military and political 
' aspects of detente were goals of American and Soviet foreign 
policy, and with those objectives the politics of gains and 
concessions, the economic aspects seemed to be one-sided. 
The Soviets could continue to construct and enlarge at a 
rapid pace their conventional, tactical, and strategic weap-
ons system in the hope of catching and even by-passing Ameri-
can military might. They could, likewise, continue to base 
their foreign policy on their increased military power, and 
aid national liberation movements around the globe, while at 
the same time maneuvering in a determined and provocative 
fashion in Europe. What the Soviets did require were the 
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high quality and advanced Western - particularly American -
technology, economic assistance in the forms of loans and 
credits, and economic investment. It was in this area that 
' the West held the trump cards: no detente, as it was begin-
ning to take shape, no investment, loans, credits and tech-
nology. 
Economic negotiations were part and parcel of the de-
tente process. Benefits would accrue to both sides. In the 
1972 Basic Principles agreement, a section was composed and 
agreed to that was entitled "Commercial and Economic Rela-
tions." It read, in part: 
The two sides agree that realistic conditions exist for 
increasing economic ties. These ties should develop on 
the basis of mutual benefit and in accordance with gen-
erally accepted international practice. 33 
A U.S. -Soviet Joint Co~~ercial Commission was formed 
to explore the possibilities of what was expected to be an 
increase in trade, and to formulate principles and informa-
tion to facilitate the exchange of economic products. The 
initial overtures and commercial developments far exceeded 
any previous forecast. 
, 
The economic by-products of detente were beginning to 
show results to American industry. Soviet interest in a 
large truck plant, fertilizer plants, petroleum exploration 
' 33. Gerald L. Steibel, Detente: Promises and Pitfalls, Na-
tional Strategy Information Center, (New York: Crane, 
Russak & Co., 1975), p.34. 
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in Siberia, heavy-scale industrial machinery, and the pur-
chase of the latest in computer technology were economic 
possibilities that the Soviet Union was considering in its 
commercial dealings with the United States. A Board of Di-
rectors of the u.s. -U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council was 
formed, which consisted of high Soviet diplomats, the Soviet 
Minister of Foreign Trade, the Secretary of the Treasury, 
and the chairmen of twenty-six major corporations. 
At the October, 1972 meetings in which President Nixon 
agreed that the Soviet Union should be granted Most Favored 
Nation (MFN) status and credits from the Export-Import Bank, 
I 
a new controversy arose to plague detente: the question of 
Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. This economic-poli-
tical debate was expressed in an amendment offered by Repre-
sentatives Vanik and Mills to the Trade Reform Bill, and co-
sponsored in the Senate by Henry Jackson. The amendment be-
fore the bill stated that the Congress would deny MFN unless 
the Soviets eased restrictions on the emigration of Soviet 
Jews and other Soviet citizens that wished to emigrate. On 
December 11, 1973, the amendment passed the House by a vote 
of 319 to 80. 
Secretary of State Kissinger was understandably con-
cerned over the extremely menacing effect that an issue such 
as emigration could inflict on progress in economic and po-
litical matters. From the end of 1973 all through 1974, 
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Kissinger attempted to save the vestiges of progress that 
had seemed so likely only a year and a half before. The 
question of the relation of the stalled MFN and Export-Im-
port Bank credits to the emigration of Soviet Jews was unduly 
• interfering with the political aspects of detente. In a 
speech before the Center for the Study of Democratic Institu-
tions on October 8, 1973, Secretary Kissinger strongly de-
fended the administration's efforts in extending MFN status 
to the Soviet Union without tying it to a policy of increas-
ing the emigration of Jews and others. While admitting "a 
genuine moral dilemma" in this matter, Kissinger stated that 
there were limits as to how far the American government could 
press the Soviets in their internal affairs "without return-
ing to practices in its foreign policy that increase inter-
. 1 t . 34 natlona enslon." 
• In Secretary Kissinger's testimony on detente, before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he expressed his 
fears of the emigration issue and the potent debate it was 
• generating on the economic area of detente. 
The period of confrontation should have left little doubt 
however that economic boycott would not transform the 
Soviet system or impose upon it a conciliatory foreign 
policy ••• The question then became how trade and economic 
contact - in which the Soviet Union is obviously inter-
ested - could serve the purposes of peace. On the other 
hand, economic relations cannot be separated from the 
political context.35 
34. "Pacem in Terris III," Center Magazine, December, 1973, 
P. 15. 
35. Detente Hearings, p.252. 
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I 
In discussing the specific progress made since the de-
tente negotiations began, Kissinger acclaimed their signifi-
cance and the prospects for future improvement in economic-
political matters by stating that a number of beneficial and 
far-reaching economic agreements had been negotiated. Kis-
singer stated that no remonstration was voiced in regard to 
soviet internal matters, and the possibility of tying that 
to the furthering of trade while the negotiations were in 
process. Only after the agreements had been signed in 1972, 
Kissinger stated, were issues about Soviet internal affairs 
raised that could jeopardize "progress so painstakingly a-
hi. d 36 c eve ." 
And, finally, in discussing the linkage between the eco-
nomic outgrowth of policy and the knot being tied by the con-
cern for Soviet domestic policy, Kissinger stated that this 
type of linkage raised questions for the Soviet Union con-
cerning American dependability at the negotiating table. 
Kissinger believed that possibly over time the Soviet domes-
tic order would be modified because of trade and the realiza-
tion that the Soviet economy was strongly associated with, 
and dependent upon, the world economy. Such an awareness, 
Kissinger stated, would act as a stabilizing influence in 
Soviet-American relations. 
36. Ibid., p.252 
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One month after his testimony before the committee, 
Kissinger sent Senator Henry Jackson a letter stating the 
intention of the Soviet Union to ease restrictions on Soviet 
Jews and other applicants. Senator Jackson responded by 
stating that Congress would "apply a 'benchmark' of 60,000 
visas a year for would-be emigrants, irrespective of their 
' ' ' ' ' 37 
•race, rel1.g1.on or nat1.onal or1.g1.n. "' 
Congress finally passed the Trade Reform Act on Janu-
ary 3, 1975, but as a result of the amendments offered it was 
considerably less than what both the administration and the 
Soviet Union expected. The Soviet response was predictable. 
On January 10, 1975, the Soviets informed the administration 
that it could not comply with the provisions as imposed on 
the 1972 trade agreement, and refused to repay a $700 million 
World War II Lend-Lease debt. Such was a display of the lim-
t 
its of detente. 
Policy pronouncements in a free society do not pass 
unquestioned. And so it was - and is - with the history of 
t 
detente. Critical analysis attacked the military, political 
t 
and economic dimensions of detente. In July, 1975, Secre-
tary Kissinger launched an angry assault on his critics. 
Therefore, critics of detente must answer: what is the 
alternative that they propose? What precise policies do 
they want us to change? Are they prepared for a pro-
longed situation of dramatically increased international 
37. Steibel, op. cit., p.43. 
80 
danger? Do they wish to return to the constant crises, 
and high arms budgets of the Cold War? Does detente 
encourage repression - or is it detente that has gener-
ated the ferment and the demands for openness that we 
are now witnessing?38 
The next chapter will show that the answer was not long 
in coming. 
' 38. Theodore Draper, "Appeasement and Detente," Commentary, 
(February, 1976), p.33. 
CHAPTER V 
THE CRITICS RESPOND: 
' THE "REALIST" SCHOOL OF DETENTE 
The year 1973 can be labeled the period in which a con-
certed effort began to develop challenging the Nixan-Kissin-
' ger policy of detente. This effort was by no means limited 
to a specific organization dedicated to thwarting a continua-
tion of the administration's policy. Rather, a loose and 
informal arrangement of interest groups and individuals from 
a variety of political viewpoints launched a determined ef-
fort to call into question the present conduct of Soviet-
American relations. What had prompted this rather sudden and 
highly visible expression of dissenting opinion was the So-
viet conduct during the 1973 Middle East War. Prior to this 
political-military conflict that quickly involved both super-
I 
powers, the anti-detente forces had been quite submissive to 
the administration's policy endeavors. The lack of a strong 
, 
critical response during detente's high point of 1972 can be 
explained by the administration's successful China venture, 
I 
the fear that an attack on detente could possibly produce the 
opposite effect of benefiting the forces of George McGovern, 
' Who was perceived by the detente critics as highly incapable 
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of perfecting a strong defense posture, and by the prestige 
that the White House was enjoying as a result of an active 
foreign policy. By the end of 1972, the challenge which 
Henry Kissinger had initiated by requesting the for~ign poli-
cy debate was reaching a height of concern. By the end of 
the 1973 War, a full-fledged debate was apparent. One may 
assume that even Kissinger was shocked by the totality and 
extent of this critical response. 
I 
The critical responses that were directed at detente 
from the Presidency of Richard Nixon to the end of Gerald 
Ford's tenure, had its origins in a historical-ideological 
viewpoint that was suspicious of any type of positive Soviet 
response to a rapproachment; and in another source that was 
primarily concerned with the political and military conse-
quences of the recent American acceptance of nuclear parity, 
the result of which - the critics stated - would be a shift-
lng of the balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union. 
The ideological criticisms derived from a view of the world 
political conditions from the end of World War I to the pres-
ent. Specifically, this observation focused on the Bolshevik 
seizure of power in Russia, and the international and demes-
tic behavior of the Soviet state. American observers were 
perplexed as to what course the Bolshevik Revolution would 
eventually take. From the Bolshevik Revolution to the Second 
World War, Russia was a mystery -and dangerous. From the 
end of World War II, Russia was not only dangerous, it was 
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implacable. 
Much of this ideological view dealt with the concern 
about the Soviet espousal of their Marxist viewpoint. Marx-
ist ideology views conflict between the capitalist and work-
ing classes as a natural state of affairs. This also in-
eludes conflict among nations that adhere to diverging eco-
nomic systems, such as capitalism versus socialism or Cornrnun-
ism. American policy-makers, particularly after World War II, 
evaluated Soviet foreign policy as an attempt to disrupt the 
international political community, pursuing Soviet political-
military and ideological desires wherever possible. 1 Because 
of this Soviet post-war proclivity toward provocation (the 
Korean war and the Berlin Crisis stand as examples), many 
American policy observers believed that the Soviets were in-
capable of modifying their policy from one of propagating a 
revolutionary ideology, to one of acting in a responsible and 
t 
non-belligerent manner. Even during the height of detente in 
1972, a deep suspicion was felt by some policy observers to-
ward what the Nixon administration believed was a Soviet 
modification of policy in seeking a genuine rapproach~ent 
t 
with the United States. As such- detente critics would 
1. Such views on the part of American foreign policy-makers 
were not representative of one party or political view-
point. Domestic liberals such as George Kennan and Dean 
Acheson were often in agreement with conservatives on how 
to counter Soviet power. 
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state - Soviet willingness to embark upon a new relationship 
with the United States was only a temporary phenomenon, with 
the Soviets inevitably returning to their old habits of seek-
ing to dominate an opponent by striving for advantage, then 
ultimately gaining the upper hand. This view, critics state, 
was evidenced by a reading of Soviet foreign policy, and by 
its ideological dictates that require the active prolifera-
tion of Marxism globally. 
Another critical response surfaced from the concerns of 
the recent political-military negotiations that had begun 
with the Nixon Presidency, specifically the Basic Principles 
and the SALT agreements. These concerns were particularly 
sensitive to those who felt that America had succumbed in 
military strength to a surging Soviet commitment to approach 
equivalent strategic levels. In the political sphere, the 
Soviets were viewed as indeed dangerous, but certainly not 
implacable. American policy had to be revitalized, and probe 
for areas of agreement with the Soviets that would be benefi-
' cial to both sides. The Nixon-Kissinger years of detente at 
least exhibited a willingness to embark on an active foreign 
policy. By President Ford's tenure, the public perception of 
2. Most detente critics did not accept the Nixon-Kissinger 
proposition that the Soviets would agree to a consistent 
and long-term policy of reduced international tension. 
Critics such as Ball, Tucker, Schlesinger, Meany and Zum-
walt believed that the Soviets would not accede to a new 
policy in which limitations would be imposed on their 
political, military and ideological power. 
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detente had waned amidst the 1973 War and the consequent oil 
embargo, Soviet disregard for the human rights basket signed 
at Helsinki, and the Soviet involvement in Portugal and 
Africa. 
The critics of the recent political-military overtures 
to the Soviet Union of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger policy be-
I 
lieved that detente was providing the Soviets with an oppor-
tunity to increase their global influence at the expense of 
I 
an American commitment to preserve the balance of power. De-
tente simply was not meeting with the expectations original-
ly thought conducive to American interests. A re-evaluation 
of political strategy was required, accepting the fact that 
the Soviets would continue the "search for marginal advan-
tages" whenever and wherever politically beneficial to their 
national interest. 
I 
These detente critics shall be identified in this chap-
' ter as the "realist" school of detente. This realist school 
should not be confused with the school of "realism" in po-
litical science. The school of "realism" in international 
relations in America reached a degree of prominence after the 
Second World War, when certain observers - Hans Morgenthau is 
a leading exponent - adhered to the premise that the use of 
power on the global scene should be the prime focus in any 
Political consideration. This use of power, and the power 
relations among nations which make up the balance of power, 
is the objective reality by which nation-states pursue poli-
3 
tical goals. 
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Those individuals that accept the approach of the 
school of realism have maintained that American objectives 
should be based on the dynamics of power. Such advocates 
stress the need to deal with competitive states - specifical-
1y the Communist nations - on the basis of power and "reali-
ty," and not to pursue policy objectives primarily because of 
ideological or moral considerations. The label "realist" in 
the context of this debate does not describe any particular 
type of school of political analysis, but rather a descrip-
' tive term to differentiate the supporters ("orthodox" de-
tentists) from the opponents ("realists"). 
What the realists were lobbying for was a rethinking of 
American foreign policy toward the main competitor. This was 
thought necessary because those presently in command of for-
eign policy had misinterpreted Soviet intentions, believing 
the Kremlin would be content with nuclear parity and bringing 
the international political conflict into some form of reso-
lution. The realists held to two evaluations of Soviet poli-
cy quite different from the political interpretation of the 
Nixon-Kissinger efforts. One contention analyzed Soviet 
strategic policy as willing to accept nuclear parity with the 
United States only as a means to gain time, then to ultimate-
3. For a much broader acquaintance with the "realist" school 
of political thought, see Cecil v. Crabb, American For-
eign Policy in the Nuclear Age (New York: Harper and Row, 
1965). 
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ly push ahead into a position of nuclear superiority. In no 
sense would the Soviets be content with anything but a mili-
tary superiority that would guarantee them the power to dic-
tate their political desires. The other contention judged 
the Soviets as unwilling to be satisfied with nuclear parity 
and political stability. While not completely accepting the 
notion that the Soviets were bent on a policy of near-total 
nuclear superiority, this view held that they would strive 
for advantages of a political and military kind that would 
always keep them one step ahead of American strength, and 
thus capable of defending - and projecting - their interests 
globally. 
What should be kept in mind is that many of the critics 
were not wholeheartedly antagonistic to the entire policy of 
t 
detente, particularly members of Congress. Some of the crit-
ics felt, particularly in the early stages of the Nixon-
t 
Brezhnev detente in 1972, that at least an attempt was being 
made to alleviate present - and prevent future - forms of 
conflict. The policy was at least being given the oppor-
tunity to succeed or fail on its own merits. Time, and the 
political and military situation, were to be the indicator of 
whether the policy was fundamentally sound. The Soviet Un-
ion's international and domestic behavior was being carefully 
scrutinized to see if they would comply with the spirit of 
the Basic Principles. 
Professor Stephen Gibert of Georgetown University and 
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senior Research Consultant at the Strategic Studies Center 
of the Stanford Research Institute, provides a description 
of the realist school. Gibert notes that the realists tend 
to accord more attention to Soviet capabilities and less 
to Soviet intentions. This group believes that there is 
such a thing as politically usable military superiority 
..• Although acknowledging the frightfulness of nuclear 
war, realists believe that it is possible that such a 
war may be employed as a conscious instrument of national 
policy and that an outcome which clearly differentiates 
the winner from the loser will occur. Furthermore, they 
think that detente is making it more likely that Soviet 
Russia, not America, will win such a war.4 
Gibert further explains the realist position by point-
ing to the proclivity of the realists to be suspicious of 
Soviet intentions. They do not accept the rationale of the 
' detentists that Moscow is now inclined toward accepting the 
status quo, or that the age of ideology has been buried. 
Gibert states that "many of this school of thought think, 1n 
fact, that Moscow does indeed intend war with the United 
States in the future. At the minimum, the realists believe 
that the U.S.S.R. will use force to change the international 
. h h h 'h . 5 system 1n cases were t ey cans ort of war w1t Amer1ca." 
In short, the Soviets will actively continue to stifle 
the American and Western political and military positions and 
not abandon their search for "marginal advantages." Only one 
month after the Basic Principles were signed in May of 1972, 
4. Stephen P. Gibert, Soviet Images of America (New York: 
Crane, Russak & Co., 1977), p.18. 
5. Ibid. , p. 19. 
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secretary Brezhnev stated that although peaceful coexistence 
would continue to mark Soviet foreign policy, the ideologi-
cal struggle between the capitalist and Communist systems 
would intensify. At the Twenty-Fifth Party Congress in 1976, 
' Brezhnev stated that detente would not "abolish or alter, the 
laws of class struggle •.• We make no secret of the fact that 
' we see in detente the way to create more favorable conditions 
for peaceful socialist and Communist construction." 6 
Professor Robert Conquest, Senior Fellow of the Hoover 
Institution on war, Revolution and Peace, and author of The 
Great Terror, enlarges on these thoughts by explaining that 
the "Soviet leadership are frank in their public speeches 1n 
' 7 describing detente ••• as itself a form of struggle." The 
ideology of class struggle is a serious belief that the So-
viets adhere to, and not just a form of intellectual argu-
' ment. Detente has thus become, Conquest believes, another 
political tactic that the Soviets will use to further their 
own national interest. 
Walter Laqueur, Chairman of the Research Council of the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, 
D.c. wrote that the "great expectations prevailing in 1971-
1972 have on the whole given way to a more realistic assess-
ment."8 American policy-makers miscalculated Soviet inten-
6. Ibid. , p. 135. 
7. Robert Conquest, et al., Defending America (New York: 
Basic Books, 1977), p.209. 
8. Walter Laqueur, "Confronting the Problems," Commentary, 
LXIII (March, 1977), p.37. 
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tions, particularly the Soviet notion of peaceful coexistence 
and the proclivity to pursue the ideological struggle. La-
queur states that the Soviets "never promised to 'freeze' 
the global balance of power, nor have they ever said that 
they would not make the most of Western weaknesses and in-
decision."9 The fault, therefore, lies not with the Soviets 
for attempting to pursue their political ambitions, but with 
American policy-makers who have made an insufficient effort 
to understand the political psychology of the Kremlin leader-
ship. 
' The political criticism of detente reflected a skepti-
cism of present American policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, 
' especially since detente's pre-eminent year of 1972. What, 
some critics would inquire, was the actual difference between 
' detente as fashioned by Nixon-Kissinger, and the past policy 
of containment, besides a shift in mood? Robert w. Tucker 
of Johns Hopkins University has written that while Nixon-
Kissinger strove to diminish the effects of containment aimed 
at the Soviet Union and China, and create a stable world or-
der, this notion cannot be interpreted as a reduction in So-
viet-American competition. Tucker believes that the dramat-
' ics that accumulated from the Nixon-Kissinger practice of de-
tente left an impression that the great power competition had 
' ended. Detente was still a form of containment, Tucker states, 
9. Ibid., p.37. 
91 
but "without tears and without the term that had once been 
. d b . d d 10 w1dely accepte ut was now carefully avo1 e ." 
Tucker commented that the effects of the domestic de-
bate emanating from the Viet Nam experience would eventually 
I 
have its effect on the detente debate. As such, a change of 
expressions and language was thought to have produced a great 
policy alteration. To Tucker and other critics of the real-
ist school, the superpower competition in the post-war world 
required American policy-makers to devise a strategy to con-
tain the Soviet Union without resorting to nuclear warfare. 
t 
Detente was substituted by Nixon and Kissinger in place of 
containment, and that, Tucker states, was a misguided act. 
I 
Tucker accuses the proponents of detente as having fostered 
I 
and encouraged the notion that detente has ended the Cold War 
and containment. This "magical connection between words and 
. 11 . . . h . th1ngs" 1S not a rea11st1c assessment of t e u.s. - sov1et 
rivalry. 
One of the more outspoken detractors of the Nixon-Ford-
I 
Kissinger policy of detente is former Ambassador George W. 
Ball. Ball resembles many critics from the realist school 
I 
in his denunciation of not only the 1-10rd "detente" but also 
the political policy as shaped by Nixon and Kissinger. While 
I 
in agreement with those who support detente that the Soviet-
' 10. Robert w. Rucker, "Beyond Detente," Commentary, (March, 
1977), p.46. 
11. Ibid., p.47. 
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American competition must be brought under some form of reso-
' 1ution, Ball believes the whole conduct of the detente poli-
cy smacked too much of a Broadway production. Ball calls 
' the "inherent ambiguity" of detente, its slogans such as the 
' 
"spirit of detente," and the impression that person-to-person 
diplomacy between leaders can substitute for the rigors of 
traditional diplomatic practice, "has become such an over-
used phrase that the skin has worn off to disclose precisely 
nothing. Its constant flogging by political writers has made 
it as cheap and commercial as the 'spirit of Christmas."• 12 
' Ball not only criticizes the politics of detente, but 
' attacks those who have too readily labeled critics of detente 
as "cold warriors," "a term of opprobrium, since there is a 
school of thought that regards cold warriors as a threat to 
the peace, because they encourage the wrong Russians," 13 
meaning the more provocative military elite as opposed to the 
more "peaceful" Brezhnev civilian group. So, to George Ball, 
' detente has become an oversold production that promised too 
much, leaving the impression and hope that Soviet-American 
conflict would easily enter a new era of cooperation, re-
straint and an abrogation of conflict. The weakness of this 
logic, to Ball, was that it misjudged to an appreciable ex-
tent the global interests of soviet political and military 
12. George W. Ball, Diplomacy for a Crowded World (Boston: 
Little, Brown & Co., 1976), p.SS. 
13. Ibid., p.86. 
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concerns. 
The first lack of realism, according to Ball, involves 
the conduct of the United States as it views its purposes and 
' goals on a global scale. No detente as such can stop the So-
viets from acting in a unilateral manner, much in the same 
way that Nixon and Kissinger conducted so much of their for-
eign policy in like circumstances. Ball states that the so-
viets relate their strategic policies in terms of power and 
ideology, and if Henry Kissinger wishes to act the unilater-
alist, "the Soviets seem as addicted to playing a lone role 
14 
of maneuver as is the Secretary." 
Ball's criticism echoes much the same concerns that 
• 
other critics have followed: if detente is to spell an end 
to Soviet-American conflict, and form a policy by which joint 
cooperation can resolve the sources of conflict before it in-
evitably leads to a nuclear showdown, then unilateralism must 
cease. If it does not, then what change has there been? 
A second lack of realism, Ball states, is not to have 
grabbed the opportunity to extract conditions from the So-
viets for our economic and technological assistance. Thus, 
American policy could have demanded that the Soviets modify 
their international policies. If the Soviets continue to ob-
struct American policies that attempt to solve world-wide 
problems, then Ball questions the wisdom of assisting the So-
14. ~., p.123. 
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viets in correcting many of their pressing technological and 
agricultural deficiencies. As long as the Soviets find it in 
their interest to play the game of superpower politics, Ball 
states, and not to substantially reconcile their views and 
I 
actions as befits a comprehensive detente, then the United 
states would be remiss not to oppose them. 
I 
Ball would label the references by Kissinger to detente 
as the "mindless chatter" of a professor who should know bet-
I 
ter. Underlying Nixon and Kissinger's policy of detente was 
the thesis of the Soviet Union's diminished reliance on revo-
lutionary doctrine. The Soviet Union, in Nixon and Kissin-
ger's view, was ready to accept the present balance of power 
with American incentives reinforcing that avenue. The le-
gitimacy of the existing international system would be ac-
cepted. 
George Ball questions the accuracy of such perceptions. 
Has the American acceptance of Soviet strategic parity 
prompted the Soviets to alter their actions and become a 
power interested in stability? Ball views such assertions as 
ridiculous, prompting him to remark that "that young skeptic, 
Professor Kissinger, would have thought the idea quite fool-
ish ... 15 
I 
In Ball's final critique of detente, he not only ques-
tions whether the policy will result in a more relaxed atmos-
15. Ibid., p.l25. 
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phere between the Soviet Union and the United States, but is 
r 
clearly pessimistic that detente can resolve third party con-
flicts, such as in Africa and the Middle East. To Ball, that 
' 16 is "t}J.e acid test of detente." 
Professor Hans Morgenthau, a realist to be sure, levels 
r 
his doubts of detente in much the same manner as George Ball. 
writing in 1972, Morgenthau expressed his concern over the 
r 
dramatics of detente and the public images it had created. 
r 
To Morgenthau, a realistic assessment of detente is that it 
has not brought about peace, and will not do so in the fore-
r 
seeable future. Rather, detente simply eased some tensions 
of the political-military rivalry. This is, Morgenthau 
states, progress that will be beneficial in three areas: 
"the global atmosphere, international power relations, and 
nuclear arms control. How extensive and lasting these ac-
complishments will ultimately prove to be, of course, only 
the future can show." 17 
The ideological rivalry of the Cold War has eased, says 
Morgenthau, so it would be highly unlikely for both sides to 
return to it. However, political conflicts will continue, 
although lacking the ideological combativeness of past years. 
Disputes will be conditioned on a more traditional basis of 
16. Ibid., p.126. 
17. HanS Morgenthau, "After the Summit: Superpower Politics," 
New Leader, (June 26, 1972), p.11. 
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conflict, i.e., power conflicts 1n which both sides strive 
for advantage. 
' Morgenthau, writing in 1975, sees detente as having 
succeeded in some areas, while having failed in others. Pro-
gress in the areas of strategic arms negotiations, a subsid-
ing of the ideological tensions of the past, lowering of 
East-West tensions in Europe, and even in the area of Middle 
' East negotiations, a form of detente has occurred. But as 
' George Ball has also written, there is no detente in third 
party struggles throughout the globe. Morgenthau states that 
the "same tensions exist as existed before because the same 
incompatible objectives exist on both sides of the dividing 
line. And here is the intellectual and political danger in 
' 18 the term 'detente.'" 
' Politically, Morgenthau asks, what does detente mean as 
a policy if it fails to act as an incentive for the super-
powers to resolve and avoid involvements in conflicts between 
third parties? The danger exists, Morgenthau believes, that 
neither superpower will concede part of its strength or its 
participation in small, localized conflicts when political 
advantages can be acquired. Even though it seems apparent 
' that detente has not succeeded in this area, Morgenthau 
states, the public expectations that quite naturally followed 
' 18. Henry Friedlander and George Schwab (ed.), Detente in 
Historical Perspective (New York: Cyrco Press, 1975), 
p.76. 
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the Nixon administration's pronouncements have now produced a 
' disillusioning effect. Detente has become an illusion, Mor-
genthau believes, his primary concern being that it "creates 
public expectations which may not be fulfilled," and the dif-
ficulty of discerning "between means and ends in foreign 
. 19 polJ.cy." 
Paul Seabury, Professor of Political science, Universi-
ty of California at Berkeley, and a member of the Council on 
Foreign Relations and the editorial board of ORBIS, is like-
wise concerned with the public expectations that have fol-
' lowed detente. The danger of these public expectations, as 
Seabury views it, is that the public will expect a much di-
minished role of America's obligations to self and allies. 
' Seabury notes, like George Ball and Hans Morgenthau, that de-
tente has created public expectations which cannot be at-
tained. While the general public may be persuaded to believe 
that the Cold War has ended, the actual fact is that the So-
viets do not adhere to this notion, and continue to pursue 
policies that have been "merely rechanneled into areas of op-
. d b . 20 portun1ty an enefJ.t." 
' Seabury notes that the detente policy of the Nixon ad-
ministration received its greatest support from a population 
19 . Ibid. , p. 77. 
20. Paul Seabury, et al., Defending America, (New York: Basic 
Books, 1977), p.209. 
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weary of the Viet Nam involvement, and the continuing global 
' competition in general. Detente held out the promise of not 
just an easing of Cold war tension, but possibly even the 
erasing of the political and ideological rivalries between 
the superpowers. This view, shared by a large segment of the 
population, was an over-optimistic and unrealistic appraisal 
' of the international environment. Detente was built upon 
21 
what Seabury notes as "pillars of strength," the political 
and military balance of power. It is the equality of 
strength that exists between the two superpowers that pro-
vided them the opportunity to negotiate a number of impor-
' tant issues. Yet, Seabury notes, the promises of detente can 
leave the dangerous impression that these "pillars of 
strength" are no longer necessary. 
Seabury concluded by mentioning that the Soviets have 
purposefully refrained from imbuing their citizens with any 
false hopes that their ideological pursuits will be abandon-
ed. 
' Some critics review past periods of Soviet detente, and 
see in those actions lessens that can possibly indicate fu-
ture Soviet conduct. Professor Gerald Steibel, Director of 
Foreign Affairs Research for the Research Institute of Ameri-
ca, labels six time periods in which Soviet policy moved for 
21. Ibid., p.241. 
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' a detente with adversaries. These periods can be summarized 
as follows: 
' 1) 1920, The Lenin Detente - Lenin and Soviet Russia, be-
cause of the continuing civil war, massive crop failures, 
its economy in ruins, and their hopes for world revolu-
tion, particularly in Europe, standing little chance for 
success, sought help from the west to assist in economic 
recovery. 
' 2) 1935, Stalin's Detente - This period produced Stalin's 
concern over the Nazi threat emanating from Germany's re-
armament. He ordered the Communist Parties of Europe to 
join their political counterparts in "popular fronts" to 
resist Fascism. 
' 3) 1941, The Devil's Detente -The need for Russia and the 
West to band together to defeat Nazi Germany. 
' 4) 1954, Khrushchev's Detente - Phase One - Soviet-American 
decision to negot1ate an ABM Treaty and limitation on 
offensive nuclear arms. 
' 5) 1968, Brezhnev•s Detente - Phase One - Soviet-American de-
cision to negotiate an ABM Treaty and limitation on offen-
sive nuclear arms. 
' 6) 1972, Brezhnev•s Detente - Phase Two - The ABM Treaty; 
limitation on ICBM and SLBM's; and the Basic Principles 
were the highlights.22 
' Steibel remarks that with each period of detente, opti-
mism was followed by disappointment and conflict. While not 
' overly critical of detente as other detractors, Steibel does 
' place detente in these perspectives: 
. ' . F1rst, detente 1s an up and down affair, not a straight 
line evolution. Second, detente is an institutionaliza-
tion of conflict, not a replacement for it .•• Detente is 
relaxation to permit conflict to continue on less danger-
ous levels. Entente is the abolition of conflict and the 
' 22. Gerald L. Steibel, Detente: Promises and Pitfalls (New 
York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1975), Pp.4-11. 
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movement toward full amity and alliance. The distinc-
tion must be kept in mind if detente is to be handled 
effectively. Third, detente has become a negotiating 
process.23 
' Steibel concludes by stating that past detentes have 
proven that the Nixon-Kissinger variety will stand little 
chance of success in the areas of crisis management and the 
' elimination of "marginal advantages." Rather, detente will 
alternate between periods that will benefit both sides. In 
' other words, detente will be selective and not all-encompass-
ing as Kissinger hoped. 
Theodore Draper, who has written extensively for Com-
' mentary, views detente as a form of appeasement. This was 
done not by design, but by a terrible miscalculation of the 
world political realities, especially as concerns the Soviet 
quest for hegemony. While touching upon the notion by some 
' ' advocates of detente that there is no middle area between de-
tente and Cold War, Draper answers by asking: "'Do you want 
to go back to appeasement?' In fact, an even more incredible 
. 
question might be: 'Do you realize that appeasement was 
. ' 24 built 1nto detente?'" 
Draper, not too unlike other critics, views Soviet ad-
vantages accruing from their ability to extract political and 
military concessions from an American-inspired policy that 
23. Ibid., p.12. 
' 24. Theodore Draper, "Appeasement and Detente," Commentary, 
LXI (February 1976), p.28. 
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has provided them this opportunity. Accordingly, they have 
' utilized the American thrust for detente to conspire with the 
Arabs in the 1973 War, to assist the Cubans in Angola, and to 
repress Jews and dissidents. Economically and technological-
1y, the Soviets have everything to gain and nothing to lose. 
In the Soviet view of international politics, Draper points 
out, is the Soviet proclivity toward analyzing an adversary's 
potential strengths through more than just its military make-
up, but by what they perceive as the "correlation of forces," 
which takes into account factors such as political will, 
' allies, economic health, ideology, and military acumen. De-
tente has been a miscalculation of policy from the very be-
ginning, Draper states, because of the divergent world views 
held by each superpower, and how they analyze political e-
vents and the possibility of gain. To the Soviets, Draper 
states, "what always counts most is the relationship of 
25 forces, not the arrangement of words." 
Draper mentions two factors which have contributed to 
what he views as appeasement: linkage and its policy of in-
centives, and a policy of non-interference in Soviet internal 
' affairs. Appeasement was built into detente, Draper states, 
because of the willingness by the United States to placate 
the Soviets in the area of nuclear arms, economics, tech-
25. Ibid., p.31. 
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nology, and a lackadaisical attitude toward the question of 
human rights. American acceptance of Soviet desires provided 
the Soviets with advantages which they would not have been 
able to extract solely by themselves. To Draper, the Soviets 
are now in an unmistakably expansionist and imperialist 
' phase, and no efforts toward detente can "appease the un-
appeaseable." 26 
If the Soviets are indeed "unappeaseable" vlhat are 
' their reasons for detente? And how do they view its bene-
' fits? Critics and supporters of detente have taken two dif-
ferent positions in this analysis. In studying the debate 
between these two schools of thought, a clearer view can be 
established that assists one in the search for Soviet moti-
' vations. Supporters of detente see the Soviet need for tech-
nology and economic assistance, and a need to lessen the ex-
pensive and massive nuclear arms race, plus the Soviets' de-
sire to avoid a military confrontation with the United States, 
and to be regarded as a great power on a par with American 
' strength. Critics of detente view a different set of criteria 
' ' for the Soviet acceptance of detente. Detente has provided 
the Soviets with a change in tactics to further isolate and 
outflank the Americans while gaining unique advantages that 
were denied them in the past. Lawrence Whetten commented 
' that it is a widely asserted notion that detente has not pro-
2 6. Ibid. , p. 36. 
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duced the expected results that the West at one time thought 
possible. This recognition rests upon the misconception by 
. d . . . d . . 27 the Un1te States of Sov1et m1l1tary an pol1t1ca1 power. 
The United States has incorrectly analyzed soviet tech-
nological capabilities, states Whetten. Even more signifi-
cant was the Am~rican attitude in misperceiving Soviet poli-
tical intentions, particularly what advantages the Soviets 
would theoretically perceive within the context of strategic 
superiority. Whetten views the Soviets as following a course 
not too dissimilar from that which American foreign policy 
adhered to in the 1960's: exercise restraint against a weak 
rival while maintaining overwhelming superiority. Political 
"points" can be accumulated with such a policy, and Whetten 
feels that this analysis has been the primary motive for So-
I 
viet detente policy. Whetten views such Soviet attitudes as 
"one of the most significant accomplishments of the Brezhnev 
28 
era." 
Hans Morgenthau sees a much more specific need for the 
I 
Soviet acceptance of detente. First, is the fear of China, 
a nuclear China, and what could be the terrible results of 
having to engage in a two front war. The second reason is 
t~at the Soviets recognize their inability to compete with 
27. Lawrence L. Whetten, The Future of Soviet Military Power 
(New York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1976), p.14. 
2 8. Ibid. , p. 14. 
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the West in terms of technological and economic strength. 
And, to Morgenthau, the third consideration is the Soviet 
political objective to end American influence in Western 
Europe, and destroy NATO through means short of war, isolate 
29 
west Germany and then dominate it under Soviet power. 
Professor George Schwab, a member of the Board of Di-
rectors of the National Committee of American Foreign Policy, 
' views Moscow's motives for detente as a tactical change. 
' schwab does not accept the premise of the detentists that the 
soviets have appreciably diminished the use of their ideology 
in the quest for political goals, nor does he discredit the 
' ' possibility that detente may lead to appeasement. The de-
tentists have misinterpreted Moscow's political and strate-
gic intentions, "and have, thereby, seen only what Moscow at 
this moment wishes to convey to the West." 30 
Schwab, like Morgenthau, sees the Soviet motivation 
' behind detente spurred on because of a fear of a nuclear 
China, and the consequent possibility of having to fight a 
two front war. The military dimension, and the need to pro-
teet their Russian flanks in Europe and Asia, have forced the 
Soviets to re-align their political policy. To prevent such 
a possibility from occurring, the Soviets have embarked on a 
two-pronged course, Schwab noted, "which on the surface may 
29. Friedlander and Schwab, op. cit., p.lOO. 
30. Ibid., p.l43. 
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appear contradictory, but in fact, form two sides of a 
coin." 31 The Kremlin's long-range military target is to sub-
stantially weaken the military capabilities of Western Europe 
and the united States, while at the same time acquiring fi-
nancial credits, Western technology, and trade. Schwab con-
eludes by stating that the course the United States embarked 
' h ' ' f d' ' ' 1 32 on Wlt lts pollcy o etente lS "partla appeasement," 
since the u.s. has reacted with insufficient strength and 
resolve in permitting the Soviets to gain political and mili-
tary strength at American expense. 
Frank R. Barnett, President of the National Strategy 
' Information Center also views Soviet motives for detente in a 
questionable light. Critical of Secretary Kissinger's belief 
' that if detente falters the Cold War will escalate in a new 
and more frightening nuclear dimension, Barnett spoke frankly 
in an address before the D.c. League of Republican Women on 
April 5, 1976. 
Barnett spoke of Kissinger's "historical dream" of 
Washington, Moscow, and Peking forging a "Twentieth Century 
equivalent of the Holy Alliance" 33 to settle questions such 
as strategic arms, the prevention of nuclear war, and closer 
ties through trade and technology. But a perusal of Kis-
singer's actions have led to disappointments, and the di-
31. Ibid., p.146. 
32. Ibid., p.146. 
33. National Strategy Information Center, Alternatives to 
Detente, (New York, 1976), p.5. 
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chotomy that exists between Soviet and American perceptions 
' ' of detente. To the Soviets, detente has been regarded as 
another political instrument to acquire advanced Western 
technology, "and a strategy-through-time by which the Soviets 
. - 34 
hope to change the correlat1on of world forces." 
Barnett notes the Soviets' preference for using peace-
' ful coexistence instead of detente. Although the Soviets do 
wish to avoid a nuclear war, they will continue to wage 
"ideological war, class war, economic war and propaganda war 
35 
as usual." They will, true to their Marxist faith and past 
practices, continue to provide support for "liberation move-
ments" wherever they feel it is politically wise. The So-
viets will continue to have a dialogue with the United States 
to avoid a nuclear showdown, but this will not - and has not 
- hindered them from acting in a provocative manner by sup-
plying the North Vietnamese with the equipment and techno-
logy to conquer South Viet Nam; failure to warn Washington 
of the impending Arab attack in the 1973 Middle East war; the 
Soviets and their Cuban "Gurkhas" supporting "wars of nation-
al liberation," as in Angola; and the large-scale Soviet fi-
nancing of Marxist elements to take power in Portugal. As 
for Secretary Kissinger's concern for the after-effects of 
' a failed detente, Barnett stated that the Cold War never 
34. Ibid. , p. 5 • 
35. Ibid., p.7. 
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turned nuclear, and that "there is a middle ground between 
shipping grain on credit (plus turning our back on Solzhenit-
) d . . . 36 syn an shootlng mlSSlles." 
James Schlesinger, a former Secretary of Defense under 
president Ford, until he resigned because of disagreements 
t 
over defense and detente policy, has been one of the more 
' critical opponents of detente. Worried over the rapid Soviet 
' military build-up, he sees detente as having offered some 
type of relaxant to cure the nation's frustration and anxiety 
over Viet Nam, and notes that the Soviets have not failed to 
extract advantages from these debilitations. Part and parcel 
of these qualms about Soviet intentions is what Schlesinger 
views as an unmistakable Soviet urge to utilize their ideo-
logical, political, and military tools as weapons in the 
search for "marginal advantages." In stating the American 
desire that the Soviets would continue to exhibit a more 
permanent attitude in realigning their foreign policy, 
Schlesinger states that American policy-makers had hoped the 
Soviets would share the American concern for stability, and 
that many of the political issues that separated the two ri-
vals could be resolved by linkage. Schlesinger echoes the 
opinions of Morgenthau, Barnett, Ball, and Schwab, in stating 
that the Soviets have not abandoned, or even diminished, the 
36, Ibid., p.7. 
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' ideological conflict, using detente as another political wea-
pon that will benefit them in "wrenching from the West eco-
nomic, political, or military advantages - marginal or other-
wise."37 The outcome of these Soviet actions and policies 
has been the disappearance of linkage as an American concept, 
' reducing detente to the concerns of avoiding nuclear war, and 
containing Soviet political and military objectives. 
Professor Eugene V. Rostow of Yale, former Under-Secre-
tary of State for Political Affairs from 1966 to 1969, be-
lieves that Soviet strategy was responsible for the military 
defeat of South Viet Nam after the 1972 Basic Principles were 
signed. He saw Soviet designs to knockout China, and the So-
viet policy to convince the Arabs to starve Western Europe 
and America with an oil embargo as a result of the Middle 
East War. How close the Soviets came to accomplishing the 
totality of these ambitions is frightening to Rostow. 
' The Soviets have used detente to strengthen their poli-
tical and military positions in Europe, the Middle East and 
Asia. Rostow believes that the Soviets were adept at cor-
rectly assessing the m.cod of the American public - and gov-
ernment - in not wishing to become embroiled in foreign in-
volvements because of Korea and Viet Nam. The Soviets have 
shunned rash and dramatic actions, having opted to portray 
37. James Schlesinger, et al., Defending America (New York: 
Basic Books, 1977), Pp.xi-xii. 
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themselves as the party which is favorably inclined toward 
' detente, while nevertheless acting in a manner to encourage 
conflict by supporting groups and nations which injure Ameri-
can and Western interests. With this dual policy, Rostow 
states, the Soviet "program of war was therefore dressed in 
. . . 38 the costume of conclllatlon." 
Rostow is particularly harsh on Nixon and Kissinger 
for attempting to save what he views as the last remnants of 
' their failed detente after the 1973 War. The Soviet failure 
to inform the United States of the Arab plan to attack Is-
rael, and the view held by Rostow of actual Soviet complicity 
in the affair, was contrary to all the public utterances 
about the new state of cooperation between the two super-
' powers. To continue with the detente policy, Rostow says, 
Nixon and Kissinger were forced to conceal from the American 
public the actual role of Soviet policy in the october War. 
It was too fine a line of distinction for Nixon and Kissinger 
to explain that the Soviets were only an accessory, and not a 
principal, in urging the Arabs to fight, tran to boycott oil 
to the West. Calling into question only the degree of Soviet 
involvement would nevertheless force Nixon and Kissinger to 
• 
admit a failed detente. 
Rostow criticizes Kissinger for stating that Soviet 
• 
conduct was "not unreasonable" and that detente "contributed 
38. Ibid., p.61. 
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to an agreed settlement. This, too, is from the theater of 
39 the absurd." And what would our policy be if the Soviets 
successfully implemented their strategy to accomplish their 
ambitions to become the predominant power in the Mediterra-
nean, to Finlandize Western Europe, and have China and Japan 
accommodate to them? 
Rostow questions whether the United States would pre-
pare to strenuously oppose any of these actions. Perhaps, 
he ponders, the American policy would opt not to oppose So-
viet adventures, and in so doing, accept the Soviet notion of 
' detente. The latter choice would relegate the United States 
and Europe to a mere supplier of food and technology to the 
Soviet Union, "and leave the serious business of world poli-
40 tics to Moscow." 
So far we have seen some of the political criticisms of 
' detente by a number of observers and participants in the for-
eign policy field. Many of these same critics have likewise 
' voiced their concerns as to the military dimension of detente. 
Political goals and ambitions demand an appraisal of what 
tactics and strategy shou~d be employed. Of particular con-
cern is the assemblage of military might a given nation can 
muster to fulfill foreign policy goals. In this nuclear age, 
39. Ibid. , p. 61. 
40. Ibid., p.63. 
111 
the question of political objectives and the resultant mili-
tary dispositions of power further complicate a global condi-
tion that pits against each other two superpowers of parti-
cular competitive ideological views, each concerned about the 
I 
need for national security. Detente in the Kissingerian 
School was thought to provide safeguards by which the use of 
military strength wotud be diminished as a result of progress 
in the political dimension. But, as with the political cri-
I 
ticisms that were directed at detente, concerns were also 
lodged regarding the military dimension, particularly the 
SALT Talks. 
Professor Richard Pipes, former Director of the Russian 
Research Center at Harvard, and Chairman of President Carter's 
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to decipher Soviet stra-
tegic objectives, wrote in an article entitled "Why the So-
viet Union Thinks It Could Fight And Win A Nuclear War," in 
the July, 1977 issue of Commentary, that the American and So-
viet nuclear doctrines share few similarities. The American 
view focuses on the theory that nuclear war would be so in-
sanely destructive, that neither side could realistically 
contemplate its use, let alone fathom the thought that a VlC-
tor could emerge. Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD as it 
is commonly known, was the principle by which American stra-
tegic doctrine has approached the question of nuclear deter-
renee since the middle of the 1960's. The Soviet view, as 
Pipes points out, is a strictly adhered "Clausewitzian prin-
112 
. . . . 41 
ciple that warfare 1s always an extens1on of pol1t1cs," 
and that political considerations are the focal point by 
which strategy is conceived. 
The political dynamics reflect the application of the 
various military components in the Soviet arsenal. MAD and 
mutual deterrence are schools of American thought that have 
little value in the realm of Soviet strategic planning. What 
counts is the calculation of forces, the strategy to be pur-
sued, and in what fashion to directly approach or outflank an 
adversary. As Pipes points out, "Soviet military theorists 
reject the notion that technology (i.e., weapons) decides 
42 
strategy." Rather, the opposite is more likely the case. 
Political considerations, and the strategic possibilities 
that exist to attain objectives, determine the military force 
and type of weapons needed to effectuate a strategic design. 
Whatever suspicions may be directed at the theories of war-
fare from a Nineteenth Century political and military think-
er, Pipes believes that the Soviets continue to adhere to the 
validity of the "Clausewitzian principle." 
Part and parcel of these Soviet principles are two 
terms which are constantly mentioned in the literature of 
nuclear strategy: countervalue and counterforce. Counter-
value refers to the destruction of an enemy's population cen-
41. Richard Pipes, "Why The Soviet Uni-on Thinks It Could 
Fight And Win A Nuclear War" Commentary, (July, 1977), 
p._27. 
42. Ibid., p.30. 
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ters, and is conceived as the deterrent against any undue 
nuclear provocations. This is an overwhelmingly American 
concept by which the principles of massive retaliation and 
MAD have revolved. A nuclear exchange would be too costly 
to contemplate because of the vast destruction to the civil-
ian centers, and with it the very political structure of the 
nation. The Soviets hold to the principle of counterforce. 
As Pipes explains, the destruction of military instal-
lations are the primary targets, and large population centers 
are of secondary importance. The first priority is to destroy 
the other side's command, communications, and military em-
placements. If this is done, the capability to resist is, to 
say the least, appreciably diminished. The Soviets accept 
this view, and reject "the whole basis on which u.s. strategy 
has come to rest: thermonuclear war is not suicidal, it can 
be fought and won, and thus resort to war must not be ruled 
out." 43 
What the above purports to show is not only the varying 
outlooks in nuclear strategy between the American and Soviet 
sides, but also the political importance placed by critics 
' of detente on these strategic theories. The nuclear dimen-
sian is not the sole criterion that is analyzed by these 
critics. The conventional deployment of forces and their 
43. Ibid., p.30. 
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political usefulness is likewise deemed of significant value. 
In such a light, the SALT Talks and MBFR have come under in-
creasing criticism, the concern being the possibility that 
the Soviets could replace a weakened America as the predomi-
nant military power. Paul Nitze wrote that Kissinger's poli-
• 
cy of detente with the Soviet Union focused American mili-
• 
tary strength as a positive factor to make detente possible, 
rather than the continuing American policy to defend self and 
. f s . . . 44 all1es rom ov1et m1l1tary power. 
General Daniel Graham~ former Director of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, stated the view that the policy of con-
' tainment provided the opportunity for detente to seem possi-
ble. Graham considers the strategy of containment as "the 
first and the last strategy to be devised by the United States 
A h . h d . d 45 or N TO as a w ole 1n t e post-Worl war II per1o ." Be-
cause of the success of containment in keeping the Soviets at 
bay, an acco~~odation to the Soviet policy of peaceful co-
, 
existence was made. This policy became detente, and as 
Graham states, it was "destined to destroy the strategy of 
containment and leave NATO with no strategy at all." 46 
General Graham believes that an American acco~nodation 
to the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence was of greater 
44. Paul Nitze, et al., Defending America (New York: Basic 
Books, 1977), p.97. 
45. Daniel o. Graham, A New Strategy for the West (Washington, 
D.C.._: The Heritage Foundation, 1977), p.20. 
46. Ibid., p.20 
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' significance in moving toward a detente than the need to re-
duce nuclear tensions. Even though the Soviets continued 
to strengthen their Warsaw Pact allies with even greater 
numbers of men and material, to pursue an impressive program 
of nuclear weaponry, and to support national liberation ef-
forts, General Graham states that by "1970 onward, the in-
' evitable policy conflicts between containment and detente 
' were decided in favor of detente. The dismissal of Secre-
h . . . 47 tary of Defense Sc leslnger was a case ln polnt." 
As to the SALT negotiations, General Graham is equally 
critical of the discrepancy between American and Soviet philo-
sophies of strategic thought, and the agreements arrived at 
through SALT. Graham states that the Soviets have taken full 
advantage of the opportunities to strengthen their nuclear 
forces, particularly in the category of throwweight. It is 
clear that the Soviets have received the "best of the deal ln 
SALT negotiations on intercontinental systems," Graham be-
lieves, "and in their terms the results look even better." 48 
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations during 
the Nixon years, and a controversial figure in his own right, 
' has criticized the totality of the detente process, and the 
individuals that have pursued this policy. Appalled by the 
lack of civic-mindedness in the Nixon-Kissinger conduct of 
4 7. Ibid. , p. 2 5. 
48. Ibid., p.40. 
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domestic and foreign policy (he resigned in protest to Water-
t 
gate), Zumwalt believes that the military dimensions of de-
tente were predicated upon domestic electoral considerations, 
and a misplaced trust in the Soviet compliance with the en-
t 
tire nature of detente. In his book, On Watch, Zumwalt leaves 
little doubt of where he stood with the Nixon administration 
t 
and Henry Kissinger regarding SALT and detente. Although 
Zumwalt was an active participant in the American prepara-
tions for the SALT negotiations, he accepted certain provi-
sions of the various agreements with qualifications. Once a 
supporter of Nixon-Kissinger, Zumwalt became increasingly dis-
illusioned with the SALT negotiations, and the machinations 
emanating from the White House (including Kissinger). In a 
conversation with Henry Kissinger, in November of 1970, that 
had a bombshell effect upon Zumwalt, Kissinger's prophecy of 
future history prompted Zumwalt to reveal these notes: 
K. does not agree with the President that American people 
can be turned around. He states strongly that President 
misjudges the people. K. feels that u.s. has passed its 
historic high point like so many earlier civilizations. 
He believes that u.s. is on downhill and cannot be roused 
by political challenge. He states that his job is to 
persuade the Russians to give us the best deal we can 
get, recognizing that the historical forces favor them. 
He says that he realized that in the light of history he 
will be recognized as one of those who negotiated terms 
favorable to the Soviets, but that the American people 
have only themselves to blame because they lack stamina 
to stay the course against the Russians who are 'Sparta 
to our Athens.'49 
49. Elmo Zumwalt, On Watch (New York: New York Times Book 
Co., 1976), p.319. 
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Just prior to Zlli~alt's early retirement from the Navy, 
and the troubled experiences of working "under a wrecked 
50 president and an unprincipled Secretary of State," he 
voiced his disgust at the maneuvers to isolate Paul Nitze and 
James Schlesinger, who were likewise perplexed with the White 
House's insistence on a SALT agreement that Zumwalt says was 
impermissible. The Nixon-Kissinger administration was taking 
too lightly the Soviet suggestions that were designed "like 
SA . d f . . . 51 most LT proposals, a1me to reeze Sov1et super1or1ty." 
In a letter to President Nixon dated June 17, 1974, 
Zumwalt expressed his concern about the course the SALT Talks 
' were taking, and the future conduct of the detente process as 
a whole. Zumwalt stated that the SALT I agreements were pas-
sible because the United States felt it was strong enough to 
allow the Soviets to approach strategic parity. This situa-
tion was extremely ambiguous, since it would be difficult to 
ascertain not only when the Soviets reached strategic parity, 
particularly in view of the stagnation of American strategic 
weaponry when compared to the Soviet effort, but also to 
know lvhen and if the Soviets would opt to progress beyond 
that phase and into an attempt at superiority. At this june-
ture, as Zumwalt points out, the strategic balance would have 
shifted to the Soviet side. Such a situation to a member of 
50. Ibid., p.492. 
51. Ibid., p.496. 
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the Joint Chiefs of Staff - as Zumwalt wrote Nixon - would be 
intolerable. Zumwalt believed that the Soviets did indeed 
progress beyond parity, and that "each day shifts the balance 
52 further to their advantage." It -.;v-as necessary to correct 
this Soviet progression in strategic weaponry, but it would 
not be possible, so Zumwalt thought, by continuing on the same 
. h . . 53 
road 1n t e "narrow context of arms control negot1at1ons." 
Zumwalt strongly advised Nixon to place future SALT negotia-
f 
tions into the total "framework of the entire detente rela-
tionship between the u.s. and the u.s.s.R." 54 
Zumwalt, like so many other critics of the arms nego-
tiations, believes the United States should exercise its op-
tion to continue to develop qualitative improvements in weap-
ons systems and, thusly, prevent the Soviets from acquiring 
the strategic means to become militarily superior. If the 
United States fails to improve its strategic posture, Zumwalt 
believes, the ultimate result will be a political and mili-
tary plus for the Soviet Union on a global basis. With this 
strategic advantage, the Soviet Union will threaten the very 
security of the United States. Zumwalt states the Soviets 
will not be reluctant to use their superior power, particu-
larly a Soviet Union becoming bolder with each passing year. 
52. Ibid., Pp.500-502. 
53. Ibid., Pp.S00-502. 
54. Ibid., Pp.500-502. 
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R. J. Rlli~el, Professor of Political Science at the 
university of Hawaii, Director of the non-profit PATH Insti-
tute of Research on International Problems and Vice-President 
of Political-Economic Risk Consultants, Ltd., is also out-
t 
spokenly critical of detente and its SALT negotiations. He, 
too, believes the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger approach to Soviet-
American relations has led to an obviously inferior conven-
t 
tional and strategic position for the United States. Detente, 
and its reliance on the good will and trust of the Soviets to 
t 
comply with the spirit and intent of detente can only afford 
the Soviets the opportunity to increase their already bur-
geoning military superiority. 
President Ford and Secretary Kissinger have assured the 
• t publlc that detente has not weakened us, that we main-
tain the edge over the Soviet Union. The evidence does 
t • 
not support them. Detente has not meant slmply a re-
straint of American military power consistent with mutual 
U.S. -Soviet arms control, nor American superiority. It 
has not even meant parity. It has meant dangerous infe-
riority.55 
The concern for American strategic inferiority is de-
rived from the fear that the Soviets have not modified their 
ideological and political competition with the United States 
t 
and the West, as it should have as the detente process as-
sumes. R~~el sees American policy as an attempt toward 
finding security and order, but in pursuing this goal becom-
ing increasingly weakened as a result of misinterpreting So-
viet intentions. 
I 
55. R. J. Rummel, Peace Endangered: The Reality of Detente 
(Beverly Hills: Sage Pub., 1976), p.79. 
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Rummel believes that the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger approach 
' to detente has been a "defensive interpretation of American 
power," 56 and that it has led to a drastic reduction in 
American military and political might. Strongly critical of 
this approach, Rummel opines that the Soviets are managing 
' detente to subvert the West, and in so doing, preparing them-
selves for a military confrontation with the United States. 
soon -very soon, Rummel states, the United States will find 
0 h 0 0 f b 0 57 d h h ltself t e VlCtlm o "nuclear lackmall," an t us ave no 
alternative but to fight or surrender. This, to Rummel, is 
' the prime danger of detente: two choices, either one a 
frightening selection. 
Paul Nitze is equally critical of the dangerous course 
that was being pursued by the Nixon-Kissinger administration. 
Nitze was the Secretary of Defense's representative on the 
u.s. SALT delegation from 1969-1974, but he resigned from his 
position on May 28, 1974 because of current u.s. policy in 
the arms negotiations, personality clashes·with Henry Kis-
singer that were outgrowths of policy differences, and the 
domestic political climate that infected the Nixon White 
House. Nitze's resignation from the SALT delegation was a 
great blow to the Nixon-Kissinger team amongst aware ob-
servers, who recognized that a great gulf in opinions must 
have existed for the SALT delegation to lose the services of 
56. Ibid., Pp.148-149. 
57. Ibid., Pp.148-149. 
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such an important member. Before Nitze left washington, he 
stated in a press release that for five years he partook ln 
negotiations to reach agreement on balanced force reductions 
which would, ln effect, strengthen the security of the United 
states and the Soviet Union. This would be accomplished by 
"maintaining crisis stability and providing a basis for less-
. h . . . b h 58 enlng t e strateglc arms competltlon etween t em." Nitze 
saw little chance that this goal could be realized. 
In 1976, Nitze would write of his suspicions that the 
SALT agreements and u.s. policy in that direction were pro-
viding the Soviets with the opportunity to gain a strategic 
superiority, not only in the quantitative sense, but also in 
the achievement of a "theoretical war-winning capability." 59 
Nitze believes that if the Soviets gained such a position, 
' detente would crumble, nuclear confrontation would once again 
seem dangerously probable, and Soviet expansion and political 
pressure would greatly increase to further jeopardize Western 
interests. With the Soviet Union becoming strategically more 
powerful, they would become politically bolder. 
' The one thread that binds the critics of detente, 
especially in the military context, is that the United States 
surrendered too much of its nuclear superiority to the So-
viets in the acceptance of parity. The differences in 
58. Zumwalt, op. cit., p.491. 
59. P<ful Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of 
Detente," Foreign Affairs Quarterly, LIV (January 1976), 
p.207. 
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' 
soviet and American strategic theories have led the detente 
critics to charge that a dangerous misinterpretation of So-
viet intentions was made, which is a nuclear war-winning 
' capability. Inevitably, the detente critics charge, the So-
viets may achieve a first-strike capability to destroy the 
American nuclear force in the near future, and thus cripple 
any American military response. The Soviets would then have 
achieved their most cherished political victory: to become 
the world's dominant power, and most certainly control the 
destiny of America and Western Europe. This occurrence for 
all intents and purposes would spell the end of American and 
European sovereignty. 
Few of the critics were diametrically opposed to the 
initiation of the SALT Talks and the requirements of limit-
ing nuclear arms. On the contrary, many of the critics were 
actively involved in the formulation of policies that were 
' the mark of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger approach to detente and 
SALT. As the policy unfolded, particularly the Soviet ex-
ample of still seeking a nuclear superiority and its refusal 
to adopt the American view of strategic weaponry, the percep-
tion that America had conceded too much to the Soviets in 
the field of strategic weapons, the Interim Agreement and the 
limitation of nuclear arms as signed in Moscow in 1972, began 
to show that somewhere a policy that had commenced with great 
expectations was now the victim of mistaken notions. 
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' The detente critics would state that the Vladivostok 
Accords of 1974 were an American attempt to salvage at least 
part of what had been relinquished at Moscow two years before. 
' The military dimension of detente spurred a furious debate 
because of the massive force nuclear weapons engender. What 
likewise cannot be dismissed was the behavior of Richard 
Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and their staffs. The more secretive 
they became, the more isolated they became from those that 
would offer dissenting information and opinions on current 
political and military strategy. This mentality would carry 
forward into the Ford administration, but to a diminished 
extent. It is no coincidence that in the area of the great-
est debate, that of strategic arms, individuals suffered 
most. The early retirement of Admiral Zumwalt, the resigna-
tion of Paul Nitze, and the firing of James Schlesinger are 
prime examples of the casualty list due to the question of 
' formulating the military dimension of detente. As each parti-
' cipant left government service, the prior stature that de-
tente had enjoyed was being whittled down. Each individual 
' criticized detente and the military dimension as being a mis-
take that has endangered the nation's security and survival. 
These criticisms found ready ears, especially amongst those 
who never did trust the Soviets, believing they would never 
abide in good faith, and never would renounce their real in-
tent of achieving nuclear superiority. 
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' The year 1974 would see the attack on detente and its 
three dimensions by the realists as steadily progressing. 
president Ford had come under increasing attack not only 
from a number of quarters, but more importantly to him from 
the conservative wing of the Republican Party, who were sup-
porting in ever greater numbers his opponent, Ronald Reagan. 
t 
When one aspect of detente was attacked, the entire policy 
seemed to suffer a setback. The whole of the policy could 
not survive an attack when directed even at one issue. De-
tente came to encompass the totality of Soviet-American re-
lations, and thusly when one dimension was criticized, such 
as the military dimension, the economic and political dimen-
' sions were brought into disrepute. Ironically, when detente 
came under suspicion, and then subject to attack as a policy 
of providing too much to the Soviets, this recent importation 
of a French word conjured up all the remembrances of the Cold 
War, and visions of what the future could portent to a lax 
America. 
The critics, as stated on previous pages, adhered to 
many political views, from conservatives to liberals. These 
critics would speak at various seminars, or were well known 
personalities in politics and military affairs. Most spoke 
basically to groups that were active observers in foreign 
affairs. No one group was formed that could appeal to the 
broad mass of the American public save one: the American 
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labor movement. It was the only group well organized enough 
through its infrastructure and history to launch such a cam-
paign. Launch it they did. 
' Before an analysis of labor's position vis-a-vis de-
tente is examined, a brief statement of the American labor 
movement is in order, for to understand why labor so vehe-
' 
rnently attacked detente in all its dimensions, one must note 
some of labor's basic philosophies and attitudes. 
The American labor movement has had a long history of 
active involvement in foreign affairs. It has been the 
philosophy of labor that the organization of workers into 
units of collective bargaining and in the area of what labor 
calls "economic democracy," is not an isolated phenomenon 
that exists only for these purposes. A larger arena of af-
fairs exists outside the concerns of wages and benefits. 
Economic policy and politics go hand in hand. Labor realized 
long ago that to limit itself only to economic affairs would 
spell the death of labor and its potentially great political 
powers. 
Labor's philosophy has been that the trade union move-
ment and labor's independent power can only be exercised in 
a society where political freedoms exist as basic rights. 
These basic civic and political rights are the right to organ-
ize, the right to strike, and the right of unions to elect 
their own representatives. Only in a society where political 
freedoms are guaranteed and protected can labor survive as an 
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independent organization, unencumbered by governmental re-
strictions and control. No independent and free labor move-
ment exists in an authoritarian or totalitarian society. 
once the means of production have been seized by a govern-
ment that seeks total control - political and economic - the 
labor movement as an effective organization is for all intents 
and purposes fractured, then eliminated and destroyed. It is 
no small wonder that whenever an authoritarian government 
seizes power, among the first to be repressed, jailed, or 
even murdered are labor leaders. It is in this context that 
labor's rights are interwoven, and dependent upon, the fabric 
of human and political rights. Consequently, labor has 
voiced strong sentiments in opposition to Communist regimes, 
and authoritarian governments where state power permeates to 
a great degree fields of life where such interference would 
not be tolerated in democratic societies. 
On October 1, 1974, AFL-CIO President George Meany 
testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee dur-
r 
1ng the detente hearings. His opening statement was frank 
and outspoken, and in view of George Meany's indomitable 
personality and lengthy stay as labor's president, his state-
r 
ments on detente are the views and sentiments of the AFL-CIO. 
There can be do doubt that George Meany was, and as we shall 
r 
see, the AFL-CIO is categorically opposed to any type of de-
tente as expressed during the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger years. 
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Mr. Meany began his testimony by asking what is the 
' ' definition of detente. He stated that detente was difficult 
to define because it was becoming increasingly ambiguous. 
What was once thought to be a "great idea - this 'conceptual 
breakthrough,' to use one of Secretary Kissinger's favorite 
60 phrases," was proving to be a policy that was all show and 
no substance. The public expectations that were raised in 
hoping the Cold War had ended have fallen victim to a policy 
that was incapable of acquiring the hoped for results. So 
' Meany asks, what is the difference between detente and Cold 
war? 
Now a common thread runs through all these definitions of 
detente. They all boil down to the same thing; detente 
is the avoidance of nuclear war. Detente is the imposi-
tion of restraints so that the two superpowers don't blow 
each other up. If this is the meaning of detente, then 
I have a question. What is the difference between de-
tente and Cold War? Isn't Cold War also an avoidance of 
hot war?61 
Throughout Meany's testimony, which was reprinted in 
the leaflets, booklets, and newspapers of the entire trade 
union movement, his blunt and oft-times comical rendition 
' of some of the contradictory aspects of detente paralleled to 
a close degree the academic criticisms from far more schol-
arly men. The presentation was different; the substance the 
same. To George Meany, the Russians cannot be trusted, and 
' 60. Meany calls the public disillusionment with detente a 
"revolution of falling expectations." This description 
places him firmly in the compan:::r o.f .. critics. that have been 
mentioned in previous pages. Detente Hearings, p.373. 
61. Ibid., p.374. 
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I 
the Nixon-Kissinger policy of detente is nothing more than 
"phrase-mongering" to convince the American people that the 
Cold War is over, when in fact nothing is further from the 
truth. Soviet conduct in the Middle East, to George Meany, 
is the example par excellence of Soviet disregard for the 
Basic Principles as signed in Moscow in 1972. Also promi-
nently mentioned is the grain deal that was a financial bur-
den to the American taxpayer; Soviet statements on the need 
to continue the ideological and political competition, par-
'ticularly statements by Secretary Brezhnev, "one of the all-
. . h' h d' . h . 62 t1me experts" 1n the " 1g art of 1plomat1c ypocr1sy;" 
and Soviet intransigence in not allowing their people even 
the most fundamental of political freedoms and human rights. 
To Meany, as with so many other critics, a dichotomy exists 
I 
between the Soviet and American view of detente. In this re-
gard, George Meany stated: 
Clearly, something is wrong here. I think most Americans 
have a pretty good understanding of what our side means 
by detente, what we want out of it. But do we under-
stand what the Russians want? I think we need to look at 
detente from their perspective. They mean something dif-
ferent -and that is the source of the problems.63 
George Meany ended his testimony by stating that a real 
I I 
detente, a true detente, would end the ideological and politi-
cal conflicts on both sides. This we do not have, and will 
62. Ihid., p.376. 
63. Ibid., p.376. 
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not have as long as the Soviets continue their policy of 
. 64 
confrontatlon. 
Jay Lovestone, former Director of the AFL-CIO Depart-
I 
ment of International Affairs, states that detente has been 
used by the Euro-Communist parties in their march for na-
tional power in Europe, particularly in France, Italy, and 
spain. Lovestone sees this as part of the Communist strate-
gy to further isolate the West. As the Soviets have ex-
tracted concessions from the West and used their enhanced 
power to gain advantage, the Euro-Communist parties in West-
I 
ern Europe have likewise taken advantage of detente to fur-
h . 1 d . d . 65 ther t elr electora en eavors to galn omestlc power. 
Sidney Hook, philosopher and author, and now a Senior 
Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution 
and Peace, is a close friend and intellectual ally of the 
American labor movement. As a member of the Social Democrats, 
u.s.A., his views make him particularly attractive to labor 
and its allies.· In the keynote address to the National Con-
vention of Social Democrats, u.s.A. in July 1976, Hook placed 
in perspective what the American labor leadership believes 
and its supporters accept. Addressing the delegates Hook 
' 64. Meany sees little chance for detente as long as the So-
viets oppose the political freedoms enjoyed by the West. 
This, to Meany, is the "greatest threats to peace today," 
along with the "delusion we call detente." Detente Hear-
ings, p.386. 
65. Jay Lovestone, "Euro-Communist: Roots & Reality," AFL-CIO 
Free Trade Union News. XXXII (June-July, 1977), p.S. 
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' stated that detente's political objectives have not been 
realized because of the "imbalance in United States and so-
viet objectives in d~tente ..... 66 ' Detente could be a success-
ful policy from an American point of view only if the United 
States would stand firm in its opposition to totalitarianism. 
Hook also views the Soviets as an imperialist power 
' that disguises its primary objectives through detente. The 
' policy of detente, under Nixon-Ford-Kissinger, placed an un-
due emphasis upon achieving political compromise, and disre-
garding the issue of democracy. In this regard, the issue 
of human rights has been dismissed because the Communists re-
fuse to voluntarily accept and abide by any such notions. 
Without some measure to demand that human rights issues are 
complied with in an affirmative manner, the Soviets will con-
tinue to remain recalcitrant. Hook suggests one possible op-
tion: ••tying economic cooperation from the West to progress 
in the human rights field is one such measure that should be 
used." 67 
On June 30, 1975, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, under the 
sponsorship of the AFL-CIO, delivered his first formal address 
since he was expelled from the Soviet Union in February, 1974. 
The fact that President Ford decided to accept Kissinger's 
66. Sidney Hook, "The Social Democratic Prospect," address 
before the 1976 Convention of Social Democrats, U.S.A. 
(in the files of the organization). 
67. Ibid. 
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advice not to grant Solzhenitsyn an audience for fear of ern-
barrassing the Soviets was a decision that George Meany would 
never forgive. Their refusal to meet Solzhenitsyn only pro-
vided Meany a soapbox and greater ammunition to launch into 
I 
further criticisms of detente. But what was said by Solzhen-
itsyn was much more important than the squabble between Meany 
and Ford-Kissinger. Solzhenitsyn was presented by the AFL-
CIO as the number one dissenter from Russian repression. 
I 
Detente, Solzhenitsyn would repeat again and again, 
was the Communist strategy to lull the west into a period of 
complacency and naive security. For this, the West has only 
itself to blame, for it has become morally and spiritually 
bankrupt, while decaying into military and political has-
beens. This state of political and military impotence, and 
moral decadence, has resulted in the unwillingness to sacri-
fice for an ideal. To Solzhenitsyn, the West has existed too 
comfortably for too long. If the West is lethargic and nap-
I 
ping now, detente will surely put it to sleep. So, Solzhen-
t 
itsyn asks, is detente needed? 
Not only is it needed, it is as necessary as air. It's 
the only way of saving the earth - instead of a world war 
to have detente, but a true detente, and if it has al-
ready been ruined by the bad word which we use for it -
'detente' - then we should find another word for it.68 
68. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, America: You Must Think About 
the World, an address sponsored by the AFL-CIO in 
New York, June 30, 1975, AFL-CIO Pamphlet, Publication 
No. 152, p.19. 
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Solzhenitsyn spoke of three characteristics of a true 
' detente. The first would be disarmament - "not only dis-
armament from the use of war, but also from the use of vio-
lence."69 The second characteristic would be that both par-
ties could guarantee that the commitment to peaceful rela-
tions would not be interrupted. To ensure this prom1se, 
the Soviet Union would have to radically modify its internal 
political structure to allow for the free debate and expres-
sian by the press and public opinion, and for free elections 
and a parliament. Such an eventuality seems, to say the 
least, highly unlikely. But, until such a situation occurs, 
Solzhenitsyn sees little likelihood that the Soviets will 
seriously follow a course to end conflict. Part and parcel 
with the second characteristic is the third and final con-
dition that Solzhenitsyn mentioned: an end to the "sort of 
inhumane propaganda which is proudly called 1n the Soviet 
70 Union 'ideological warfare.'" 
. 
Solzhenitsyn is not optimistic by any means that 
these events will transpire in the near future. What is 
needed at the present moment is the resolve of the West to 
resist the encroachments of the Communists, and to form a 
policy that will present the Communists with a united front 
' that will not falter. And what of the advocates of detente? 
69. Ibid., Pp.19-20. 
70. Ibid., Pp.19-20. 
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But the principal argument of the advocates of detente 
is well-known: all of this must be done to avoid a 
nuclear war. But after all that has happened in recent 
years, I think I can set their minds at ease, and your 
minds at ease as well: there will not be any nuclear war. 
What for? Why should there be a nuclear war if for the 
last thirty years they have been breaking off as much of 
the West as they wanted - piece after piece, country 
after country, and the process keeps going on.71 
Solzhenitsyn's two speeches in Washington and New York, 
and the subsequent snub by President Ford, would add a tre-
I 
mendous impetus to the forces of the detente opposition. To 
critics of his speech, saying that he was reviving the Cold 
War, Solzhenitsyn would counter by saying that the Cold war 
had never ended, and that the forces of Communism continued 
to threaten the freedom and security of a West that is weak 
and indecisive. 
' The critics of detente would point to a number of fac-
tors and events, each with its own importance, to dispel the 
notion that a change in atmosphere by the Soviets hardly 
meant a radical deviation from their past practices. Even a 
change in the political atmosphere, the critics would point 
out, was only temporary, and the Soviets could not resist the 
inevitable temptation to return to their old ways. The Mid-
dle East War of 1973 and the Soviet complicity in that at-
tack; the victory of the North over the South in Viet Nam; 
Soviet involvement in Portugal, Africa, and Angola in par-
ticular; the signing by the Soviets of the Helsinki Final Act, 
71. Ibid., p.40. 
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and their refusal to honor the stipulations of Basket III; 
I 
all these events stirred the detente critics into pointing 
out one common theme: the Soviets had never intended to 
I 
abide by the detente of America's interpretation. 
The dynamics of international politics, the critics 
would say, still dictated the need to meet force with force, 
and be militarily prepared. And possibly most important of 
all, the Soviet Union still remained a revolutionary power, 
still in pursuit of overthrowing the established balance of 
power, and seeking "marginal advantages," and nuclear superi-
I 
ority. Detente seemed, to the critics, a one-way street, 
with the Soviets having everything to gain and the West pre-
cious little. As the political spokesmen, particularly Sena-
I 
tor Henry Jackson, expressed their misgivings of detente, and 
the military spokesmen, specifically individuals like Admiral 
Zumwalt, Paul Nitze, and James Schlesinger warned of the im-
pending downslide of American military preparedness, the 
' ' 
critics of the economic aspects of detente likewise found the 
same fault. Little would be gained by providing the Soviets 
with loans and credits, selling them technology and heavy 
industrial products that they require. That prospect was al-
I 
ready foreclosed, and with it detente's linkage aspect, when 
the Soviets refused to partake in the 1972 Trade Agreement 
because of the emigration issue attached to it through the 
Jackson Amendment. The Soviets would not reform their politi-
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cal behavior for promlses of economic assistance from the 
United States. 
' With the detente debate in full force, the supporters 
of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger endeavors attempted to defend 
their position. The next chapter will show how their argu-
' ment was presented: that detente was not only desirable, but 
that it was the best political approach to the superpower 
competition and the avoidance of nuclear war. 
CHAPTER VI 
' DETENTE ATTRACTS SUPPORTERS: 
' THE ORTHODOX SCHOOL OF DETENTE 
' In the waning months of 1973, the supporters of de-
tente found their policy increasingly under the attack from 
opponents, who recognized an opportunity to at least par-
tially scuttle a good deal of what had been initiated through 
the efforts of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. The basis 
for this upsurge in dissenting opinion was the Soviet com-
plicity in the October War, and the threat to militarily 
intervene to rescue their unfortunate clients - Egypt and 
' Syria. Opposition to detente had always existed, but mostly 
as an undercurrent of opinion. As George Kennan remarked, 
the prestige of the White House, bolstered primarily through 
Nixon's trips to Peking and Moscow, and his overwhelming 
victory over George McGovern, had stifled the administra-
tion's foreign policy opponents. 1 Nevertheless, plenty of 
potential opposition existed, waiting for an incident to oc-
cur that would show exactly how the Soviets would interpret 
the "Basic Principles." That incident was the October War. 
1. George F. Kennan, "The United States and the Soviet Union, 
1917-1976," Foreign Affairs Quarterly, (July, 1976), 
p.688. 
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Added to this Soviet-American confrontation was the eroding 
of the administration's authority and prestige because of 
watergate. 
' The supporters of detente clearly recognized that a 
political contest over issues of international importance 
' was brewing. If detente was to be given a chance to succeed, 
it had to be vigorously defended. Before one delves into 
the defense of their positions, one must seek some answers 
' to why detente was pursued by those labeled the "orthodox" 
' school of detente. 
As stated on previous occasions, this orthodox school 
' of detente was in command of American foreign policy from 
Richard Nixon's tenure as President until Gerald Ford's de-
feat at the hands of Jimmy Carter. Throughout this paper, 
some generalizations have been utilized to paint a larger 
picture. Labels are in many instances subject to change. 
But one can look back and search for positions which various 
individuals and groups adhered to, and at least decipher 
where they stood at the moment. What stance they take to-
day may be completely different, or at least a shift from a 
prior stance. Professor Gibert has noted that during the 
early stages of the Nixon administration, one school of 
thought on the conduct of Soviet-American relations eventu-
ally assumed command of the foreign policy-making apparatus. 
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Inevitably, the contention that the Cold War had run its 
course and a new, more cooperative mode of superpower 
interactions had begun was challenged by some Americans 
and ardently defended by others. Basically, three 
schools of thought emerged during the Nixon administra-
tion. The first - officially adopted by President Nix-
on and his national security adviser, Dr. Henry Kissin-
ger, and later by President F~rd - could be called the 
'orthodox' school of detente. 
The American view, propagated prominently by Nixon and 
Kissinger, was that since the Soviet Union was now on an e-
qual nuclear footing with the United States, there were op-
portunities for a rapproachrnent and a new political relation-
ship. The possibility of lessening the intensity of the So-
viet-American competition was thought to be available be-
cause of the strategic balance of power, the easing of ideo-
logical competition, and the willingness to cooperate in 
solving common problems. If difficulties could be solved 1n 
these areas, then the vitally important political questions 
of power, what Kissinger would note as the "search for mar-
ginal advantages," could be reconciled in some type of order-
ly framework to reduce the threat of nuclear war. This is 
' what detente was all about. 
' To the orthodox detentists political lessons could be 
learned from the initial stages of the First world war that 
held some meaning for the nuclear world: that larger and more 
powerful states such as the United States and the Soviet Un-
2. Gibert, op. cit., p.l2. 
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ion could become so involved in the regional affairs of 
smaller and weaker states, that at some future point it was 
inevitable that in a time of crisis the two superpowers would 
be brought to the brink of a nuclear exchange. The lessening 
of tensions and the need for stability predicated on the 
political and military balance of power, was the goal many 
thought could initiate a new era in Soviet-American rela-
tions. What cannot be dismissed by any means was the futile 
American effort in viet Nam, and the attendant disappoint-
ments and national disgust that venture produced. The 
American failure in Viet Nam was probably the greatest lm-
' petus to the American pursuit for detente, and to seek re-
pose from further immediate conflict. 
Former Ambassador George F. Kennan, the architect of 
containment, while not impressed with the Nixon-Kissinger 
dramatics in their policy approach, nevertheless supports the 
basic premise of detente: the avoidance of nuclear war. Ken-
nan states that the greatest threat in this contemporary pe-
riod comes not from the danger of an open confrontation be-
tween the two superpowers because of political circumstances, 
but rather from the continuation of the nuclear arms race 
that "will become wholly uncontrollable, and will, either 
through proliferation or by accident, carry us all to de-
. 3 
structlon." 
3. George F. Kennan, The Cloud of Danger (Boston: Little, 
Brown & Co., 1977), p.202. 
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To begin to control this situation, Kennan suggests, the 
United States should start by reconsidering our political 
and military thinking. 
In the 1974 Senate Hearings, Kennan expressed his dis-
' may at the style of conduct of the detente policy as pursued 
by Nixon-Kissinger, in some instances resembling the criti-
cisms of George Ball. But as to the goals of the policy of 
' detente, and his disgust at those who oppose them, Kennan is 
' explicit: he states that the pursuit of detente was possible 
because of a number of changes in the international climate, 
and that "due credit [should be given] to those who perceive 
and took advantage of these changes and pursued with such 
imagination and patience the possibilities they created."4 
' The pressures against detente continued to be vibrant 
even during its height in 1972 and 1973, but, Kennan says, 
these pressures were effectively checked by the "momentary 
. d . h . 5 'h d. prest1ge an author1ty of t e Wh1te House." As R1c ar N1x-
on's administration slowly, but steadily, began to lose con-
fidence and crumble amidst the controversy of watergate, the 
' opponents of detente launched an offensive that would eventu-
ally show results. Kennan opposed such measures as the 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment which "dealt a bitter blow to any 
hopes for retaining the very considerable momentum that had 
' 4. Detente Hearings., p.61. 
5. George F. Kennan, "The United States and The Soviet Union, 
1917-1976," Foreign Affairs Quarterly, (July, 1976), p.688. 
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been obtained in the development of Soviet-American rela-
. 6 tlons." 
' Kennan vigorously defends detente from critics that 
believe it is a policy bound to fail because of past Soviet 
actions. Rather, present difficulties have been the products 
of thirty years of conflict and rivalry, and not the result 
' of the present detente. Close and careful cooperation with 
the Soviet Union across a broad range of issues could pro-
vide the incentive needed to avoid nuclear war, and hinder 
any rash conduct in the pursuit of "marginal advantages." 
Perhaps over time, even the pursuit of "marginal advantages" 
will have been channeled into a more orderly and peaceful 
display of power. George Kennan was perhaps thinking of 
these difficulties when he noted that the conflicts that en-
gage the United States and the Soviet Union - "the intracta-
ble elements of this problem" 7 - will not quickly recede, 
but rather remain as challenges to both superpowers to search 
for areas where cooperation can lead to a diminishing of the 
nuclear threat. 
w. Averell Harriman, who - like George Kennan - has 
had a long and active career in diplomacy, is cognizant of 
the continued dangers that are prevalent between the two 
6. Ibid., p. 688. 
7. Discussion sponsored by the Center for the Study of Demo-
cratic Institutions, "American Foreign Policy," Center 
Magazine IX (March-April 1976), p.16. 
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superpowers. But to continue down the identical path that 
has marked the antagonistic relationship between the two 
parties from the end of the Second World war until the Nix-
on-Kissinger initiatives will only add further dangerous 
• patterns of conflict. Harriman is clearly in favor of de-
• tente, and at odds with those who believe that detente should 
be a comprehensive settlement of past grievances. Rather, 
• detente has encompassed issues that are "specific and so are 
strictly limited." 8 This is the understanding that Harriman 
states he shares along with Secretary Brezhnev, who Harriman 
• 9 believes has "committed himself unequivocally to detente." 
• If the United States should decide to reconsider its detente 
policy, such actions would only prove to Brezhnev and the 
Soviets that the Americans are not willing to partake in a 
new diplomacy. Harriman is concerned that there are those 
who would wish to see such a shift in American policy occur, 
and with that shift, a return to the Cold War. 
• 
I decry those who contend that any relaxation of ten-
sions must inevitably benefit the Russians, to our dis-
advantage. It seems to me we have no choice •.. Our 
military strength0 essential as it is, should be basi-cally defensive.1 
In the Senate Hearings, Harriman spoke for the need of 
a detente that would provide the Soviets with Most-Favored-
8. W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special Envoy to Church-
ill and Stalin 1941-1946 (New York: Random House, 1975), 
Pp.vi-vii. 
9. Ibid., Pp.vi-vii. 
__,...._ . 
10. Detente Hear1ngs, p.11. 
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Nation treatment, a commitment to continue the negotiations 
on SALT, and to perfect the linkage between trade and arms 
limitation. In the June 28, 1974 edition of the New York 
Times, Harriman stated his support for President Nixon in 
his upcoming talks with Secretary Brezhnev, and urged sup-
port for the President "in his endeavors to reach agreements 
designed to reduce the possibility of nuclear disaster." 11 
Professor Marshall Shulman, Director of the Russian 
Institute of Columbia University, expressed the opinion dur-
ing his testimony at the Senate Hearings that the United 
States should continue its dialogue with the soviet Union. 
While quite aware of Soviet intransigence in a number of 
areas, he nevertheless endorsed efforts to ease tension, 
and held an optimistic forecast for improved relations if 
both sides are serious in their efforts. Shulman concurs 
' with other detente advocates such as Harriman, Kennan, and 
Kissinger, in proposing a modest policy tqat will produce 
steady results over the long run. In favoring a limited 
' rather than a comprehensive detente, Shulman is critical of 
' those who expect detente to initiate imminent and radical 
alterations of Soviet domestic and international conduct. 
' Likewise, Shulman argues, proposing a detente that unduly 
infringes on Soviet domestic power displaces a policy that 
should account for the factors of international power and 
11. New York Times, June 28, 1974. 
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questions of the politico-military balance, with one that 
is primarily concerned with overhauling Soviet society and 
its political structure. Such expectations are politically 
unrealistic, Shulman believes, since to urge and sometimes 
threaten the Soviets into making vast concessions on inter-
nal policy matters would present "conditions which the pre-
sent Soviet regime cannot but regard as terms of surrender 
and self-liquidation ••• It appears to me to be a clear case 
12 
of 'the best being the enemy of the good. ' " 
A participant in the Senate Hearings who may have 
' surprised many in his views on detente was former Secretary 
of State Dean Rusk. While a doubtful adherent of the "ortho-
' dox" school of detente, he nevertheless defended the initia-
tives and undertakings of Nixon and Kissinger. Rusk stated 
' to the Committee that his definition of detente was in line 
' with that of Kissinger's - that detente was "a process, not a 
final condition." He then gave credit to the Nixon adminis-
tration's efforts to resolve long-standing difficulties, and 
to find areas where agreement was possible, particularly in 
strategic arms, trade, and a general reduction in global ten-
sion. 
In matters of trade, Rusk doubts that its possible 
linking of Soviet political concessions would have met with 
Moscow's approval. But beyond this opinion, Rusk questions 
' 12. Detente Hearings, p.103. 
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the wisdom of injecting into trade discussions other issues 
on which we hope to see movement on the part of the Soviet 
union," 13 such as negotiations in the political, military and 
economic areas that could not have materialized if they had 
been linked to changes in Soviet domestic conditions. 
Individual members of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee also expressed approval of the administration's 
' detente policy. Senator Claiborne Fell, Democrat from Rhode 
' Island, stated that the initial stages of detente that ex-
hibited progress commanded a great amount of support in the 
United States. However, in light of recent events such as 
' the Middle East War, public approval of detente had dwindled, 
and with it the political support within the government that 
is necessary for the policy to remain intact. 
Senator Pell then mentioned the opposition emanating 
from organized labor, the American Jewish community, the 
military, industry that relies upon Pentagon contracts, and 
conservative groups in general. 
Each of these segments of our society has some measure 
of legitimacy for its concern. However, in combination, 
these segments form a very formidable alliance encompas-
sing a major part of the most articulate and influential 
opinion-forming groups in the nation. And there is a 
very real possibility that, in combination, this alliance 
could turn our country from the path of detente.l4 
Senator Frank Church, Democrat from Idaho, also ex-
' ' pressed his support for detente, and remarked that detente 
13. Ibid., p.213. 
14. ~York Times, August 9, 1974. 
146 
worked in the Middle East War of 1973 because the Russians 
did not unilaterally transport troops to the battle areas. 
' senator Church further stated that he believed detente was 
still possible, except for those who wish to perpetuate the 
Cold War. "Those" are identified by Senator Church as "old-
time cold warriors and ranking military figures," who con-
tinue to adhere to the view that the Soviets are still bent 
on a political and military "drive for world domination." 15 
Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate 
' Foreign Relations Committee during the Detente Hearings, 
stated in his opening remarks before the Committee on the 
first day of testimony, that the United States must proceed 
' with detente at all costs. He also castigated those "cold 
warriors" who would have us return to the days of conflict 
and possible hot war. 
' The heart and the core of the policy of detente - and 
the central purpose of our current policy, as I under-
stand it - is the lessening of danger of nuclear war. 
With an objective so basic and essential, it is hardly 
possible for us to give up on arms control or trade, no 
matter how discouraging the prospects may seem at any 
given ti~e.16 
' Fulbright argued that there is no alternative to de-
tente, except a return to the days of confrontation and the 
threat of nuclear war. He stated that he was at a loss to 
explain why liberals and conservatives could both oppose 
' 15. Detente Hearings, p.89. 
16. Ibid., p.l. 
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detente. This was possible because conservatives oppose 
' detente because of their suspicious view of Soviet motives, 
' and the liberals have misgivings about detente because of 
' human rights violations. Liberal opposition to detente was 
especially perplexing to Fulbright, particularly in view of 
17 the "abatement of tyranny under Khruschev and Brezhnev." 
' Fulbright believes, like other supporters of detente that 
have been mentioned, that with increased contacts between 
the Soviet Union and the West, even greater trends toward 
liberalization will occur in the East. 
Senator Hugh Scott, who traveled to the Soviet Union 
ln April, 1974, on the Dartmouth VIII Conference, wrote in 
a report to Senator Fulbright and the Committee his impres-
' sions of the Soviet attitude toward detente. Senator Scott, 
resembling other supporters of the administration's efforts, 
stated that the United States and the Soviet Union have con-
flicting objectives and differences in ideology that spell 
disagreement. Such differences should not be an obstacle to 
seeking reduced tensions. In a two-hour meeting with Secre-
tary Brezhnev, Scott reported that the progress made by Sec-
retary Brezhnev and President Nixon toward normalizing rela-
tions was diminishing the threat of nuclear war, and that 
further improvements in relations would be a "positive in-
fluence on the process of all international diplomacy of 
17. Ibid., p.2. 
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18 
either a bilateral or multilateral nature." 
In regard to the prospects of reducing the level of nu-
clear arms, Scott stated: 
Both [Nixon and Brezhnev] are resolved to make every ef-
fort to strengthen the process of detente in order to 
free the peoples of both countries from the overwhelming 
burdens of the arms race.19 
In a conclusion to the report, Scott penned some of his 1m-
pressions: 
1. The American-Soviet summit talks have provided a 
powerful impetus for the development of collaboration 
between the two countries, not only in the political 
field, but also in the spheres of science, technology 
and economics. 
2. Both in Moscow and Tbilisi I found that the USSR has 
accepted detente as a new political doctrine set down 
by the very highest councils of the state and2to be espoused and fostered by all of its elements. 0 
' Senator Edward Kennedy supported the goals of detente 
in much the same manner as his Congressional colleagues, 
Senators Scott and Fulbright. In a 1974 article in the Fall 
' edition of Foreign Policy entitled "Beyond Detente," Kennedy 
expressed his opinions on how to improve relations. He also 
focused on the issue of trade as an incentive to further the 
' goals of detente. In a conclusion to the article, Kennedy 
pointed to five areas of importance in furthering Soviet-
' American detente. 
18. u.s., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Detente and the Further Development of u.s. and U.S.S.R. 
Relat1ons, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess1on, 1974, p.2. 
19 . Ibid. , p. 3. 
20. Ibid., p.13. 
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Kennedy singled out the involvement of a broader base 
of people and institutions in discussing the public debate 
of u.s. -Soviet relations; a public viewing of the agree-
ments and debates between political leaders; an end to the 
concealing of nuclear programs by the Soviets; a consistent 
' policy toward "institutionalizing" the process of detente; 
the impact of policies on the domestic level in each nation; 
and the need for the Soviet Union and the United States to 
end their conflicts, and focus toward the greater problems 
that afflict the international community, particularly in 
the Third World. 21 
In an article in the April, 1975 issue of the Center 
Report (Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions), 
Kennedy wrote of his approval of the recently negotiated 
Vladivostok Accords, and the Senate Vladivostok Resolution, 
stating that Vladivostok was a step in the right direction, 
and should not be viewed as an encouragement to construct 
more missiles and advance technology toward further improv-
ing qualitative delivery systems. A substantial proof of 
good faith by the United States in the area of arms control 
was required, Kennedy elaborated, to show the Soviets the 
' continued American intention to pursue detente. Thus, Vla-
divostok was a necessary step toward an improvement in So-
21. Edward M. Kennedy, "Beyond Detente," Foreign Policy, XVI 
(Fall, 1974), cited in Detente Hearings, p.507. 
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. . . 22 
vlet-Amerlcan relatlons. 
The factors of trade, of decreasing the nuclear arms 
race, and of the general lessening of political tensions are 
• 
the possibilities that those that find detente desirable ln-
evitably point out as within reach. The very language and 
approach to these political questions differ markedly from 
• 
those of detente's opponents, in that those that take a dim 
• 
view of detente perceive a different view of Soviet inten-
tions. Those that give their approval toward this Soviet-
American rapproachment see a number of areas where coopera-
• 
tion is possible. The detentists believe that the Soviets 
have shown a proclivity, doubtless a cautious one, to pro-
ceed ahead. But beyond these agreements and exchanges in the 
fields of science, culture, trade and environmental matters 
lies the world of nuclear weaponry. Without the agreed in-
tentions of containing the development of strategic weaponry, 
• 23 
the detentists note, the two sides are nearing Armageddon • 
• The opponents of detente, or at least those that became dis-
enchanted with Soviet actions in global areas of conflict, 
note that Armageddon will surely ensue if America does not 
22. Edward M. Kennedy, "How to Limit Strategic Weapons Under 
the Vladivostok Agreement," Center Magazine, (April, 1975) 
p. 31. 
23. With regard to the strategic arms race, the views of such 
detente supporters as George Kennan, Averell Harriman and 
Senator Fulbright are examples of the great concern ad-
vocates of the Kissinger policy placed on limiting weap-
ons development. Such detente proponents believe that a 
nuclear confrontation between the u.s. and U.S.S.R. is 
certain if SALT and detente fail. 
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quicken its resolve to progress in the development of future 
deterrents. Even with the levels of trade and in the trans-
fer of technology, the Soviets will breech their "sacred" 
word, and will not resist the temptation to apply these 
24 technical advancements to their military arsenal. The de-
' fenders of detente take an alternate view, and see a number 
of areas where Soviet and American perceptions run parallel 
to each other, with progress leading to further improvement 
in East-West relations. 
Samuel Pisar, an attorney and commentator in Paris, 
and Washington, notes these differences, and throws his lot 
' on the side of detente. Pisar notes that the United states 
and the Soviet Union are faced with only two alternatives be-
' cause of their nuclear rivalry: "Apocalypse" and "Detente." 
' Since detente is the only alternative to avoid a nuclear war, 
Pisar is concerned why certain elements in the West continue 
to exhibit a purposeful opposition to improved relations, 
particularly in the fields of 'trade, agriculture and tech-
nology. Such opposition, Pisar states, is founded on the 
faulty notion that such increased contacts will only strength-
en the Soviet power structure. Viewing such prognosticating 
' by detente's opponents as a misinterpretation of Soviet in-
' 24. Detente opponents, particularly those from the military, 
such as Zumwalt and Graham, also believe that nuclear war 
is a certainty if the u.s. continues to participate in 
the SALT Talks as presently constructed. They believe 
the Soviets will always take advantage of such agreements. 
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tentions, Pisar believes that such contacts will strengthen 
the chance for a real detente, and further the possibility 
for the Soviet Union to liberalize its "domestic system and 
. . . . 25 the moderat1on of 1ts fore1gn po11cy." 
Former Senator Eugene McCarthy, an outspoken critic of 
American foreign policy and its military dimension, believes 
that progress in the areas of arms limitation, trade, and 
' cultural agreements can aid in the process of detente, and 
begin the reassessment of American foreign policy that he be-
lieves necessary. cooperation in fields outside the scope of 
political and military concerns can contribute to lessening 
• the prospects of nuclear war, which is the aim of detente. 
McCarthy strongly suggests that the United States must 
initiate nuclear weapons reductions, unilaterally if neces-
sary, because of our overabundance of nuclear weapons that no 
longer serve any political or military purpose. Such prodi-
gious amounts of nuclear weapons, McCarthy asserts, only 
force the Soviets to develop further weapons systems. As far 
as McCarthy is concerned, the Soviets can go right on produc-
lng more weapons. The United States should not. 26 
Paul Warnke, former General Counsel at the Defense 
Department, key adviser to Senator George McGovern's presi-
• 25. Samuel Pisar, "The Dynamics of Detente," L'Ex~r_ess, No. 
1206, 19-25 about 1974, cited in Detente Hear1ngs, p.329. 
26. Eugene McCarthy, "The Case Against a Militaristic Foreign 
Policy," Center Magazine, (December, 1975), p .10. 
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dential campaign, and chief arms negotiator ln the SALT Talks 
' for the Certer administration, focused upon the need for de-
tente to end global political conflicts, and the necessity 
for arms control. During a November, 1973 "Symposium" span-
sored by the "Coalition for a Democratic Majority," Warnke 
' expressed an opinion to which many detentists subscribe: 
' there is no alternative to detente. Included in this view 
' is Warnke's tolerance of Soviet behavior. Detente, to Warnke, 
is a chance worth taking. Since there is no alternative to 
' detente, the United States must excuse certain actions on the 
part of the Soviet Union which the United States does not ap-
prove, but nevertheless must accept. Such a view of Soviet-
' American relations places Warnke firmly ln favor of detente 
' policy. The opponents of detente would remark that it is 
precisely because of Soviet behavior and its history of "bad 
h t d ' . b b 27 manners" t a makes any real etente lmpro a le. 
In discussing the Soviet potential for "risk-taking" 
during the Middle East War of 1973, for example, Warnke saw 
' no violation of detente by the Soviets, but did view the 
American alert as ill-advised. 
The reaction of the United States at that point was very 
mixed. We brandished a very big stick but at the same 
time we spoke softly. The worldwi~e nuclear alert was a 
meaningless and dangerous charade. 8 
27. The Coalition for a Democratic Majority, The Future of 
' . . Detente, A Symposlum, (Washlngton, D.C.: The Coalltion 
for a Democratic Majority, 1973), p.1. 
28. Ibid., p.2. 
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Commenting on the Soviet threat to rescue the encir-
cled Egyptian Third Army, and to give assistance to the Syri-
ans, Warnke believed the United States also exerted pressure 
upon Israel not to proceed with the decimation of the Third 
Army, and to acquiesce in a cease-fire. 
It is an instance not of a failure of detente, but of 
the exercise of detente. You may question whether or 
not it was a paper exercise, but it seems to me it 
demonstrates that detente lives.29 
' Warnke, like so many others that approve of detente, 
notices the fact that the Soviets probably will continue to 
seek areas where their political and military power can 
penetrate to their advantage. In these instances, provoca-
tive actions on the part of the Soviet Union must be force-
fully discouraged. 
If we are going to pursue detente with the Soviet Union 
we must make clear to them that we cannot tolerate ln-
tervention by them that will bring new areas under their 
exclusive control.30 
' Perhaps Kissinger, the architect of detente, would re-
' 
.:nind Warnke that detente commenced with the need to eliminate 
the "search for .:narginal advantages." If the Soviets contin-
ue to maneuver in the game of power po~itics, seeking to ex-
ert control ~n spheres that will provide the Soviets "new 
areas under their excLusive control," then the realists may 
' be justified in asking wfiat is the difference between detente 
and Cold War? 
29. Ibid., p.2. 
30 • Ibid. , p. 2 • 
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' The military dimension of detente has also spurred a 
debate that is as controversial and far-reaching as the poli-
' tical questions. In this matter, the detentists do not ac-
cept the proposition of the opponents that the Soviet Union 
is preparing itself for a potential first-strike capability. 
The probability that the Soviet Union would entertain such 
thoughts of a nuclear war-winning capability is dismissed as 
Cold War rhetoric, as is the notion that the Soviets can 
achieve a strategic superiority. Little can be discovered 
' in pro-detente literature that recognizes a serious alterna-
tive to the present parity as agreed to by both sides. 
Gene R. LaRocque, Rear Admiral (Retired), and present-
ly Director, Center for Defense Information, is confident 
that the armed forces of the United States and NATO can with-
stand any type of Soviet attack, and in a nuclear exchange 
the United States can obliterate the Soviet Union. Admiral 
' LaRocque, in testimony before the Senate Detente Hearings, 
' ' stated his unqualified support for detente. Detente, La-
Rocque argued, is advantageous for the United States, since 
it is based on American nuclear strength which can withstand 
any Soviet attack. LaRocque believes the Soviet Union could 
not win or survive a nuclear war, and would fail if it at-
tempted to "intimidate the u.s. militarily and achieve an 
advantage" 31 because of American nuclear strength. Other 
' 31. Detente Hearings, p.464. 
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high-ranking military leaders, such as Admiral Zumwalt and 
General Graham strongly disagree with LaRocque's contention 
that the United States possesses preponderant military 
strength, or that the Soviet Union lacks the capability to 
militarily challenge the United States in areas of political 
concern. 
In a pointed reference to those that support a much 
stronger military posture because of the presumed danger of 
an encroaching Soviet military superiority, LaRocque states 
that an analysis of Soviet military strength does not warrant 
such a conclusion. LaRocque believes that such warnings are 
the same "old rhetoric" that the cold warriors have repeated 
over the years, and only enable the "hardliners in the Soviet 
. t h h . . . 32 UnJ.on" to s rengt en t eJ.r posJ.tJ.on. 
In a 1975 analysis of the fiscal year 1976 Pentagon 
budget, LaRocque and two staff members of the Center for the 
Study of Democratic Institutions, staff member David Johnson, 
and Herbert York, a nuclear physicist and a one-time top 
Defense Department adviser to Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy 
and Johnson, offered a list of counter-proposals. What their 
propositions encompassed was to radically slow the American 
nuclear program, and conventional weaponry, with the result 
that the Soviets would soon follow suit. Their recommenda-
tions were: 
32. Ibid., p.464. 
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1) Cancel the B-I Bomber. 
2) Stop spending on new ICBM's. 
3) Stop development of new strategic cruise missiles. 
4) Stop ABM spending. 
5) Slow Trident Program to one a year. 
6) Place a ceiling of 10,000 on strategic weapons • 
. . 7) Reduce overseas tactical nuclear weapons. 
8) Terminate obsolete military treaties. 
9) Cut marginal overseas forces. 
10) Don't increase army divisions. 
11) Cancel airborne warning and control system. 
12) Cancel SAM (surface to air missile) system. 
13) Cancel XM-I tank program. 
14) Reduce Operations and Maintenance. 
15) Cut unnecessary military aid and arms sales.33 
The existence of modern nuclear weapons and their g1-
gantic cost and destructiveness has been at the center of the 
' debate on detente in more than just a military sense. What 
is perplexing in this debate is the substantial absence of 
' concern by the detentists about the possible political advan-
tages that can be gained if one side commands even a nominal 
' superiority. The detentists are primarily concerned with 
nuclear parity and the avoidance of further qualitative and 
' quantitative improvements. As detente began as a policy to 
equalize the nuclear arsenals of both sides so as to control 
a spiraling arms race, it also sought to lessen the dangerous 
political consequences that the arms race has engendered. 
The 1973 Middle East war, and Soviet policies in Africa and 
' Portugal, brought about a surge of anti-detente opinion that 
feared the political consequences of growing Soviet nuclear 
3 3. Admiral Gene R. LaRocque, et al. , "Toward a Realistic 
Military Budget," Center Magazine, (April, 1975), Pp.3-5. 
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' power. It is remarkable that the detentists - unlike their 
opponents - have seemingly neglected the political opportu-
nities that can conceivably follow military power. Rather, 
a policy that was initiated to end the "search for marginal 
advantages" between the two rivals, but which at least took 
into account the politics of the post-war world, retreated 
into a simple fear of nuclear war, where, paradoxically, the 
opportunity to use power politics to one's advantage is dis-
missed as either Cold War rhetoric, or paranoia over Soviet 
' intentions. In this matter, the detentists are not as con-
cerned over Soviet political pursuits as they are in regard 
to avoiding nuclear war. 
' Still another school of detente exists, a minority one 
to be sure: the "revisionists." The realists and the ortho-
' dox detentists have oft times in the past shared the same 
fundamental approach to political analysis. The differences 
in the context of the past decade are primarily over how 
power can best be used. The revisionists, who have attempted 
to revise and rewrite the history of the post-war world, 
stand out as a school of political opinion that in large 
measure expresses dissatisfaction with the entire course of 
post-war American foreign policy. 
The revisionists garnered the greatest of their support 
during the civil protests of the 1960's and early 1970's. A 
variety of groups - many no longer in existence, but at one 
time having enjoyed a considerable popular following - con-
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tributed to the strength of the revisionist school. The New 
Left, which became a sort of all inclusive description of 
protest groups, such as the SDS, The New Democratic Coali-
tion, The Co~~ittee to End the War, and a variety of civil 
rights groups and campus activists, lent a varied assortment 
of opinions to the popularity and attractiveness of revision-
ism. Such movements and radical critiques of American for-
eign policy and domestic affairs often reflect many diverse 
opinions, by such individuals as Marxists Herbert Marcuse and 
Angela Davis, and non-Marxian "establishment" spokesmen like 
Senators McCarthy, McGovern and Fulbright. 
The loose alignment of assorted groups and their di-
verging shades of beliefs gave revisionism its greatest 
strength. It has also been responsible for its rapid decline 
in recent years. As such, revisionist political thought 
could hardly survive amongst ideas that ranged from isolat-
ing America from further foreign involvements because of 
Viet Nam, to the opposite extreme of assisting "peoples lib-
eration movements" around the globe. When the American in-
volvement in Viet Nam began to scale down, and the civil 
rights movement entered a new stage, the appeal of revision-
ism receded with those issues and causes. Yet, the revision-
ist school continues to exist, primarily as a small academic 
community that continues to criticize American foreign poli-
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cy as explo1tat1ve an m1l1tar1st. 
Fred warner Neal, Chairman of the International Rela-
tions faculty of the Claremont Graduate School and Chairman 
of the American Committee on u.s. -Soviet Relations, pres-
ents the type of revisionist analysis that harshly judges 
post-war American foreign policy. In an October, 1972 arti-
cle, for example, Neal characterized the 1972 Basic Princi-
ples as a policy shift in the positions of both sides, but a 
particularly greater modification of policy for the United 
States. This alteration of policy for the United States was 
difficult because of Washington's past preoccupation and in-
correct analysis of the Soviet Union's commitment to military 
expansion; the belief that Soviet ideological concerns would 
block any meaningful type of peaceful relations; and the 
"denial of Soviet core interest ••• and a reluctance to con-
sider the neutralization of other areas" 35 because of 
American containment policy. The result of all this, Neal 
states, has been a consistent American policy to rely on 
34. The revisionist school of political thought holds to a 
number of minority viewpoints: American aggressiveness 
and rabid anti-Communism was responsible for the Cold 
War; American political and military power is used to 
protect "Wall Street" interests; and business and gov-
ernmental elites from the "military-industrial" complex 
commands the predominant power in American government. 
This business-governmental alliance, the revisionists 
note, is unwilling to pursue a moral and idealistic for-
eign policy. 
35. Fred warner Neal, "The Moscow Declaration," Center Maga-
zine, V (Sept.-Oct., 1972), p.27. 
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military superiority over the Soviet Union, which has made 
peaceful relations impossible. With the signing of the 
Basic Principles this American policy can no longer be sup-
ported. 
Neal further asserts that if the Basic Principles are 
adhered to the Cold War has ended. For the first time, the 
United States made a "verbal ••• commitment to the idea of 
peaceful coexistence, as enunciated by Nikita Khrushchev in 
1956." 36 Consequently, Neal believes, it will be particu-
larly challenging for the United States to follow the Basic 
Principles because of past American attitudes. This will not 
be a hindrance for Soviet leaders, however, since "they are 
37 inclined to put more faith in such documents than we do." 
As we shall see in quoting a few more statements from 
' Neal, the revisionists saw in detente the end of an era of 
confrontation and crisis, made so prevalent in those years 
after the Second World War because of American refusal to 
realistically deal with legitimate Soviet concerns, and of 
a policy of confrontation that could have no other effect 
but to make the Soviet Union more militarily prepared to pro-
teet itself. All of America's errors, the revisionists men-
tioned could be pointed to in two terrible occurrences: the 
tragedy of Viet Nam, and the burning of America's cities, 
36. Ibid., p.27. 
37. Ibid., p.27. 
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caused by the frustrations of an oppressed minority. New 
Left, or revisionist approaches, place a heavy emphasis upon 
domestic policies and attitudes in the formulation of for-
eign policy. 
' Detente, to the revisionists, was an American attempt 
to do what was right after the tragedy of Viet Nam. Since 
anti-Communism would no longer hold the national polity to-
gether, a radical shift in policy toward accommodation with 
the Communist world was necessitated, partially because of 
the "youth revolt" of the 1960's. American youth simply 
would not fight for a "guilty nation," particularly one which 
expended so little effort to erase domestic injustices. With 
problems at home, why should America expend so much effort 
abroad to hinder the threats of Communism? George F. Kennan, 
who has revised some of his earlier propositions, has on oc-
casion agreed with the attitudes of the revisionists. 
When I see the complacency in the face of the evils we 
have in our own civilization - the crime, the drugs, 
the pornography, the cynicism, the disillusionment - I 
wonder why these same people are so worried about an 
attack from the outside. I wish I could say to them, 
'Look, show me an America in which these things have 
been overcome and then I will talk to you about how we 
are going to defend ourselves against the Soviet Union.' 
There is no use concentrating on the fancied danger out-
side the door when we have not mastered the greater dan-
ger inside.38 
38. The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 
The Center Magazine, American Foreign Policy, A Sym-
posium (Santa Barbara, Calif: March-April, 1976), p.l9. 
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To the revisionists, the Nixon-Kissinger policy of 
• detente, particularly in its infancy, was one of the great 
turning points in American foreign policy. Of all people, 
Richard Nixon, the archetypal Cold Warrior, was attempting 
to end the conflicts between the two superpowers, and re-
• direct American policy toward accommodation. Detente had to 
be pursued and preserved, and nothing should stand in its 
• 
way. The greatest danger that could befall detente, the re-
visionists believed, was not the actions of the Soviet Union, 
but the American domestic critics who would not foresake the 
psychology and politics of the Cold War. Professor Neal 
wrote: 
This cold war psychology is still deep, and it is re-
flected in repeated exaggerations about Soviet strength 
and its aims and in the assertion that only the Russians 
get something out of detente, that we get nothing from 
it. I don't think we should say, 'Let the Russians 
prove they are worthy of detente.• Let us prove also 
that we are worthy of detente.39 
To the revisionists, the vestiges of containment, anti-
Communism, nuclear superiority, and the failure to recognize 
legitimate Soviet national interests were still alive, and 
• 
could deliver a death blow to the new Soviet-American de-
tente. Another danger was that of interference in Soviet 
internal affairs, especially the issue of tying trade and 
emigration. This is an unpardonable intrusion into the So-
39. Ibid., p.l9. 
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viet domestic process, and America certainly has no right to 
demand of other states what we ourselves have failed at home. 
In 1975, Professor Neal led an unofficial delegation 
of the American Committee on u.s. -Soviet relations to Mos-
cow to assess the "damage" done by the Soviet reaction to the 
Congressional passage of the u.s. -U.S.S.R. Trade Act, which 
tied the emigration of Soviet Jews to the American granting 
of Most-Favored Nation status. Neal's observations of his 
Moscow visit, and his disappointment in the course that the 
' detente critics had embarked upon, was incorporated in a let-
' ter he wrote, "Can the Soviet-American Detente be Salvaged?" 
His opening salvo was directed at the Congressional action, 
h . h 1 . . d 40 w 1.c "was contrary to al norms of 1.nternat1.ona1 con uct." 
Neal believes that this action had not only a damaging ef-
feet upon the successful pursuance of a new relationship, but 
was an unnecessary provocation toward an already tenuous be-
ginning. 
Neal states that in his conversations with leading So-
viet officials he was convinced they are truly interested in 
' a new relationship - detente - even though the Trade Act was 
interpreted as a terrible stumbling block in that regard. 
While stating that the Soviets can live without trade with 
the United States, the 
' 40. Fred Warner Neal, "On Salvaging the Soviet-American De-
tente," The Center Report, (April, 1975), p.9. 
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primary interest of the Soviet Union in detente, it was 
insisted, is not in obtaining American credits and tech-
nology, but in being able to work out political and dip-
lomatic agreements to prevent war, curtail nuclear arma-
ments, and reduce international tensions.41 
In a meeting with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuz-
netsov, Neal quotes him as stating: 
'We are prepared to go very far in cooperation if you 
will only go along with us. We would be stupid not to 
see that peace and reduction of tensions, and therefore 
our welfare as well as yours, depends on American-Soviet 
detente. The Soviet Union is not stupid.' The American 
Committee on u.s. -U.s.s.R. Relations •.. hopes that the 
United States is 'not stupid.•42 
' The supporters of the Nixon-Kissinger detente carne from 
a many and varied lot. Having spent years in study, or de-
' cades as experienced diplomats, they perceived of detente as 
a policy process to draw the United States and the Soviet Un-
ion into some type of arrangement to lessen the dangers of 
nuclear war. The Nixon-Kissinger approach to foreign policy 
always kept the Soviet Union as the center of attention. The 
stakes being as high and dangerous as they are, the u.s. -
Soviet global interaction could never be shoved to the side-
' lines. For too long, the detente supporters would explain, 
the Soviet-American rivalry had kept the world teetering on 
the brink of a massive nuclear holocaust. The political, 
military and ideological competition that pitted the two 
superpowers against each other had to be reduced to diminish 
41. Ibid., p.10. 
42. Ibld., p.12. 
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the threats of a terrible conflagration. The history of the 
names, places and events of these conflicts are fresh ln the 
memory of many - sketched from the end of World War II to the 
present, a history that unfolded rapidly and with great en-
ergy, a history of conflict, but, nevertheless, one with some 
degree of cooperation in specific instances. 
The ideological imperatives that each side adhered to, 
each.feared by the other, is a struggle of ideas and power. 
Buy beyond all of these political, military and ideological 
vicissitudes lay the spectre of nuclear war, where one mis-
take, one miscalculation, could bring unbelievable horror 
and havoc upon each side. As each event led to another, like 
chips being stacked in a poker game, sooner or later one 
side would feel fortified and confident enough to call the 
other's bluff. Sooner or later, one side would attempt to 
cash in all the chips. 
The political events that led to this monumental strug-
gle would have to be redirected to avoid an almost certain 
' catastrophe, the detente supporters would argue. After it 
became apparent that the Soviets had a different interpreta-
' tion of detente and the Basic Principles than the United 
' States, the detentists would state that to expect a quarter 
century of direct conflict to wither away was unrealistic, 
and that only through the pointed determination of both sides 
to cooperate, find areas of accommodation, and search for 
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further arms limitations, could the world avoid a nuclear 
nightmare. The opposition that was attempting to redirect 
' this recent accommodation - said the detentists - were the 
"Cold Warriors," or those who would accept the benefits of 
' detente accruing only to the American side; those that con-
tinued to see the world through the spectacles of an obsolete 
Cold War psychology. In conjunction with these attitudes 
' was the perception of the detentists that the Soviet Union 
and the United States were still competitors on a global 
scale, with conflicts that would continue to plague both 
sides, but, nevertheless, conflicts of a more traditional 
political nature, less subject to the irrationalities of a 
military and ideological kind. 
' When the Nixon-Kissinger policy of detente reached its 
apex, with all the dramatics that attended it, the opponents 
' of detente were silent. Here was an administration that was 
ending the active American involvement in Viet Nam; had jour-
neyed to China in a historic gesture; and had negotiated a 
number of far-reaching agreements with the Soviets. The 
prospects of a new future blocked any possibility of a great 
' attack on detente. But when the Nixon administration began 
to feel the political effects of Watergate, and the Soviet 
' action in the Middle East called into question what detente 
was all about, the opponents spoke forcefully, and not just 
' on the prior issues of the Cold War, but on the issue of de-
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' tente itself. The detentists tried desperately to salvage 
what they could in this regard, and at least stay some type 
of course to avoid repeating what they perceived as errors 
of the past. No matter what political, military and economic 
agreements would be reached, one matter would continue to 
' burden the detentists in this debate: the question of human 
rights. 
CHAPI'ER VI I 
' DETENTE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger's approach to for-
eign policy questions invoked the traditional balance of 
power concept. Both men preferred to analyze the world po-
litical and military condition in terms of power. Quite 
naturally, they sought to devise strategies whose central 
point would be the maximum use of power to resolve some of 
the outstanding issues that embroiled the Soviet-American 
competition. Part of their preference for this reliance on 
power was the interpretation by many foreign policy experts 
that the ideological competition between the two superpowers 
was rapidly receding amidst more vital questions. Specifi-
cally, certain analysts noted a decreasing Soviet reliance 
on ideology, and a growing desire to negotiate conflicting 
issues with the West in terms of power and self-interest. 
An ancillary notion of this interpretation entertained the 
belief that the age of ideology was over, and that the So-
viets had also accepted this "reality." This was considered 
a new and positive atmosphere in which to resolve some as-
pects of the political and military rivalry. Instead of an 
ideological fight, which is always difficult to resolve, 
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questions of war and peace could now be approached and nego-
tiated in a more "practical" environment. This was especial-
ly appealing to the American side. Nixon and Kissinger could 
engage in a strategy that took into account power for power. 
It is important to recognize the value which the Nixon 
administration placed ln its preference for the use of power, 
and what this spelled for the question of human rights. The 
administration perceived the issue of human rights as an ele-
ment within the ideological spectrum, an element that should 
be avoided. This judgment was necessitated, the administra-
tion reasoned, because of two influences. One, if the admin-
istration was to negotiate successfully with Communist 
states, specifically the Soviet Union, touchy and embarrass-
ing issues such as human rights had to be avoided. To in-
corporate concern for human rights on the negotiating level 
with strategic arms talks, and political questions over Ber-
lin, the Middle East, Viet Nam, and what was beginning to 
' unfold as the administration's stated detente relationship, 
any hope for a modification of views on specific issues could 
be jeopardized. These were questions of political and mili-
tary power, and they should not be burdened by emotionally 
charged moral concerns. 
The second influence which the administration perceived 
as cautioning against any human rights element actively in-
valved in direct American foreign policy, was the domestic 
environment affected by the war in Viet Nam. The Southeast 
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Asia conflict sparked a debate which called into question 
many of the tenets thought basic to American foreign policy. 
Many of the domestic critics of the Viet Nam involvement 
charged that excessive anti-Communism had led the United 
states into the Viet Nam misadventure, and that the American 
position on human rights was just another element in that ex-
cessive preoccupation. So the Nixon administration, which 
had chosen a foreign policy that would concern itself pri-
marily with the elements of power that accrued from the poli-
tical and military foundations of each superpower's strength, 
found support for silently disregarding human rights because 
of the viet Nam War. The best policy to follow, the admin-
istration believed, was to avoid the issue of human rights. 
The Nixon administration thought, quite correctly, 
that if the issue of human rights was actively invoked as a 
"pillar" of American foreign policy, it would inevitably 
point to the Soviet Union as one of the most consistent 
abusers. If such a situation were allowed to occur, it would 
be inevitable that the human rights concern would progress 
from identification to intervention. Once a state was iden-
tified as having a dismal record in human rights, some type 
of intervention into that nation's internal affairs would 
ultimately ensue. The administration was cognizant of So-
viet sensitivity in such matters. The Soviets know from past 
experience that they will be so identified, and that human 
rights will be engaged as a weapon to interfere in their 
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domestic environment. 
The Nixon, and eventually Gerald Ford administration, 
therefore purposefully attempted to downplay the issues of 
human rights because of the provocative effect this issue 
would have concerning negotiation on strategic arms, trade, 
and other political questions. Both administrations believed 
that it would not be possible to negotiate with the Soviet 
' Union within the broad context of detente if issues such as 
human rights were being directed at Moscow. Moscow would -
and eventually did - retort to Washington that the human 
rights movement was resulting in peace being threatened. 
Two events can show how the issue of human rights affected 
' the political dimensions of detente. 
The first such instance was the concern over Soviet 
Jews, and their right to emigrate to Israel and the West. 
Senator Henry Jackson, one of the most outspoken critics of 
' detente, sponsored legislation in 1972, along with Congress-
man Vanik, to link emigration of Soviet Jewry to American 
granting of Most-Favored-Nation status. This proposal met 
with considerable opposition from Henry Kissinger, who felt 
that this type of linkage would adversely affect political 
and economic negotiations. An ideological linkage could only 
' strain a most sensitive beginning in the detente process. 
Eventually, Kissinger was able to extract from the Soviets 
a higher number of Soviet citizens that would be allowed to 
emigrate. But in 1975 the Soviets informed Washington that 
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they could not accept the provisions imposed on the 1972 
trade agreement. 
A second incident was the refusal of President Ford 
to meet with Alexander Solzhenitsyn. This decision was 
urged upon Ford by secretary Kissinger, who felt that such 
a symbolic gathering would embarrass the Soviet Union and 
Secretary Brezhnev. This act was a major mistake on the 
part of the administration, for it aroused the indignation 
• 
of many concerned observers, who now felt that the detente 
relationship had completely abandoned any type of moral con-
cerns 1n the international arena . 
• At the Senate Detente Hearings in 1974, Secretary 
Kissinger spoke of the difficulty of injecting issues of 
human rights into the political relationship between the two 
superpowers. 
Where the age-old antagonism between freedom and tyranny 
is concerned, we are not neutral. But other imperatives 
impose limits on our ability to produce internal changes 
in foreign countries. Consciousness of our limits is 
recognition of the necessity of peace - not moral cal-
lousness. The preservation of human life and human so-
ciety are moral values too.l 
This attitude on the part of Secretary Kissinger, and 
the Nixon and Ford administrations, found a number of impor-
tant and influential allies, who believed that the possibili-
ties to reduce tension outweighed the admittedly moral goals 
• 1. Detente Hearings, p.239. 
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of the human rights movement. These observers speculated 
that if human rights were to be made an integral part of 
American foreign policy, demanding of the Soviets a modified 
domestic behavior, then the Soviets could justifiably claim 
that such policies were an unwarranted intrusion into their 
internal affairs, and a weapon to attack the very foundations 
of their regime. Knowing how the Soviets react to such po-
litical forays into their domestic affairs, the supporters of 
Kissinger's policy were cognizant of the Soviet response: 
interference into Soviet domestic affairs is a direct attack 
on Moscow's power, and future agreements in economic, cultur-
al, political and military spheres will be exceedingly more 
difficult to negotiate. 
Former Ambassador George Kennan was critical of the 
Congress for interjecting human rights requests, such as the 
emigration of Soviet Jews, into negotiations on economic 
matters, particularly Most-Favored-Nation status and other 
commercial agreements. Kennan felt that Kissinger's policy 
of neglecting the human rights issue as a specific foreign 
policy weapon was wise, especially in view of the effect of 
basing our co~~ercial relationship with the Soviet Union on 
the granting of exit visas for Soviet Jews. Kennan felt that 
the executive branch was much more capable of using the issue 
of Most-Favored-Nation status as a bargaining chip in nego-
tiations with the Soviets, rather than allowing the Congress 
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to attach too many conditions to its use by way of legisla-
. 2 t1on. 
' In the 1974 Senate Detente Hearings, Kennan was expli-
citly critical of those who wished to attach, or link, the 
emigration of Soviet Jews to commercial matters. Kennan felt 
that it was improper to single out one religious or racial 
group to benefit from the Congressional legislation, while 
other groups in the soviet Union would not. But beyond this 
objection is Kennan's belief that the United States should 
not interfere in the domestic affairs of other states, par-
ticularly those in the Soviet Union, actions that we would 
not tolerate if directed at washington. Kennan stated: 
Why only the Soviet Union? Are we sure there are no 
other countries where citizens would have difficulty in 
obtaining permission to leave the country at will? And 
do we really wish to convey the impression that we object 
to such restrictive policies only when they are pursued 
by the Soviet authorities, but condone it in other in-
stances?3 
Kennan does not believe that the issue of human rights 
should be completely dismissed from the totality of American 
foreign policy. Rather, human rights has a most important 
part to play in expressing the American desire that govern-
ments do have a moral responsibility to treat their citizens 
"more closely to the universal ideals of tolerance and re-
b . 4 spect for what have now come to e known as human rlghts." 
2 • Ibid. , p. 62 • 
3 . Ibid. , p. 63. 
4. George F. Kennan, The Cloud of Danger (Boston: Little, 
Brown & Co., 1977), p.202. 
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Kennan states that the overwhelming issue is the political 
question of how the United States and the Soviet Union can 
coexist together without resorting to war, and not the issue 
of human rights. The Soviet Union "asked for trouble, of 
course, when it signed the Helsinki declarations on hwnan 
rights," 5 Kennan says, and American policy must be to remind 
the Soviets of their obligations, delicately placing pressure 
on the Soviets to abide by these agreements, but not in a 
publicly forceful manner that most always forces the Soviets 
to toughen-up on their political dissidents. 
Professor Marshall Shulman, Director of the Russian In-
stitute, Columbia University, has supported Nixon and Kissin-
' ger's detente efforts. He agrees with Kennan that political 
and military considerations are of the utmost priority, and 
not issues which unrealistically aim to disrupt the Soviet 
domestic system. A lengthy period of reduced tension is the 
most realistic avenue of which to change a substantial amount 
of the repressiveness of the Soviet regime, Shulman states. 
Like Kennan and Kissinger, Shulman believes that human rights 
does have a role to play, but primarily outside the bounds of 
concerted governmental policy, and by "avoiding frontal pub-
lie confrontations of the Soviet leadership by demands from 
our government for concessions in their system which exceed 
b 'b' . 6 a reasona le scale of feas1 lllty." 
5. Ibid., p.215. 
6. ~nte Hearings, p.109. 
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' Rather, Shulman stated before the Senate Detente Hear-
ings, human rights issues should be directed by individuals 
and groups to call attention to Soviet violations of human 
rights, an effort that Shulman believes will have the most 
effect on Moscow. 
Adam Ulam, Director of the Russian Research Center at 
Harvard University, echoes the same concerns about human 
rights as his colleague Professor Shulman. While somewhat 
more supportive of human rights as a political policy direct-
ed at the Soviet Union to end governmental repression, he 
nevertheless cautions against any publicly directed govern-
mental policy to attach human rights issues to political 
questions. While stating that his sympathies lie with those 
who support the aims of the Jackson Amendment, he views such 
. . d . 7 Congress1onal act1ons as counterpro uct1ve. 
' What eventually transpired from detente's heyday in 
' 1972 to the 1974 Senate Detente Hearings, was a clear iden-
tification of the groups and issues that divided "the sup-
' porters and opponents of detente. What this meant for human 
rights became even more clearly represented after the sign-
ing of the Helsinki Final Act. Those individuals and groups 
that supported Nixon and Kissinger's efforts in the politi-
cal-military arena tended to follow that policy in the hlli~an 
rights field. Progress in areas of direct political and 
7. Ibid., p.114. 
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military concern should not be burdened by a governmental 
policy that attached human rights as a negotiating issue. 
Although this view on what importance should be attributed to 
human rights had a significant following, it too began to re-
cede amidst other events that were eroding the political-
' military aspects of detente. Still, significant elements of 
the political establishment continued to voice their support 
for a policy that they believed would reduce Cold War ten-
' sions. In their approach to a Soviet-American detente, such 
influential political leaders as Senators Fulbright, McGov-
ern, Church, Fell, and former Ambassador Averell Harriman, 
spoke in favor of approaching the Cold War conflict in a 
typical Kissingerian manner: negotiate the most significant 
political-military issues that divide the two superpowers 
(and in so doing, hoping the Soviets will accept a truce), 
and refrain from creating additional conflicts because of So-
viet human rights violations. 
The opponents of detente had always thought it a mis-
take to relegate the human rights issue to a compassionate 
silence. Of course the Soviet Union would be singled out, 
the critics responded, because of its massive power. But 
on the h~~an rights subject, the west held an ideal trump 
card: when it came to preserving and defending basic human 
and political rights, the Soviets could not compete. 
I 
The opponents of detente did not accept the Nixon-Kis-
singer view that ideology had succ~~bed to power and self-
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interest between the two superpowers. Ideological questions 
were still important, and were bound to continue, particu-
larly in the case of the Soviet Union. This view took the 
form of perceiving the superpower rivalry as a contest be-
tween the totalitarian Communism of the Soviet variety, and 
the democratic nations of the West. Implicit in this con-
' test that knows no detente is the human rights subject that 
should be utilized as a weapon in negotiations with the So-
' viets. What the detente opponents were stating was a simple 
tit-for-tat: If the Soviets can justifiably continue to 
spread their Marxist creed globally, and in a bellicose ~an-
ner, then why should the West discard its most powerful ideo-
logical weapon because it will upset Soviet sensitivities. 
And if the Soviets can aid "national liberation movements" 
wherever they wish, then why can't the West assist the So-
viet dissidents? 
The political question of h~~an rights was brought to 
its fullest light during the 1976 Presidential campaign, and 
afterward by President Carter, who would not follow President 
Ford's decision of refusing to grant an audience with Soviet 
dissidents. Domestic political benefits notwithstanding, the 
nature of human rights in a political context was fraught 
with important symbolisms. Prior to Solzhenitsyn•s snub by 
President Ford, and Jimmy Carter's human rights campaign, a 
number of groups, intellectuals, and foreign policy activists 
believed that the issue of h~~an rights should be used as a 
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political weapon against the Soviet Union. Once again the 
American labor movement was in the forefront of those who 
strenuously spoke and lobbied for insistence on basic human 
rights. 
Daniel P. Moynihan, in describing the destruction of 
the once potent anti-war coalition of the poor and the col-
lege-educated, and the generational conflicts between the 
young and the older generation, remarked that this genera-
tional divisiveness 
was not all inclusive. The American labor movement's 
leaders, in part because they have not encountered such 
generational conflicts, have not wavered in their sup-
port of the libertarian commitment implicit in our post-
war policy. Were President Kennedy to return, they -
many of them - would wish him to sound that very trumpet 
once again.8 
' In George Meany's detente testimony before the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, he pointedly described in 
' what manner organized labor views detente. The American la-
bor movement, Meany stated, was not limited to the bread-and-
butter issues of wages and other economic matters. A concern 
for questions of freedom throughout the world was something 
that organized labor was compelled to maintain because of 
tradition and policy. The aspects of power politics and 
military affairs in American foreign policy have always in-
terested organized labor. But at the heart of their overview 
of foreign policy is the question of the degree of freedom 
8. Daniel P. Moynihan, "How Much Does Freedom Matter?," 
The Atlantic Monthly, (July 1975), p.24. 
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in the global community. Where a state deems it necessary to 
restrict the freedom of its citizens in the political sphere, 
the abrogation of freedom in the economic sector is a logi-
cal corollary. Thus, the AFL-CIO recognizes that trade un-
ion independence is dependent upon the political structure 
of a state that tolerates its existence. The Soviet Union is 
singled out by organized labor as the prime example of in-
tolerance because it is the most powerful of the totalitarian 
' nations. In describing labor's "score card" of detente, it 
is this philosophy that has prompted George Meany to state: 
So, in appearing before this committee, the AFL-CIO is 
not departing from the best traditions of the labor move-
ment, but rather continuing a long tradition of involve-
ment and concern - a tradition of caring about working 
people everywhere, about the cause of freedom everywhere. 
And this is the vanta~e point from which we look at this 
thing called detente. 
Professor Roy Godson of the Political Science Depart-
ment at Georgetown University, who has been active in labor 
union affairs as an international relatiqns adviser, points 
to labor's dual focus on the political questions involved in 
u.s. -Soviet relations, as well as on the human rights is-
sue. 
American labor contends that if in the future there is to 
be peace and genuine detente, the Soviet leadership must 
not only make concessions to match those already made by 
the West in arms control negotiations, but must improve 
the political and social conditions of the people living 
' 9. Detente Hearings, p.373. 
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under its control. Only under these circumstances can 
the West 'stand down.' Meanwhile, the United States and 
its allies must maintain and even increase their strength 
as well as keep their commitments, particularly to 
NATO ,10 
Another issue that American labor is particularly con-
cerned about is the so-called alliance between American in-
dustrialists and the Soviet leadership. Ever since the poli-
' cy of detente began, American industry has perceived the So-
viet Union as a great market that offered undreamed-of prof-
its and materials. The Soviets themselves helped further 
' this notion as another reason for detente, along with their 
more pragmatic need for Western technology, loans and cred-
its. American labor views these capitalists as furthering 
only their pursuit for greater profits as a paramount inter-
est of their corporations, while the Soviet leadership can 
continue their policy of denying greater freedom to their 
people. In a 1977 issue of American Federationist, Lane 
Kirkland, Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO, voiced his con-
cern over the "private group composed of American free enter-
prisers and Soviet commissars," the u.s. -U.S.S.R. Trade 
and Economic Council, "who meet with some frequency in the 
. . . 11 
splrlt of fraternlty." 
10. Roy Godson, "American Labor's Continuing Involvement in 
World Affairs," ORBIS, (Spring 1975), p.98. 
11. Lane Kirkland, "Labor's voice in world Affairs," Ameri-
can Federationist, (Jan. 1977), p.3. 
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Kirkland believes that the motive for this association, par-
ticularly on the American part, is simply to explore means 
for greater economic investment and markets in the Soviet 
Union, while acquiesing in the Soviet desire to see less ern-
phasis placed by the Congress on the "tiresome insistence on 
the freer movement of people or on the contents of the Third 
12 Basket of the Helsinki Agreement." 
The AFL-CIO has made its position known on the ques-
tion of human rights in resolution form at its Executive 
Council conventions. One of the more recent examples is the 
February, 1977 session, when the Human Rights Resolution was 
unanimously passed. It stated: 
The AFL-CIO Executive Council strongly endorses and corn-
mends the position and actions of President Carter in 
support of human rights as a basic tenet of American 
foreign policy. By speaking out unequivocally on spe-
cific cases of oppression, as well as in general terms, 
he has established for his entire administration the 
principle that human rights constitutes the line at which 
diplomatic expediency must stop.13 
This concern of American labor with human rights versus 
' the political dynamics of detente can be reduced to one corn-
rnon denominator which has had a spill-over effect, and has 
found allies which have sprung from other sources as well: 
the politics of ideas. One basic reality exists today that 
distinguishes the whole panoply of life, society, and poli-
12. Ibid., p.3. 
13. AFL-CIO, Statements and Reports Adopted by the AFL-CIO 
Executive Council, (Washington, D.C.: AFL-CIO, 1977), 
p.101. 
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tics of East and West, and that basic idea is the fundamen-
tal question of freedom. Particularly in recent years, the 
AFL-CIO has perceived the world condition in terms of the 
totalitarians versus the democracies of Western Europe, In-
dia, Israel, the United States and others, what has been 
called in some quarters "the West." With so many nations of 
the Third World preferring left-wing ideologies, American 
labor believes that this type of preference for states such 
as the Soviet Union and Cuba will inevitably breed totali-
tarianism, the destruction or. abrogation of free trade union-
ism, military and economic support from the Soviet Union, and 
the support of "national liberation" movements on a global 
basis, which are directed against the West in general. Such 
an assault upon the libertarian ideals of freedom and repre-
sentative democracy no longer are confined to an esoteric 
debate amongst scholars and the political leadership. To 
many observers, the politics of totalitarianism seem to have 
bred a force of its own. 
Former United Nation's Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan, 
voiced such concerns in a 1975 speech before the AFL-CIO Na-
tional Convention. Carl Gershman, Executive Director of the 
Social Democrats, u.s.A., and a trade union activist, de-
scribed Moynihan's speech as a warning to Western democracy 
that it is under assault from totalitarian nations, and that 
this "major crisis" is not "merely economic and military, but 
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' ' ' ' 14 d more fundamentally, pol1t1cal and 1deolog1cal." I eas 
1n politics do matter, Moynihan believes, especially in view 
of the ideological battle raging between the totalitarians 
and the democracies. To Moynihan, the totalitarians "will 
seek whatever opportunities come to hand to destroy that 
15 
which threatens them most, which lS democracy." 
The Soviet Union has steadfastly resisted the encroach-
ments by the human rights activists in the West by responding 
that their appeals are provocative in nature, and will im-
I 
peril detente. They also object to their being singled-out 
as the primary target, particularly by those who envision the 
issue of human rights in the context of a political weapon, 
not just a humanitarian gesture without teeth. Daniel Moy-
nihan responded to such Soviet objections by stating that the 
Soviets know very well why they are singled out by the human 
rights activists: they are the most powerful of totalitarian 
nations, and "their ideology which, since the passing of 
Nazism and the eclipse of fascism as a school of political 
thought, remains the only major political doctrine that chal-
lenges human rights in principle." 16 
I 
Another area where human rights and detente joined 1n 
a political-ideological controversy was in the situation ln 
14. Carl Gershman, "Moynihan and the Politics of Ideas," New 
America, A Publication of Social Democrats, USA (Nov.-,--
1975)' p.l. 
15. Ibid., p.1. 
16. Daniel P. Moynihan, "The Politics of Human Rights," 
Commentary, (August, 1977), p.24. 
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Portugal in 1975. After the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe had ended, Western European concern over 
Soviet conduct, brought about by the events in Portugal in 
which the Soviets were actively supporting Communist mili-
tary and political forces, heightened fears and suspicions 
that the Soviets were reneging on their promises made at the 
Security Conference. One week after the conclusion of the 
Conference, a meeting of West European Socialist Prime Minis-
ters and Party Chairmen gathered in Stockholm. c. L. Sluz-
berger reported for the New York Times: 
With considerably more gumption than the Helsinki af-
fair, the ideologically unified Stockholm meeting voted 
to back Democratic Socialism in Portugal, including 
guarantees of a free press, free parties and free labor 
unions.17 
Present at the meeting when a plan was formulated to 
actively oppose the Portuguese Communists and Soviet inter-
vention in Portugal, were Mario Soares, Chairman of the Por-
tuguese Social-Democratic Party; Premiers Olaf Palme of Swe-
den, Helmut Schmidt of West Germany, Harold Wilson of Great 
Britain, Yitzhak Rabin of Israel, Bruno Kreisky of Austria, 
and Socialist statesmen such as Willy Brandt of West Germany 
and Francois Mitterrand of France. These leaders and spokes-
men were concerned with what they observed as a mounting So-
viet drive to "detach" Portugal from Western Europe. James 
Reston, writing for the New York Times on August 13, 1975, 
17. New York Times, August 11, 1975. 
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reported: 
We are beginning to see already how the Soviet Union in-
tends to interpret the principles of the Helsinki Con-
ference to promote its own revolutionary objectives even 
in Western Europe. At the end of the conference ..• the 
Soviet Union signed a document in support of the most 
fundamental human rights, and it should be noted, as a 
symbol of the cynicism of the age, that the first to in-
voke the Helsinki principles were the Soviets, of all 
peoples, and in Portugal, of all places •.• There is not 
a single principle in this catalogue that is not being 
violated and brutalized by the alliance now running 
Portugal with recent financial aid from Moscow ... This 
is the weakness of the Helsinki Agreement, for there is 
no agreement on what detente means.18 
The question of human rights versus the dynamics of politics 
in this nuclear world will continue to breed conflict and de-
bate. It is understandable that in the nuclear age, where 
two great competing giants must continually caution them-
selves, the struggle for human rights would be pushed into 
the background. Where the interplay of powerful political, 
economic and military forces manifest themselves, the formi-
dable problems over the fate of one's fellows cannot remain 
neglected, despite such forces that possess such tremendous 
' power. Such is what has transpired in the debate over de-
tente. Can the dynamics of politics leave aside or fail to 
meet the demands for human respectability by powerful modern 
governments? The human rights debate has proved that it can-
not. To those in the West that have wrangled over this prob-
lem, both sides have held to legitimate positions that bear a 
' truth in each segment. The detentists are rightly concerned 
18. New York Times, August 12, 1975. 
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when they caution against a human rights campaign directed 
primarily at the Soviet Union as an undue interference ln 
Soviet domestic affairs, and injurious to a process of rap-
proachment where the survival of civilization is at stake. 
Contrariwise, those who speak for human rights, specifically 
as a political weapon, are correct when they state that a 
nation that fails to guarantee its citizens basic political 
rights is hardly a trustworthy partner in the process to se-
cure some sort of decrease in international tension. Some-
where the two positions must meet if the United States is 
to develop a foreign policy that takes into account the ele-
ments of calculated power, and the respect for basic politi-
cal human rights that our western traditions demand, and 
rightly refuse to foresake. 
EPILOGUE 
The human tragedy reaches its climax in the fact that 
after all the exertions and sacrifices of hundreds of 
millions of people and of the victories of the Righteous 
Cause, we have still not found peace or security, and 
that we lie in the grip of even worse perils than those 
we have surmounted.l 
- Winston Spencer Churchill 
March, 1948 
Winston Spencer Churchill, that great captain of war 
and politics, was unquestionably correct in his evaluation 
of the world condition only three years after the last of 
the Great Wars had ended. It is no less true today. The 
defeat of Nazi Germany, Italy, and Japan at the hands of 
the Allies had raised hopes that conflict and war on a glo-
bal scale would cease, and that the most powerful nations 
would find that their interests could best be served by 
living peacefully with each other without resorting to vio-
lence and bloodshed. Such aspirations were dashed amidst 
the territorial and political ambitions of Stalin in Central 
and Eastern Europe, and by the proliferation and popularity 
of Marxism among significant and determined nationalistic 
1. Winston Spencer Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1948), Pp.iv-v. 
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forces globally. Perhaps it would have been wise for Henry 
Kissinger, Richard Nixon, and the foreign policy establish-
ment in power in this country during the last ten years, to 
recall Churchill's perceptive and prophetic warnings. A 
terrible political miscalculation was made, and it is called 
, 
detente. 
What the decades after the close of the Second World 
war have proven is that a Marxist revolutionary power will 
not accept stability. The ideology of the Marxian creed 
knows little compatibility with forces that are opposed to 
it inside the borders of Communist nation-states, nor even 
in those neighboring states that refuse to accept its tenets. 
Of course, this is not always the case. Yugoslavia stands 
as an exception, but only because Tito's political survival 
depends on the West to protect him from his Soviet "breth-
ren." Nevertheless, Churchill would have been declared the 
world's greatest political clairvoyant if his visionary pow-
ers could have predicted a Cuban army slugging its way 
through Africa, while the United states sat on the side-
lines, refusing to assist anti-Communist forces. What re-
sponsibility Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger share for 
' this political miscalculation called detente is dependent up-
on a number of global events that have transpired, the forces 
these events have unleashed, and the culpability the two men 
share for believing that the Soviet Union would reside as a 
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responsible member of the global community. Perhaps a review 
of history is required to find some answers. 
The Congress of Vienna has been shown to be a political 
success because the nations involved in those deliberations 
were not revolutionary states, concerned with overthrowing 
the political structures that had existed for centuries. No 
revolutionary power existed among the victors. Each nation 
accepted the political legitimacy and sovereignty of its 
neighbors. Political, national and territorial differences 
did eventually lead to war, as with Bismarck's Prussian ad-
ventures to unify Germany, but not at the expense of over-
turning an entire society and ruling elite. Such has not 
been the case for six decades of the Twentieth Century, where 
Soviet Russia has opted to spread on a global scale a revolu-
tionary ideology that does not respect legitimacy, sovereign-
ty, stability, territorial integrity, or tolerance for di-
verging views. Rather, it has only respected power that can 
oppose it forcefully. 
Hitler's Germany also attempted to change the political 
boundaries of Europe. The victorious states that met after 
Hitler's defeat differed from the Congress of Vienna because 
a revolutionary state was included in the membership of the 
victors. The Congress succeeded in establishing and preserv-
ing legitimacy and stability for a century because all of 
the participants agreed that such goals were desirable and 
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politically beneficial for their own survival. Such was not 
the case in the atmosphere that existed following Germany's 
surrender. A Marxist revolutionary state opposed Nazi Ger-
many, and with great pains sealed, along with its Western 
allies, Berlin's demise. What eventually emerged was simply 
the case of an ideological state that has no interest in 
preserving stability and order, victorious over a defeated 
and vanquished ideological state that hardly respected those 
attributes either. Has there been any indication since that 
time that the Soviet Union has altered its policy to anything 
different, and will accept and abide by a peaceful reciproci-
ty of competing interests? The answer is mostly in the nega-
tive, and this has been the source of the political, mili-
tary, and ideological competition between the two super-
powers. 
Certain elements in the American political establish-
ment, particularly since the Viet Nam War, have miscalculated 
the political and military intentions of the Soviet Union. 
Diverse influences were partially responsible for the po-
litical miscalculations, some of which are understandable in 
their effect upon policy considerations that inevitably dealt 
with America's strongest rival. These influences have been 
mentioned at great length in this thesis. The desire to 
avoid a nuclear war has exerted the most preponderant force 
in motivating both rivals to understand that while they may 
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compete, a final resolution of the conflict could result in 
a nuclear nightmare. But such understandable fears, espe-
cially from the American side, should not result in a policy 
whereby the Soviet Union is thought to be any different than 
' what it is. The goals of detente, of limiting the strategic 
arms race and attempting to resolve the political conflicts 
that pit the two superpowers on a global scale, have resulted 
on the part of the United States in a curious, yet dangerous 
confusing of humanitarian goals on the one hand, and what 
are the political ambitions of the Soviet Union on the other. 
What cannot be dismissed by any means in causing the 
malaise in American foreign policy are the still powerful 
and lasting effe~ts of the Viet Nam War. The American fail-
ure in Southeast Asia caused the foreign policy elite such 
consternation and embarrassment that past policies that had 
shown strength and success in at least placing formidable 
roadblocks against Soviet expansionism, were thought to be 
dreadful and disastrous policies that were no longer honora-
ble. It was as if the foreign policy establishment had been 
charged with thirty years of malfeasance, and silently plea 
bargained itself into an admission of guilt rather than pub-
licly and forceably standing up for its past accomplish-
ments. The protracted American effort in VietNam caused a 
national debate that resulted in an attempt to rectify the 
Viet Nam failure by reassessing the history and conduct of 
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not only our foreign policy, but a new reassessment of So-
viet foreign policy as well. The demands to change American 
foreign policy unfortunately seemed to take priority over 
the most important political question that Washington has to 
face: once again, what are the political ambitions of the 
Soviet Union? Coupled with this problem is the unique Ameri-
can proclivity to constantly berate itself with guilt com-
plexes, which can only result, and has resulted in, a stymied 
foreign policy that fails to act. For the purposes of ana-
' lyzing American foreign policy and detente, the history and 
events of the Cold War resulted 1n a demand to control the 
nuclear arms race, and reassess our global view because of 
the failure in Viet Nam. It was such a progression of e-
vents, the result of the Cold War conflict since 1945, and 
demands for a reassessment and modification of American for-
eign policy that challenged the administration of Richard 
Nixon and Henry Kissinger. 
It is understandable why two such figures approached 
the primary question of America's relationship with its first 
rival, and the ideological forces that it assists, in the 
manner that was chosen. Powerful domestic forces were clam-
oring for a scaling down of the Viet Nam imbroglio, and for 
a new foreign policy less concerned with attempting to influ-
ence events such as we had successfully done with the Mar-
shall Plan, NATO, the Berlin blockade, Korea, and the Cuban 
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Missile Crisis. Granted, the domestic pressures that flowed 
from the resentment of a failed foreign adventure were tre-
mendous, enough to bewilder any administration with questions 
of what to do next. Richard Nixon, as politician, could not 
escape such conditions. But, nevertheless, were such pres-
sures valid reason to embark on a new foreign policy that re-
defined our perception of the Cold War and the First Enemy? 
Not only were such modifications of American policy judged 
mandatory to avoid future VietNam's, but also for scholars 
such as Henry Kissinger, they resulted in a rethinking of how 
power can best be exercised in a nuclear and unstable world. 
This rethinking of past policy, and what future course we 
should follow to serve our own national interests without 
tearing asunder alliances with old and needed friends, would 
' be the roots of the debate on detente. But, first and fore-
most, was the question of power, and how it should be used. 
' Detente, as presented and explained by Nixon and Kis-
singer, was a new policy that took into account a number of 
"realities" that America would have to accept if a truly 
viable and consistent foreign policy could be developed and 
sustained. The fragmentation ln the Communist Bloc; the 
emergence of the Soviet Union as a first-class nuclear power 
that had finally closed the gap with the United States ln 
strategic arms, thereby ending American nuclear superiority; 
the increasing attractiveness of Marxism in the Third World 
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nations; and the increasing interdependence between nations 
to solve various problems, were all thought to have exerted 
an influence upon ~vashington .to modify American foreign poli-
cy toward less combative policies, particularly vis-a-vis 
the Soviet Union, and to seek a truce between the two super-
powers. These realities as spelled out by Nixon and Kissing-
er were joined with the view that nations would conduct their 
foreign affairs less subject to ideology, and more in accord 
with the traditional needs of power and self-interest. If 
such interpretations were correct, the opportunities to les-
sen the Cold War conflict, and solve common problems, es-
pecially in the area of nuclear weapons, could be a possible 
avenue through which to re-direct American foreign policy 
toward a plan of action that would convince other states to 
accept some sort of global order and stability, less subject 
to the rigors of the Cold War and ideological stresses. 
By the 1960's it became apparent, Kissinger believed, 
that the traditional modes of foreign policy as practiced by 
the superpowers were no longer relevant. With the United 
States and the Soviet Union on an equal nuclear footing, each 
strong enough to destroy the other, a reappraisal of each 
superpower's world position was necessitated because of the 
equality in force levels, and the dangers attendant to them 
in conflicts involving weaker states. As such, Kissinger 
reasoned, the pursuit of "marginal advantages" over an op-
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ponent was now obsolete. A gain in strategic military 
strength did not necessarily mean that one could capitalize 
on such force to a political advantage. 
Perhaps from the relative safety of his Harvard class-
room Kissinger could play with such theories, and because of 
his scholastic reputation and coming to power under Richard 
Nixon, convince others that his theory was correct. In the 
I 
entire debate on detente, this view of Henry Kissinger's 
would provoke the most controversy, since any such applica-
tion of this view of power would require the active accept-
ance by the soviet Union of such an analysis. The Soviets 
did not accept such a prognosis, and for reasons which Kis-
singer and Nixon would belatedly understand. This was the 
I 
major miscalculation of the entire detente process, for to 
convince the men that inhabit the sources of power in the 
Kremlin that military strength, and the political advantages 
that can be gained from it, are no longer pertinent in to-
day's nuclear world is a fiction that would explode in the 
1973 Middle East war, in Angola, Portugal, Ethiopia, Somalia, 
' and in Viet Nam. In this regard, Kissinger and the detent-
ists share the greatest blame for this terrible miscalcula-
tion of Soviet intentions. Such fantastic appraisals of 
future Soviet behavior in a cooperative setting with the 
United States was totally devoid of sound political judgment. 
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' In appearing before the 1974 Senate Detente Hearings, 
Kissinger said: "It is equally clear that the substance of 
' detente will disappear in an atmosphere of suspicion and 
h . . 2 OS t1.11. ty." Well, did he really expect the Soviets to. act 
otherwise? The domestic structure of the Communist Party in 
the Soviet Union is built on "suspicion and hostility." The 
rulers in Moscow view the world only through their own politi-
cal experiences. As Stalin's lieutenants, they survived be-
cause they were the most adept at doing unto others before 
others could do unto them. Politics to the commissars is 
permanent warfare, where power and survival is the prime con-
sideration in any enterprise. Whether Mr. Brezhnev and com-
' pany believe, as Nixon, Kissinger, and the detentists sur-
mised, that ideology was no longer important and should not 
be an obstacle toward normalizing relations is not the ques-
tion. The Communist Party believes that it is, if for no 
other reason than its own legitimate need to politically gov-
ern. 
In May, 1972, the Basic Principles were signed in Mos-
cow. The question of unilateral advantage of one superpower 
over another was of paramount consideration. Both nations 
' expressed the opinion that detente could only be realized 
when such actions had ceased amidst the foundations of a new 
I 
2. Detente Hearings, p.259. 
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relationship and understanding of the danger of confrontation 
politics in the nuclear age. How have the Soviets conducted 
themselves since then? No different that at any other peri-
od: they continue to spread their power through violence, 
arming almost every left-wing "national liberation group" or 
revolutionary military clique that espouses hatred toward 
the West. And Moscow will continue to arm such groups be-
cause it is in their interest to do so. 
' The debate on detente did not cease with the passing 
' from power of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. Detente is 
still referred to at times, but no longer does it carry the 
hope toward a resolution of difficulties between the two 
superpowers that it once commanded. The international con-
flicts that embroil the superpowers with weaker states, and 
the competition for the oil resources in the Middle East, 
have dashed the idea that "marginal advantages" are no longer 
decisive. Whether in the area of strategic arms limitations, 
or in conflicts globally, the Soviet Union will continue to 
seek additions of power that will enhance Moscow's standing 
in the world community. Stability and peace will be accepta-
ble to Moscow only when the Soviets are capable of dictating 
the nature of that stability and peace. 
The United States and the West now stand at a cross-
road. Do we survive as free and independent people and 
states, proud of our past, and willing to defend our future? 
Or do we succumb to the Soviet threat and fail to oppose 
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power with power because of fears of a cataclysmic disaster? 
Strategic arms limitations is important. The lessening of 
tensions is an ideal worth pursu1ng. But at what price? 
Not until the Soviet Union exhibits the temperament of a na-
tion concerned with repudiating a violent past, and wishing 
to coexist as a responsible member of the global community, 
' 
will a true detente show the possibilities of coming to frui-
tion. That day seems remote. 
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